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The philosophers' reluctance to explicate the concept 
of 'thinking' has resulted not only in paucity of material 
but also in a continuous futile effort by the empirical 
psychologists to come to an understanding of 'thinking'. 
Philosophers have often remarked that 'thinking' is sui 
generis. Our ordinary language shows no clear distinction 
between 'thought' and 'thinking'. The earlier being the 
result of the activity and the latter the activity itself. 
This shows that 'thinking' has not yet stepped out of its 
philosophical cradle. 
This thesis attempts to find a unitary stand in the 
scattered ideas of Ryle on the subject of 'thinking'. Ryle 
could not till the end find an amicable solution. He remained 
thoroughly dissatisfied with his analysis of thinking. This 
thesis is also an attempt to locate the basic weakness in the 
Rylean approach which hindered Kyle's project of coming to 
terms with the concept of 'thinking'. 
The Concept of Mind visualized an official theory, 
which it claimed was accepted as a doctrine, that suggests 
the mind to be outside the causal system of bodies. The mind 
was supposed to be private, inaccessible and a kind of 
ghostly Robinson Crusoe. Ryle claimed that the official 
theory has made a category - howler of identifying hypothe-
tical (dispositional /neither observable nor unobservable) 
statements with occult operations. Ryle argued against the 
theory of the 'occult' by suggesting that a dispositional 
description would be exhaustive. 
There is a prevailing duality in the framework of The 
Concept of Mind where 'mental event' is neither denied nor 
acknowledged and at the same time 'mental distinctness' is 
maintained. The Concept of Mind maintains that the meaning of 
expressions referring to the 'mental' and 'neuro-physiologi-
cal co-ordinates' is different. This duality comes out most 
strongly in dealing with 'thinking'. As a result Ryle founds 
himself forced into explicating 'thinking' by drawing 
analogies with didactic talk, teacher-pupil relationship and 
refereeing. The analogy is that thinking, in the present-
continuous, is like 'looking over the shoulder' which goes 
against the entire project and purpose of The Concept of 
Mind. 
Soon afterwards Ryle wrote six papers on 'thinking' 
setting himself the task of rectifying what he considered to 
be a perfunctory treatment of 'thinking' in The Concept of 
Mind. He initially investigated the 'logical illegitimacy' of 
'thinking' hoping to isolate thinking and thereby rid the 
concept of 'thinking' of its obvious identifications and 
duality. He argues that there are no episodes, vehicles, 
processes, apparatii, etc. which are necessary and 
sufficient. His main thrust is that thinking is not a process 
and therefore does not necessarily have a 'result'. This rids 
'thinking' of its epistemic connotations but more importantly 
removes the demand that each instance of 'thinking' be 
accounted for in terms of overt behaviour, as was required by 
The Concept of Mind. Ryle does not at any place deny mental, 
psychological or, more particularly, thinking events. The 
argument in favour of logical illegitimacy of identification 
of essential ingredients with 'thinking' shows an interplay 
between 'activity', which Ryle would like to call thinking, 
and 'event', which Ryle required to demolish the 
process-view. 
Ryle's efforts in the papers on thinking are 
characterized by his attempt at a positive account of 
thinking which would save him the embarrassment of being 
forced to admit a duality, like at the end of The Concept of 
Mind. Ryle argues that thinking, like working, is a 
polymorphous concept. The polymorphy of thinking, for Ryle 
does not even allow the talk of family-likeness. But then it 
seems odd to claim that a particular instance of thinking is 
an instance of thinking. Ryle chose the criterial approach to 
explicate thinking but fails to provide any criteria. The 
reason being that Ryle cites examples of thinking which are 
of both 'occurrence' and 'bringing about' of thought. He 
wanted tO/ by talking of polymorphy, give an activity account 
of thinking. But his arguments show that often he treats 
thinking as an event. The ambiguity which arises from this 
does not allow Ryle to draw up any criteria for thinking. It 
seems that Ryle treats mental act both as 'bringing about' 
and 'occurrence'. 
This forced Ryle ultimately to withdraw his 
dispositional theory in favour of a non-dispositional account 
of thinking. He labelled thinking metaphorically an 
'adverbial verb', like hurrying. He argued that thinking is 
not an activity but the manner of 'doing'. The inadequacy of 
Ryle's theory of action results in an inability to find an 
activity for 1^ Penseur> which thought-adverbs could qualify, 
and Ryle admits this failure. It is the possibility of 
explicability in full blooded overt behavioural terms which 
tempted Ryle to adopt the metaphor of 'adverb'. But this 
account is in contrast to his earlier 'negative task', where 
it was logically illegitimate to demand any overt behaviour 
because of lack of necessity of result. The 'adverbial 
account' is an attempt to make the most of the result aspect 
which would be the full blooded overt behaviour. Ryle's 
failure shows that a change of locution, that is treating of 
thinking as an adverb rather than verb, is of no real 
advantage in fact it leads to a blind alley. 
It should then be concluded that Ryle failed in his 
attempts and found the concept of thinking to be 
recalcitrant to any treatment. However, Ryle's failure is due 
to three reasons: 
(a) the confusion in his theory of action; 
(b) not being able to account for any kind of second-
order monitoring; 
and (c) his overriding obsession with the project of 
demolishing the Cartesian framework. 
He might have achieved different results had he had 
concentrated on the problem at hand. Even in his 'adverbial 
account' he seeks the overtness which is required in order to 
persuade one to abandon the Cartesian or official theory. The 
failure shows the need to describe thinking in terms of 
'events', which might have been 'brought about'. It also 
shows the inadequacy of any treatment of thinking in purely 
overt terms. Thirdly, it shows a great need for further 
study. Lastly, it shows that thinking cannot be taken simply 
to be an easily remedial linguistic lacuna. 
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PREFACE 
Philosophers have had a sardonic rendezuous with the 
concept of thinking. The concept of thinking has always been 
misappropriated as a part of their larger project. This 
cursory effort by the philosophers have turned 'thinking' 
into a conceptual-dipthong. The logical pangs of the 
diocesian guilt, the inability to manage the house of 
concepts, was felt deeply by Ryle after the completion of his 
major book The Concept of Mind and he declared his treatment 
of the concept of thinking in that work as perfunctory. 
This realization forced Ryle into a reconsideration of 
'thinking' which otherwise threatened to mitigate his entire 
project. Ryle grappled with the problem for a near quarter of 
a century but to no avail. He was the first philosopher to 
attempt an isolatory analysis of the concept. As an initial 
step Ryle tried to divorce 'thinking' from its customary 
partner-concepts. He then proceeded two successive positive 
accounts of 'thinking', abandoning the earlier, which was 
dispositional in keeping with the framework of The Concept of 
Mind, in favour of the later, which was non-dispositional. 
Ryle's attempts at an analysis of 'thinking' are 
interesting primarily because it is a recognition of a 
mistake which had become a convention. Secondly, since it is 
a concerted effort which failed it would warn against the 
pitfalls present in 'thinking'. Thirdly, a critical 
11 
exposition would not only reveal the undercurrents but would 
also show the need and importance of further studies. 
In this thesis I have attempted/ through a study of 
Ryle/ to place 'thinking' in its probable proper perspective. 
I have also attempted a critical but constructive 
interpretation of the Rylean thesis, at length, a task which 
has so far not been done, to show its consistency and value. 
Further, I have tried to locate the basic reason why Ryle 
could not find a satisfactory explication of 'thinking'. 
In the foot-note of this thesis I have simply given the 
name of the author and the book or article together with the 
page number of the reference. Any further details required 
will be found in the bibliography. 
I am deeply indebted to Prof. S. Waheed Akhtar who has 
guided me in this research work ever since Prof. Jamal Khwaja 
retired in 1987. The work could not have been completed but 
for Prof. S. Waheed Akhtar's guidance, constructive 
suggestions, patient working through-out the thesis, 
encouragements and at times rebukes. 
I must also mention my gratitude to Mr. Suhail Ahmad 
(Micro Services Centre) who has meticulously made my 
illegible scribblings legible. 
July 1990 (Tariq Islam) 
Introduction 
The concept of thinking, historically speaking, reveals 
little which is of consequence. It is surprising to find that 
what has been taken to be the distinguishing feature of man 
has been given such little space and labour. If we were to 
adopt the criterion that the amount of literature to be 
found, in philosophical -texts, on a particular theme, is 
reciprocal to the importance of that theme in man's life, we 
would be forced to conclude that man is primarily concerned 
with seeing, learning, and so on; it could hardly be asserted 
that any of his time is spent on thinking. Whereas anybody 
would acknowledge, as Thomson does, that no psychology can be 
complete without some attempt to describe and explain what a 
man does when he is described as thinking.^ Traditionally 
philosophy has overemphasized the role of the cognitive and 
mitigated the independent status of other human activities. 
In everyday life we find that thinking serves purposes other 
than that of cognition. The blame rests on the philosophers 
as Thomson has aptly accused: "Those who have traditionally 
given descriptions of what a man does who thinks have been 
the philosophers. They have chiefly relied on their own 
personal experience as their data, and have usually 
undertaken the inquiry as part of a larger enterprise - that 
of understanding the world and Man's Knowledge of it".^ The 
1. Thomson, R. : The Psychology of Thinking, p.11. 
2. Ibid., p.18. 
philosophers have failed to be concerned directly with the 
concept of thinking. 
The 'dipthongian mess* created by an inadequate effort 
of philosophers have led to the overlooking of the 
distinction between 'thinking' and 'thought'. A distinction 
which is primary and requires to be clearly stated before 
attempting a theoretical framework for the concept of 
thinking. The common-sense usage of the terms as inter-
changeable/ at times, reflects the deep rooted confusion. By 
'thinking' we mean the process, the mechanism, the activity, 
or whatever one may call it, which results or terminates in 
'thought'. 'Thought' is the subject matter or the object of 
thinking, be it thinking something out, about, or of. 
'Thought' also sometimes works as the past tense of the 
'psychological process of thinking'. 'Thinking' on the other 
hand is also sometimes used to suggest current beliefs, 
opinions, etc. But in this thesis we are not concerned with 
'thought' which is the product of the 'psychological process 
of thinking'. We are here concerned with the psychological 
mechanism or process which 'brings about thought'. 
The fact that the distinction between 'thinking' and 
'thought' is not so clearly recognized suggests that the 
concept of thinking has not as yet crept out of its 
'philosophical cradle'. For example, Frege had argued that 
thoughts are real, for thought when grasped by the act of 
thinking produces its effect on the mental world which 
induces us to bring about changes in the physical world.^ 
Frege had confused the distinction, of which we are talking 
about, as Currie points out: "But Frege failed to draw a 
distinction here which in other circumstances he insisted 
upon most forcibly, that between questions about the 
objective content of thinking - what does thinking represent? 
and questions about the thinking itself - what does the 
event of thinking consist of ?"2 Wittgenstein had aptly 
noticed: "A proposition, and hence in another sense a 
thought, can be the 'expression' of belief, hope, 
expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking (A grammati-
cal remark). The concepts of believing, expecting, hoping are 
less distantly related to one another than they are to the 
concept of thinking".^ 
Thinking, as is commonly accepted, is a process. The 
problem, especially philosophically, arises when a 
description of this process, called thinking, is attempted. 
Thinking is an activity which one should be able to report in 
the present continuous. But as Hartnack points out it seems 
1. Frege, G.: The Thought. 
2. Currie, G.: Frege on Thoughts, p.245. 
3. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations, p.152 
impossible to identify it with any conceivable process.^ 
Historically, philosophers, especially those who can be 
bracketed as opponents of 'mental act theories', have 
ventured to deny that thinking is a process.2 History has 
turned an ugly face towards the concept of thinking as 
Moulton warns: "It would come as no surprise to philosophers 
to read that a thought is a mysterious phenomena or the 
occurring of a thought a mysterious event. These have always 
been puzzling aspects of experience. But it is surprising to 
read that thinking events such as the occurring of thoughts 
and making of judgements are mysterious because they cannot 
in principle be correlated with ordinary occurrences in the 
world. Such a thesis, if true, would upset all mind body 
theories which presuppose the possibility of a precise 
correlation of mental and physical events".-^ The attitude 
that thinking is a mystery is not so uncommon, for example, 
Thalberg writes: "If you insist that you are furnishing a 
positive account of the mental, I would ask what sort of 
private scrutiny you are alluding to 'Do you feel your aches 
the way you feel the keys in your back pocket- with your 
fingertips? You surely don't hear, smell, taste or see your 
1. Hartnack, J.: On Thinking, p.543. 
2. Ewingr A.C.: Mental Acts, p.78. 
3. Moulton, D.L.: Thinking and Time, p.60. 
aches! The supposedly incorporeal episodes of thinking, 
planning or wishing are even more of a mystery".^ It may be 
that the 'incorporeality' is what is guilty of undermining 
the concept of thinking. The division, between the corporeal 
and incorporeal, has come down most strongly from 
Descartes— the dualism which gives vent to peculiar episodes 
which are "incorporeal" but "describable". We find ourselves 
with a concept which eludes any description and any attempt 
to describe it simply deepens the mystery. 
Descartes took thought to mean 'any sort of mental 
happening'. The acceptance of the Cartesian view would 
tantamount to admitting that all of us are thinking all the 
time throughout our existence, Descartes' view on thinking 
repulsed Locke: "Thus, me thinks, every drowsy nod shakes 
this doctrine, who teach that, the soul is always thinking".2 
Following Locke slight modifications are made, for example, 
Thomson remarks: "The verb 'to think' has such a wide 
application that, in its most general use, we never stop 
thinking throughout our waking moments and even indulge in 
snatches of thought in our sleep".^ In order to outline what 
thinking is we will need to rid ourselves of the Cartesian 
1. Thalberg, I. : Immateriality, p.108. 
2. Locke, J.: Essays Concerning Human Nature, Bk.II, Ch.I, 
p. 13. 
3. Thomson, R.: The Psychology of Thinking, p.13. 
generalization. Wittgenstein asks: "Well, what does one 
include in 'thinking'? What has one learnt to use this word 
for ? - If I say I have thought - need I always be right ? 
What kind of mistake is there room for here ? Are there 
circumstances in which one would ask: "Was what I was doing 
then really thinking, am I not making a mistake?" Suppose 
someone takes a measurement in the middle of a train of 
thought: has he interrupted the thought if he says nothing to 
himself during the measuring?"-^ According to Descartes the 
•Cogito' is a certainty, self-evident and above all 
incorrigible. But as Wittgenstein points out there is a 
possibility of error in asserting . 'I am thinking'. Abraham 
remarks that the act of thinking involved in making an 
assertion is not what I am reporting in making the 
assertion.2 
The 'Cartesian certainty', although assumed, verges on 
suggesting that a claim to the effect that 'I am not 
thinking' is self-contradictory. The 'certainty' created a 
hard cocoon around the concept of thinking. Ginnane has aptly 
put the point: "Since Descartes, however, philosophers have 
tended to lump together all sorts of heterogeneous mental 
1. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations, p.106, 
2. Abraham, W.E.: Disentangling the Cogito, p.89. 
items ranging from thoughts to images, pains, feelings, 
sensations, memories and emotions. The violent mixture has 
produced nothing but philosophical dyspepsia".^ The 
'dyspepsia' has led to, what Fodor calls, a scandal: "It was 
a scandal of mid-century Anglo-American philosophy of mind 
that though it worried a lot about the nature of mental 
states (like the attitudes) it quite generally didn't worry 
much about the nature of mental process (like thinking).2 
Fodor qualifies himself: "But precisely because the 
mechanisms of mental causation were assumed to be 
associationistic (and the conditions for association to 
involve pre-eminently spatio-temporal propinquity), the 
Eir.piricist had no good way of connecting the contents of a 
thought with the effects of entertaining it. They, therefore, 
never got close to a plausible theory of thinking, and 
neither did the associationistic psychology which followed in 
their footsteps".3 He further adds: "When, therefore, 
Rationalist critics (including, notably, Kant) pointed out 
that thought - like argument - involves judging and 
inferring, the cat was out of the bag. Associationism was 
the best available form of Realism about the attitudes, and 
1. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts, p.389. 
2. Fodor, J.A.: Fodor's Guide to Mental Representations, 
p.91. 
3. Ibid. 
associationism failed to produce a credible mechanism for 
thinking. Which is to say that it failed to produce a 
credible theory of attitudes. No wonder everybody gave up and 
turned into a behaviourist" .•'• Fodor's critical history of 
thinking, as we would like to call it, J.eads him to certain 
conclusions: "In the paradigm mental process - viz. thinking, 
thoughts give rise to one another and eventuate in the 
fixation of belief".2 But it is difficult to accept the 
argument, for it is not as innocent as it appears. The 
thinking process is likened to a movement of thought, the 
content and the activity are identified, but this is a 
mistake which we have already noted. But that thinking is a 
'paradigm mental process' lays the necessary emphasis on the 
need for an adequate description. 
Wittgenstein rejected the entire Cartesian thesis: 
"Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and 
sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach 
from speaking.... But how "not an incorporeal"? Am I 
acquainted with incorporeal processes, then, only thinking is 
not one of them ? No; I called the expression 'an incorporeal 
process' to my aid in my embarrassment when I was trying to 
explain the meaning of the word 'thinking' in a primitive 
1. Ibid, p.92. 
2. Ibid., p.78. 
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way."l 
"One might say, "thinking is an incorporeal process", 
however, if one were using this to distinguish the grammar of 
the word "think" from that of, say, the word "eat".2 if, as 
Wittgenstein points out, the use of 'incorporeal' simply is a 
grammatical distinction then there is a great need to 
describe thinking. The grammatical distinction was made to 
blunt the edges of skepticism. Thalberg points out; "The 
question which Sussman, and especially the others, neglect is 
not so much what might provoke researchers to decide that 
mental events are incorporeal. There is a logically prior 
question; What would our savants be deciding is the case? In 
other words; what would it be like if episodes or states of 
pain and thinking were non-physical? Everyone gives the 
impression of understanding clearly enough what 'non-
physical' and its cognates mean".^ But the question still 
remains, even if we grant the grammatical nature of 
'incorporeal', whether thinking is a process of some kind. A 
process is something which produces results but this is not 
always the case with thinking: "It is worth remembering in 
this connection that we may sometimes arrive at a solution of 
a problem without any mediating conscious thought whereas at 
1. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigation, p.109. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Thalberg, I. : Immateriality, p.106. 
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other times the solution to a simpler problem eludes us even 
after laborious thinking".^ 
The stipulated definitions are many and just as varied. 
It is sometimes argued that it is a process, sometimes that 
it is episodic, and so on. Sometimes we are told that 
thinking is manipulating of words, images or symbols. 
Sometimes we are told that thinking has a medium, vehicle or 
apparatus. Thinking is sometimes proposed as judging, 
inferring, prepositional or logical procedures. There seems 
to be nothing in common among various proposals, they are in 
dire contrast to each other. It appears with most of the 
writers as if they have proposed a definition of thinking 
primarily to avoid dealing with it and secondarily to define 
it in a fashion which would be useful to theories about 
something else. Thomson remarks: "Thinking, as it happens, is 
more like struggling, striving or searching for something 
than it is like talking or reading. Words do play that part 
but they are rarely the only feature of thought. This 
observation is supported by the experiments of Wurzburg 
psychologists... who showed that intelligent adaptive 
1. Green, R.H.: Central State Materialism and Conciousness, 
p.m. 
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responses can occur in problem-solving situations without the 
use of either words or images of any kind".l This approach to 
the question of thinking has a strong epistemic shell. In 
response Thomson adds: "Again when we report or describe our 
thinking to other people we do not merely report unspoken 
words and sentences".2 Thomson realized that there is a 
tendency towards an extreme position, the possibility of pure 
and naked thought, and thus he takes precautions. The dilemma 
forces itself as soon as an attempt is made to define 
thinking. The Behaviouristjhad to find recluse in Watson's 
reducing of thinking to inhibited speech located in minute 
and unobservable, to the naked eye, movements of the larynx 
and other physiological mechanisms involved in speaking. But 
no justification is provided for the identification of 
thinking with saying. 
Wittgenstein had commented in Zettel that some segments 
of our language, especially the psychological vocabulary, 
present great barriers to the achievements of a proper 
surview.3 I think that it is not segments of language but 
particular terms. I think that 'thinking' as a term proves to 
be recalcitrant, for it does not allow a proper surview of 
1. Thomsom, R.: The Psychology of Thinking, p.165. 
2. Ibid., p..164. 
3. Wittgenstein, L.: Zettel, p.113. 
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psychology, being the paradigm psychological process. 
The responses to the concept of thinking are 
diametrically opposed. Titchner, for example, could not 
believe that anyone could think without images. Whereas, 
Watson denied that any kind of imagery is even possible. The 
responses are sometimes desperate, Hamlyn says: "Thinking is, 
after all, an activity or a form of behaviour, and in all 
behaviour what we do at any moment has this connexion with 
what we do at the next - that it is we who do it, and it is 
not something that happens to us".l But then, if Hamlyn is 
right, there is no possibility of accommodating the 
'occurrence of thought', a phenomena which cannot be denied. 
It is common place that 'thoughts' dawn on us. We often have 
the thought come to us that there is an appointment to meet. 
The desperation is more bluntly present in Price: "Often it 
will not come when we summon it. It obtrudes itself on us 
when we do not want it, changes when we would like it to 
'stay put', vanishes when we try and retain it, stays when we 
try to get rid of it".2 
Wittgenstein poses the problem differently: "In order 
to get clear about the meaning of the word 'think' we watch 
ourselves when we think; what we observe will be what the 
word means ! But this concept is not used like this. (It 
1. Hamlyn, D.W.; Stream of Thought, p.81. 
2. Price, H.H.: Image Thinking, p.148. 
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would be as if without knowing how to play chess, I were to 
try and make out what the word 'mate' meant by close 
observation of the last move of some game of chess)".^ 
I find that thinking has been a neglected topic and 
this view is confirmed by the paucity of literature on it. 
Secondly, I find that the concept of thinking has entered a 
philosophical knot, where one end of the lace is pulled by 
the theory of meaning and the other by the theory of action. 
Ryle was the first philosopher to have taken up thinking 
with comprehensiveness and intention of coming to terms with 
it. The concept of thinking is the central concept in the 
Cartesian framework which Ryle had tried to demolish in The 
Concept of Mind. Ryle's analysis is also interesting because 
it reflects a conscious realization of a neglect and 
acknowledgement of this neglect. After The Concept of Mind 
Ryle devoted twenty-five years in order that thinking should 
yield itself to some kind of treatment. He eventually 
attempted a non-dispositional analysis of the concept, 
but found that this did not help either. Ryle's attempt at an 
analysis of thinking is a story of a philosophical struggle. 
Ryle, in the Introduction to the second volume of his 
Collected Papers, wrote: "Also, like plenty of other people. 
1. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations, p.104. 
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I deplored the perfunctoriness with which The Concept of Mind 
had dealt with the Mind qua peni^ v^e. But I have latterly been 
concentrating heavily on this particular theme for the simple 
reason that it has turned out to be at once a still 
intractable and a progressively ramifying maze".^ Ryle felt 
deeply that he did not give sufficient space to the problem 
in The Concept of Mind and did not realize the importance of 
the theme. He took up the concept and wrote six articles but 
was never fully satisfied with his treatment. 
The Concept of Mind is transitory as Hampshire points 
out, it is a thesis that : "Not two worlds, but one world; 
not a ghost, but a Body; (people are not) occult, but 
obvious".2 The Concept of Mind nevertheless had a great 
influence. It was dubbed to be the best book on general 
philosophy in the last twenty-five years. But Hampshire's 
view was accepted by Ryle as he himself wrote: "Only a short 
confrontation with the theme suffices to make it clear that 
and why no account of thinking of a Behaviourist Coloration 
will do, and also why no account of Cartesian Coloration will 
do either".3 Ryle was the first philosopher to feel the full 
impact of 'thinking'. In The Concept of Mind the excorcism 
is of the Cartesian framework but in the articles the 
1. Ryle, G.: Collet^ ted Papers, Vol. II, p.viii. 
2. Hampshire, S.: The back cover of the Peregrine edition 
of 'The Concept of Mind'. 
3. Ryle, G.: Collected ' ers, Vol.11, p.viii. 
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behaviourist misconceptions are also recantated, 
Ryle's work on 'thinking' are not voluminous, but, 
being a struggle, are scattered. The ideas, portrayed, are, 
no doubt, in the offing and one has to rummage through the 
papers to find a unifying strand. A casual reader may even 
get the impression of an incompatibility between the various 
arguments. But as I have suggested it is a perpetual struggle 
- abandoning and returning again. 
The other contributive factor, for the scatteredness in 
the articles, is that Ryle writes in epigrams. The main 
purpose of the epigramatic style is to shatter the 
conventional trains of thought. He writes in order to rid 
philosophy of its conventional dogma - Ryle is a disguised 
iconoclast. A large part of the articles is thus devoted to 
the removing of falsely held assumptions. 
This thesis would be an attempt at picking out a 
unifying strand in the writings of Ryle on thinking. By doing 
so we will get a clearer picture of Ryle's struggle, mistakes 
and the actual thesis he wants to present. The work will 
first of all try and develop the main themes of The Concept 
of Mind, which will help in locating the disparity that 
developed, when Ryle dealt with thinking in that work. 
Secondly, there will be a survey to assess what Ryle thinks 
is not to be included in 'thinking' and thereby work out what 
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Ryle does not deny thinking to be. This will enable us a 
unifying strand which will be then located in his two 
subsequent positive accounts of thinking, viz. the 
'polymorphous' and 'adverbial'. 
But before embarking on this it would prove to be 
useful to review the main tenets about thinking before Ryle. 
It is important to recapture history if we are to deal with 
Ryle. There could be many reasons but two main reasons compel 
such a biginning. First of all, it has been said of Ryle that 
his style of doing philosophy is arguing against the 
traditionally held beliefs and conceptions. Secondly, it is 
often remarked of Ryle that he writes with 'Aristotelian 
pregnancy'. Hampshire writes: "... almost every paragraph 
(that Ryle writes) contains observations which require, and 
will certainly be given, thousands of words of discussion".-^ 
It would thus make an analysis of Rylean thesis easier, if we 
clearly understand how 'thinking' has been viewed 
by his predecessors. It will also help us to avoid or 
bypass the somewhat unwarranted criticism by Sibley that Ryle 
seems or claims to be arguing against an activity view but is 
most of the time arguing against an essential ingredient view 
of thinking. The view that there are essential ingredients 
which are the criteria for thinking - the distinguishing 
1. Hampshire, S.: The back cover of the Peregtine edition of 
'The Concept of Mind'. 
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marks. Sibley is suggesting that Ryle's thesis amounts to 
saying that there are no distinguishing marks or features of 
thinking. Historically it seems that almost every school has 
defined thinking as an activity, be that implicitly or 
explicitly. It has been the basic assumption or the starting 
point of all the theorie's on thinking. The difference between 
the various schools lies in the 'form', the activity is 
supposed to possess, the ingredient or ingredients, that 
characterize the activity. 
Philosophy has yielded the dictum that man is rational. 
Rationality is the outcome of that extra activity of thinking 
endowed to man which gives man the superiority necessary to 
distinguish him from other animals. Thinking is therefore, 
the determining force. Traditionally, rationality is - (a) 
that faculty which releases knowledge, it is a faculty which 
has a cognitive end; (b) the faculty which decides what to do 
and what not to do; it is a faculty with a conative end. The 
activity of the faculty, viz., thinking, would yield cogni-
tion or conation and the activity is thinking. Aristotle 
classified the two as contemplation and deliberation or 
theoretical and practical reasonings, respectively. All 
reasonings, activity of the mind, thinking or whatever one 
may like to call it is, to be more precise, thinking 
something out or making a decision. Teleological elements 
are found in the Aristotelian approach. Price, too, holds 
some such view: "But I believe there is another difficulty 
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too. The process, the going-on, is a teleological process. 
Biological rather than mechanical/ analysis are appropriate 
to it".l It is not important whether the analysis be 
biological or mechanical at this stage. The emphasis on 
teleology would displace 'idle reverie', 'day dreaming', 
doodling which are otherwise, conveniently, labelled as 
thinking. Hamlyn rightly points out: "Likewise when as 
philosophers or psychologists we consider thinking, we may be 
inclined to ask ourselves what goes on when we think, and 
perhaps produce accounts of contents of thought and what 
determines its direction. This, at any rate, has been common 
enough in the past. I think, however, that such a procedure 
is liable to generate puzzles of a sort which might be called 
'metaphysical' (in the bad sense of that term)".^ 
The basic assumption,in one form or another, histori-
cally speaking, is that thinking is done in foro interne; 
recommended by Descartes. Murdoch writes: "I shall assume, 
as we all do when we are not philosophizing, that thinking is 
a private activity which goes on in our heads, that it is a 
content of consciousness."^ This view has been held by almost 
1. Price, H.H.: Thinking and Language, p.136, 
2. Hamlyn, D.W.: Stream of Thought, p.62. 
3. Murdoch, I? Thinking and Language, p. 25 
all the philosophers since Plato. We are not suggesting that 
the schools have no disagreements. On the contrary, the 
differences have been sharp but they have been over what the 
'covert activity* is, or, in other words, over the features 
the activity is supposed to possess. Apart form these differ-
eces, except the behaviourists, all schools have taken 
'covert activity' for granted. 
Plato held that thinking is the soul conversing with 
itself. Thinking is the name given to the covert dialogue 
that the soul has with itself. The dialogue is an activity, 
of the spirit, of inspecting or recollecting 'forms', and 
discerning their nature and interrelations. Lloyd has 
expressed such a Platonic view: "Thinking, as we ordinarily 
conceive it, is really being wise after the event".^ The 
event takes place in the space we are calling in foro 
interne; " 'Thinking' and 'inward speech' - I do not say 'to 
meself - are different concepts)".2 The question of internal 
dialogue is not so old to be redundant, for example. Smith 
says: "For language is used not only in inter-personal 
communication but also in thinking, in talking to onself and 
1. Lloyd, A.C.: Thinking and Language, p.35. 
2. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations, p.211 
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in communicating with one's later self".^ 
Wittgenstein's challenge to Socratic definiteness has 
also reflected itself on thinking, he asks: "Can one think 
without speaking?' - And what is thinking? - Well, don't you 
ever think ? Can't you observe yourself and see what is going 
on ? It should be quite simple. You do not have to wait for 
it as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make your 
observation in a hurry".^ The question has to be answered 
like Hunter does: "Self examination is of no use to us 
here.When we list what we can notice about ourselves when we 
think, we find nothing that we are happy to call the 
thinking".3 Price, too, circumscribes to such a view: "I have 
now suggested two reasons why the items which a particular 
piece of thinking consists of are so difficult to describe. 
One is that thinking is a process, going on, and its phases 
succeed each other so rapidly that they do not stay to be 
looked at".^ The other reason, according to Price, is that 
1. Smith, P.: Solitary Speakers, p.591. 
2. Wittgenstein, L.:Philosophical Investigations, p.106, 
3. Hunter, J.F.M.: Wittgenstein and Materialism, p.518. 
4. Price, H.H.: Thinking and Language, p.335. 
22 
the process is beyond the threshold of consciousness.^ But 
covert activity 'it'nevertheless is. Price is making thinking 
not only not accessible to the other but sometimes, 
especially the most important parts, not even accessible to 
onself. 
Descartes has argued that mind, as a whole, is covert 
and private. The mind, epistemologically, is limited to the 
person or subject, who is the mind and who alone has access 
to it, or else it is accessible to God, whose substance the 
mind possesses. The workings of the mind, the activities 
called thinking, are private and inaccessible to another. 
Descartes left us with solipsism, which flourished in all 
quarters till the maturing of Wittgenstenian arguments. 
Brentano, the first phenomenologist, somewhat removed 
from the traditional dichotomies, also adhered to the 'covert 
activity' view, though his terminology was different. He 
argued that thinking was 'intensional' as opposed to 'exten-
sional'. Thinking, being intensional, was not a public 
phenomenon, but a covert activity, the access to which was 
subjective. Brentano's contribution as a phenomenologist was 
the putting forward of the thesis that thought was always 
'thought of something'. The thought is always directed 
towards an 'object', which is the subject of the proposition. 
1. Ibid., p.336. 
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We do not want to repeat the argument with different 
examples. The replicas would not serve our purpose, which 
was to establish that the in foro interno activity view is 
common among almost all the schools. The differences arise as 
to what features the act of thinking have or what essential 
features does the act possess. The definition of the act of 
thinking is in question. 
The assumption of the traditional schools raises two 
lines of questioning. The first, is whether the in foro 
interno could be consistently maintained. We feel that a 
sufficient amount of work has been done on this. The second, 
with which we are more concerned here, is whether we can call 
thinking an 'activity'or 'action'. The first hampers on the 
mind-body problem, especially the problem of other minds, 
whereas the second is prior to the mind-body problem. The 
'activity question' is more basic because an answer to this 
would determine the philosophy of mind. Let us say, if we 
decide that thinking is an activity, that is an activity of 
the mind (Cartesian or whatever) then only will it be re-
quired that a consistent account of translation of this 
mental acts to corporeal acts be given. The fundamental 
question 'What does the activity (called thinking) consist 
of? is our main concern. But for that, we will require to 
see whether thinking is an activity or not. The in foro 
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interno assumption is the main feature given to the activity 
and is also the common view of the various schools, except, 
of course, the Behaviourist. We can divide up the schools 
into four major groups, to give a full account of the 
intricacies which have ' followed in defining the act of 
thinking. 
The first, defines the activity of thinking to consist 
in "bringing up of concepts or ideas before the mind". Either 
the ideas or the concepts occur in the 'private space' of the 
mind. Or are applicable to words, which express them, by the 
virtue of God's grace. Descartes, and later Leibnitz, 
maintained that concepts and ideas are a-priori, they are 
present prior to the empirical. Locke, Kant, etc. argued that 
ideas and concepts are brought up before the mind by 
abstraction from sense-experience, but done internally and 
privately.The concepts and ideas show the common features of 
sense-experience and the features are then abstracted. 
The second, defines thinking as the sequence of 
episodes involving images, which have movement between 
themselves; a sequential movement from one image to another. 
The sequence of the movement is governed by, what is termed, 
'the habits of the mind', which later came to be called the 
'laws of inference'. It is these laws of inferences which 
dictate the movement involved in the activity of thinking. 
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Humean4>hilosophy conceives 'thinking' as involving a 
cause. The cause is a stimulus from the world of sense 
experience, or the sense data, and the movement from one 
image to another is the effect conjured up by the habits of 
the mind. The view is also shared by Berkeley, who maintained 
that the ideas originated by the mind were the only real 
things. The difference between the two British philosophers 
lies in the latter's denial of the 'world of nature' as an 
independent source of knowledge, or being the cause of ideas 
in the mind. Berkeley only recognised the 'world of spirit', 
so to speak, and therefore was crippled by the inability to 
recognize the chain of cause and effect, which was to be 
introduced by Hume. 
The third view, held by many, defines thinking as a 
dialogue of the soul with itself, in the head, sotto voce, 
involving verbal images or words. The view is held most 
prominently by Hobbes. For Hobbes the "complete thought" is 
the sentence uttered, which has been dialogued about, in 
one's head. Hobbes takes thinking to be that activity of the 
mind which he calls 'addition' or 'substraction', taken in 
the arithmetical sense. He writes "...., in what matter 
soever there is place for addition and substraction, there is 
also place for reason; and where these have no place, there 
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reason has nothing at all to do".^ The addition or 
substraction could be of names, propositions, or whatever 
depending on and forming levels of thinking. Lloyd has taken 
up levels of thinking as a tool of analysis. "But the 
impression I must correct is that they are three discreet 
stages, of which (owing to their different character) only 
the middle one is to be identified with thought. We can say 
that this has enough public symbolism in it for it to be 
reasonable, according to common practice, to call it 
"thinking", while that has so much that it is more reasonable 
to call it "talking to oneself".^ 
The 'Analogy School' is an affG.iation to Hobbesian 
maxims. They define the activity of thinking as being, at 
least, 'formally analogous' to speech. The Analogy School, 
whose main proponents are Geach and Sellars, does not assert 
an inner speech, but claims that thinking, which is covert is 
analogous to overt speech. The Analogy school asserts that 
the difference between overt speech and the activity of 
thinking is the 'empirical features', but the principles 
governing the two are the same, and hence 'formally 
analogous'. As Alston has remarked the analogy is supposed to 
1. Hobbes: Levithian, p.102. 
2. Lloyd, A.C.: Thinking and Language, p.37, 
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be purely 'formal' or 'functional'.^ Alston takes up the 
comment of Aune who portrays The Analogy School as arguing 
that the utility of interpreting the concept of silent 
thought as analogous to saying is that by doing so silent 
thought, which is acknowledged, can be understood as 
thoroughly inter-subjective even though it applies to 
publicly unobservable episodes.2 Aune criticizes the Analogy 
School for presenting a circular argument. He says that the 
Analogy School in elucidating the notion of silent thinking 
by reference to overt speech tacitly assumes that the latter 
could be adequately characterized without reference to silent 
mental activities.-^ 
We have dealt briefly with the main variations offthe 
concept of thinking except the 'Behaviourist' and the 
'Materialist'. The Behaviourist School differs markedly from 
the above mentioned theses. 'Thinking' was for the first 
time released from its bondage of in foro interne 
conception. Behaviourists analysed thinking in terms of overt 
behaviours. The phrases such as 'he is behaving unthinkingly' 
or 'he did X wittingly' were taken to be literal expressions 
1. Alston, W.P.: Aune on Thought and Language, p.170. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid, p.171. 
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of States of affairs. The main dictum, which came out of 
their investigation, was that thinking is 'overt speech*. 
The main contribution of the Behaviourists was the 
removal of the 'occult', so deeply imbedded in philosophy. 
But there is an over-emphasis, which always results from 
negligence or lack of consideration of other factors. The 
behaviourists turned thinking into a publicly assertainable 
activity; privacy was proclaimed to be a fable. But as 
Hartnack points out, the project falls short of its aims: 
"The view that thinking is behaviour (e.g. speech) is, if not 
absolutely fallicious, at least ambigous, insufficient and 
misleading".1 The identification is with 'speech act', but 
speech act does not entail thinking for a parrot could go 
through the physical movements and be phonetically correct 
but it could hardly be said to be thinking. The 
identification could also be with the 'act', a means to 
'express' something, which is what a parrot cannot do. The 
Behaviourist stance is not clear. It should be noticed that 
the Behaviourist School, too, is projecting an 'activity 
view' of thinking. 
It is apparent, from what has been said thus far, that 
all the 'analysis of thinking' have accepted, 
unquestioningly, the equation of thinking witi. activity. The 
1. Hartnack, J.: On Thinking p.546. 
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difference between the former schools and the Bfi^aviourists 
is on the principle of ^ n ^ r o interne. The former turns 
thinking into covert, inaccessibJ'^  and private activity 
whereas the latter crowns the activity with overtness, 
accessibility and publicity. 'What kind of activity?' has 
been the question rather than 'Is it an activity?'. Some 
philosophers have ventured to endow thinking with the status 
of 'special activity' and have given tne paradigm case, of 
thinking, to be the argument •^ orm - a syllogistic movement 
from premises to conclusion. 
We have chus far missed the materialists, deliberately. 
The reason is that their theory does not methodologically 
hanker on the controversy of in foi^ interno. But a brief 
discussion of the Materialist position '^s wanting. The 
Materialist School does not fare any better in niving an 
acceptable analysis. The 'Identity Theorists' have a,oued 
that thinking is the brain processes which take place. But 
they have themselves admitted that there is a logical 
difference between 'brain-process - statements' and 
'thought-statements'. Nevertheless, they assert that the 
difference is analogous to the difference between nation-
statements and citizen-statements. The nation, the 
Materialists argue, is not something over and above the 
citizens it has. Russel had disagreed entirely with this line 
of argument; he says the grammatical subject in "nations 
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exist" is categorically different from the grammatical 
subject in "citizens exist". Hartnack has argued: "The fact 
that I have solved a mathematical problem could then not be 
what in fact it is, namely a criterion of my having been 
thinking; it could only be evidence from which I could infer 
that I have been thinking".i 
D.M, Armstrong, a Central State Materialist, has argued 
that thinking is a belief currently in a 'mobilized state'. 
So if we 'believe p' and 'p is mobilized* then we are 
currently thinking.2 But we have here epistemic overtones and 
a labour towards coping with the in foro interne. Armstrong 
substantiates his argument: "So introspective awareness that 
we possess knowledge-that-p is a current effect in our minds 
of the knowing-p state. Here, then, we have a particular case 
falling under one general account of thinking as a belief 
that is currently causally active in our minds".3 Armstrong 
accepts the Rylean thesis that thinking is polymorphous.^ The 
point to be noted is that there is a u-turn with the 
Material ists to the Cartesian 'introspection'. Hartnack has 
1. Hartnack, J.: On Thinking, p.544. 
2. Armstrong, D.M. : A Materialist Theory of Mind, p.158, 
3. Ibid., p.345. 
4. Ibid., p.334. 
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pointed out: "The concept of thinking, as I have tried to 
show has a logic different from the logic of such concepts as 
the concept 'brain events' or concept 'observing mental 
images'. The language of thinking has a logic all of its 
own."1 
The notion of thinking is not only perplexing but 
highly disturbing. It seems that there is no comfortable way 
of describing what goes on when one is thinking. No treatment 
seems to suffice, Ryle had felt this uneasiness with the 
notion of thinking: "From the start we felt a gnawing 
uneasiness at the very programme of treating thinking as a 
special, indeed a very special, activity, specially in the 
way that singing is one special activity and gardening a 
battery of special activities".2 
1. Hartnack, J.: On Thinking, p.552. 
2. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol. II, p.405, 
Chapter-1 
The Perfunctory Rgle 
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Desartes' philosophy has thinking as its core-concept. 
It was the Cartesian model, as Ryle concieved it, against 
which Ryle's most popular work 'The Concept of Mind' was a 
full blooded attack. Ryle himself admitted the 
perfunctoriness with which he had dealt with the core-concept 
(i.e. thinking), in that work. The realization led him to 
concentrate on the topic of thinking for a near twenty-five 
years. But did Ryle admit being perfunctory with just the 
concept of thinking or did he mean that it was his 
perfunctoriness with the Cartesian framework which led to his 
misconcieving thinking? His preoccupation with the official 
doctorine may have resulted in the perfunctory treatment of 
'thinking'. Anyway, a comprehensive but brief survey of The 
Concept of Mind, ending with what Ryle has to say about 
thinking in that work, may help us to understand his later 
works with greater clarity. 
The official doctorine, which is to be demolished in 
The Concept of Mind, according to Ryle is : (1) "Such in 
outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, 
with delioerate abusiveness, as the dogma of the Ghost in the 
Machine. It is not merely an assemblage of particular 
mistakes. It is one big mistake of a special kind. It is, 
namely, a category-mistake. It represents the facts of life 
as if they belong to one logical type or category (or range 
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of types or categories), when they actually belong to 
another". ^ 
(2) "They [the official theorists] suppose that the 
primary exercise of minds consists in finding the answers to 
questions and that their occupations are merely applications 
of considered truths or even regretable distractions from 
their considerations. They thus bequethed the idea that the 
capacity to attain the knowledge of truths was the defining 
property of the mind".2 
(3) The official doctorine argues that there are two 
worlds viz. mental and physical, each with its own history. 
The physical, or the body, for humans is governed by 
mechanical laws, public and thus observable by external 
observers. The mental, or the mind, for humans is 
unwitnessable and unobservable, only the self can observe 
it.-^  Ryle says: "The mind is its own place and in his inner 
life each of us lives the life of a ghostly Robinson 
Crusoe."^ And adds: "The self-observation is also commonly 
supposed to be immune from illusion, confusion or doubt".^ 
1. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.17. 
2. Ibid., p.27. 
3. Ibid., p.13 ff. 
4. Ibid., p.15 
5. Ibid., p.16. 
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Ryle has argued that (2) and (3) above are supports for 
(1), that is theorizing is intrinsic and private, silent or 
internal operations. But, says Ryle, shrewd or silly, prudent 
or independent are not epistemic terms and do not proclaim 
knowledge or ignorance of this or that truth; they are 
abilities or inabilities to do certain sorts of things. Ryle 
remarks that, in everyday life, we are more concerned with 
people's 'competences' and not 'cognitive repertoires'. 
His arguments are based on the thesis that mind is not 
outside the causal system of bodies: "Minds, as the whole 
legend describes them, are what must exist if there is to be 
a causal explanation of the intelligent behaviour of human 
bodies, and minds, as the legend describes them, live on a 
floor of existence defined as being outside the causal system 
to which bodies belong."^ The error which the official 
theorists make, according to Ryle, is that mind is hidden, 
secret and with covert operations. The internal operations 
are inferred to be the cause of actions, either they would 
precede or accompany. The internal operations can also be 
ghostly or occult, according to some official theories. In 
Ryle there is a careful distinction between intellectual 
performances and occult performances. He says the 
1. Ibid., p.65. 
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intellectual performances take place whereas 'occult' do not 
occur. 
Ryle says, like in a game of chess one can both obey 
the rules and play cleverly or stupidly, or one can write 
eloquently or woodenly,similarly, behaviour can conform to 
laws of physics and be wise or foolish, witty or dull. 
Skillen has rightly pointed out that the analogy does not 
work, for we can always imagine a game which give no room for 
tactical maneuvers, for example a formal test of logical 
skills.1 Human behaviour taken in these terms would not allow 
a consistent description of human wit and humour. 
Both Ryle and Wittgenstein strongly objected to being 
labelled 'Behaviourists'. A reason for which is given by 
Armstrong: "Since they (Wittgenstein and Ryle) did not want 
to deny the existence of minds, but simply wanted to give an 
account of mind in terms of behaviour, they denied that they 
were behaviourists".2 Wittgenstein writes "Are you not really 
a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really 
saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction? -
If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical 
fiction".3 Both the philosophers, belonging to the Linguistic 
1. Skillen, A. : Mind and Matter, p.515. 
2. Armstrong, D.M. : A Materialist Theory of Mind, p.55. 
3. Wittgenstein, L.;Philosophical Investigations, p.102-103, 
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School, were more concerned with 'grammatical fiction' 
generated by the Cartesian model. Ryle has advanced a similar 
argument: "It must be noted from the start that it is one 
thing to say that certain human actions and reactions exhibit 
qualities of character and intellect, it is, by an 
unfortunate linguistic fashion, quite another thing to say 
that there occur mental acts or processes".^ The issue is 
not ontological but linguistic. Wittgenstein admits "So we 
have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied 
mental process. And naturally we don't want to deny them".^ 
Weiss has rightly commented that any denial of mind 
will consist of at least, one of the following claims: (1) 
non-existent, (2) meaningless and (3) unknowable.3 Neither 
Wittgenstein nor Ryle take up any of these three positions. 
Their arguments are designed to avert methodological 
behaviourism. 
Philosophical behaviourists, following Wittgenstein, 
adopted the maxim that "An 'inner process' stands in need of 
outward criteria".^ Ryle adopts a similar strategy, in The 
1. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.130. 
2. Wittgenstein, L: Philosophical Investigations, p.103. 
3. Weiss, P.: Reason, Mind, Body and World, p.326. 
4. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations, p.153. 
38 
Concept of Mind. The philosophical behaviourists' position 
can be stated as saying that mental events are not events, 
but if they are to be counted as events then they are a sub-
class of observable physical events, and thus not being 
bona-fide events, are 'dispositions'. The claim of 
philosophical behaviourism is that dispositional analysis is 
exhaustive. But according to Ziff: "Philosophical 
behaviourism is not a metaphysical theory: it is the denial 
of a metaphysical theory consequently, it asserts nothing".^ 
Dispositions are described by Ryle, as nothing till 
something takes place publicly. 
The problem, even though it did not concretize in The 
Concept of Mind pressed itself on Ryle's analysis of 
thinking, is the threat of reduction of psychological 
predicates to physical predicates, being an integral outcome 
of adopting behaviourism. Skillen points out, arguing against 
J.J.C. Smart's Identity Theory, that: ".... the development, 
even to perfection of physics in no way threatens the status 
of humans as intelligent or stupid, moral or vicious 
agents".2 Ryle held some such similar view, in The Concept 
of Mind, without formally acknowledging it. Ryle required 
that this threat should evaporate and he be able to account 
1. Ziff, P.: About Behaviourism, p.150. 
2. Skillen, A.: Mind and Matter, p.515. 
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for 'inner processes' in such a fashion that there is no 
conflict with a description in terms of mechanical causes. 
Skillen rightly points out: "This is because, whereas, 
according to Cartesian 'para-mechanical' picture, mental 
phenomena enter earthly affairs as ghostly outside agitators 
from the immaterial worl-d of the soul, regularly effecting 
transformations as miraculous as the resurrection of Lazarus, 
in reality, on Ryle's account, wishes and thoughts, while 
playing a part in the world, do so in a way which in no way 
competes with mechanical causes".^ 
CONCIOOSNESS 
The turn of the nineteenth century showed the use of 
'conciousness' as a stigma for empirical psychologists. There 
was a general feeling to abandon all such metaphysical 
concepts, and especially 'consciousness', from the subject-
matter of psychology. James enthusiastically acclaimed this: 
".,.. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it 
[conciousness] to be openly and universally discarded."2 The 
logical culmination of these ideas was Frost who finally 
challenged consciousness and suggested that it can be treated 
as a second-order physiological process. This second-order 
physiological process has, according to Frost, as its 
1. Ibid. 
2. James, W.: Essays in Radical Empiricism, p.3-4. 
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Stimulus-object neural or physiological adjustments to some 
external stimulus-object.^ 
The commendable efforts lacked a sustained and solid 
argument against the Cartesian dogmas. It had become a demand 
of the day that 'Cartesian consciousness' be denied. Ryle had 
attempted such an account, as Lyons points out: " I think it 
is fair to say that the classical source of solid and 
sustained argument for discarding the Cartesian concept of 
consciousness, and replacing it with Behaviourist 
substitutes, is to be found in the work of Ryle".2 
Ryle attacked the concept of consciousness with 
contempt, in The Concept of Mind, : "It is often held 
therefore (1) that a mind can not help being constantly aware 
of all the supposed occupants of its private stage, and (2) 
that it can deliberately scrutinize by a species of non-
sensous perception at least some of its own states and 
operations. Moreover both this constant awareness (generally 
called 'consciousness'), and this non-sensous inner 
perception (generally called 'introspection') have been 
supposed to be exempt from error. A mind has twofold 
Priviledged Access to its own doings, which makes its self-
knowledge superior in quality, as well as prior in generis, 
1. Frost, E. P. : Cannot Psychology Dispense with 
Consciousness, p.208. 
2. Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle, p.86. 
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to its grasp of other things".^ Ryle argued, in anticipation 
of Strawson that: "The sorts of things that I can find out 
about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can 
find out about other people, and the methods of finding out 
are much the same".^ Ryle finds in the official theory an 
analogy, for consciousness, with the fluorescence of light. 
It is a metaphor often employed by Cartesians. The light is 
emitted and noticed. There are no extra-requirements for the 
perception of light. "Consciousness was imported to play in 
the mental world the part played by light in the mechanical 
world. In this metaphorical sense, the contents of the mental 
world were thought of as being self-luminous or refulgent... 
The myth of the conciousness is a piece of para-optics".-^ The 
monitoring continues irrespective of the attention being 
focussed. Ryle argues that this theory allows 'mental' only 
in an 'occurrent sense'. This is the 'category-howler' of the 
Cartersians for they have mislocated the dispositional 
character of mental activities. Ryle criticizes the official 
doctrine on four points*. 
(1) No one who is un-commited to a philosophical theory 
ever tries to vindicate any of his assertions of fact by 
1. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p.148. 
2. Ibid., p.149. 
3. Ibid., p.153. 
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saying that he found it out 'from consciousness' or as *a 
direct deliverance of consciousness', or 'from immediate 
awareness'.^ 
(2) Ryle attacks the infallibility, claimed by the official 
theory, of knowledge obtained through introspection. Ryle 
writes, arguing against the metaphor of fluoresence: " I 
could see the vehicle but not necessarily would see them".2 
The illumination itself does not necessitate the recognition 
of happenings or objects. The monitoring does not necessarily 
mean all is monitored, something which the official theory 
requires. If an object 'X' is in light', as Ryle argues, it 
does not mean or imply that 'X is noticed'. The implication 
can only be stretched to suggest a possibility of 'X being 
noticeable'. The official theory, on the other hand, requires 
infallibility of this knowledge. But if mental activities are 
only noticeable, and not necessarily noticed, then, a 
fortiori, it cannot imply that mental activities are 
infallibly noticed. The official theory envisages no bridge 
for the gulf between recognizing and noticing. It can be 
argued that mental activities are in principle noticeable, 
this being the hall mark of mental, and that the official 
doctrine does not claim it to be so in practice. According 
to this argument it is only a logical possibility that we are 
1. Ibid., p.154. 
2. Ibid., p.155. 
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aware and correctly so. It is possible that we may notice 
mental activities and generate either false or true beliefs, 
both the possibilities are affirmed. 
(3) Ryle says that any claim to knowledge in terms of 
constant awareness is not tenable. He gives two reasons for 
it; firstly, "Good illumination [as the Cartesian metaphor] 
helps us to see cheese-rinds, but we could not say 'the light 
was too bad for me to know the cheese-rinds'. Since knowing 
is not the same sort of thing as looking at, and what is 
known is not the same sort of thing as what is illuminated",1 
Ryle is suggesting here that the Cartesian claim, through the 
use of metaphor, cannot be epistemic but only perceptual; 
secondly, "...They mistakenly suppose themselves to know 
things which are actually false; they deceive themselves 
about their own motives; they are surprised to notice the 
clock stopping ticking, without their having, as they think, 
been aware that it had been ticking; they do not know that 
they are dreaming..."^ the examples show that people do find, 
in normal course of life, exceptions to the Cartesian dictum 
of constant awareness. The Cartesian can here change his 
strategy and suggest a metaphorlof radio being switched on and 
off. He would, then, argue that consciousness is the switched 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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on-ness of the radio. The mental life would then be a 
phenomenal life-stream. The events, and the only events, in 
this stream would be conscious or phenomenal. These events 
would include only such things as pains, seeings, noticings 
and wonderings and as such could not possibly be in the 
subconscious or go unnoticed or be waiting to be noticed. 
These phenomenal streams could be scrutinized by a second-
order monitoring. The advantage obviously of the metaphor is 
that it can duck Ryle's objections and allow inner-activities 
which are not part of this stream of consciousness. There is 
another point to this argument which is related to Ryle's own 
thesis. Since Ryle acknowledgeJi or at least does not 
explicitly deny, mental events he cannot argue against an 
awareness of these events. 
(4) The above Cartesian position, of which even Ryle is 
susceptible, can easily cope with Ryle's fourth objection. 
Ryle has argued, which applies to the 'light-metaphor' and 
not*radio-metaphor' : "... there would be no stopping-place; 
there would have to be an infinite number of onion-skins of 
consciousness embedding any mental state or process 
whatsoever".1 Since mind is conscious of all its workings 
then it must be conscious of its' consciousness of its 
workings, and so on, which leads to an infinite regress. The 
argument leaves no room for defence of 'light-metaphor'. Ryle 
1. Ibid., p.156. 
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admits to the possibility of the 'radio-metaphor' : "If this 
conclusion is rejected, then it will have to be allowed that 
some elements in mental processes are not themselves things 
we can be conscious of, namely those elements which 
constitute the supposed o.utermost self-intimations of mental 
processes, and then 'conscious' could no longer be retained 
as part of the mental".•'• Ryle means by 'conscious' complete 
awareness of all mental activities or events. In 
characterizing the official theory he says: "The things that 
a mind does or experience are self-intimating, and this is 
supposed to be a feature which characterizes these acts and 
feelings not just sometimes but always".2 
INTROSPECTION 
Introspection, first of all, differs from consciousness 
in that it is directed. Introspection, for the official 
theory, is a non-sensous information which is infallible. 
Introspection is treated as being analogous to perception. It 
is the attention of mind directed at its own workings, it is 
the inspection of mental activities, which is immune from 
error. Introspection, according to the official theory, is 
such that all mental activities, at any given moment, are 
available to it. Ryle objects: " However, even if it is 
1. Ibid., 152. 
2. Ibid., p.158. 
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claimed that in introspecting we are attending twice at 
once, it will be allowed that there is some limit to the 
number of possible synchronous acts of attention, and from 
this it follows that there must be some mental processes 
which are unintrospectable, namely those introspections which 
incorporate the maximum possible number of synchronous acts 
of attention".1 Admitting this would be contradicting the 
official theory. A Cartesian, as we have seen with 
consciousness, may be willing to accept the limitation. The 
Cartesian would then have to face the demand that the number 
of such acts be specified. The 'enumeration principle' of 
Ryle is the test of the Cartesian thesis which can not 
possibly specify the number and thus have to abandon the 
notion of introspection. 
Second argument which Ryle presents is that no two 
reports of introspection seem to agree. This argument is 
directed towards the claim of infallibility of introspection 
by the official theory. If, as Ryle claims, no two reports 
are ever the same then it raises doubts about the reports of 
introspection and introspection itself. Accordingly neither 
would the report nor the introspection be infallible. If we 
accept the fallibility of introspection, the analogue of 
introspection to perception "would entail that observation of 
1. Ibid. 
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mental activities is like observing 'tomatoes' or 'smelling 
of onions'. But if this is the case then inspection is more 
reliable and clearly apprehensible and there seems to be no 
need for the metaphysical notion of 'introspection'. 
Ryle's third objection is that some states, and it is 
states which are the purview of introspection, such as pain, 
fury, excitement, and many more can be added, take up so much 
of our attention that they are not introspected upon, it is 
only later that we can inspect them. This leads Ryle to his 
alternative account of 'retrospection' as the monitoring of 
mental activities. The violent agitations, as Ryle calls the 
above mentioned states, give no room for introspection. 
Farrell, in appreciation of Rylean argument, writes: 
"Incidentally this should help to make it clear that we 
cannot use introspection to observe "experience", since this 
is not observable something".^ In other words, experience can 
only be considered in retrospect. But even in restrospect it 
is only parts or constituents of experience or agitational 
states which are available, since experience is the totality 
of the present and escapes as it runs away into the past. The 
examples which Ryle selects also force upon us the fact that 
retrospection of them would not yield all the details and 
will be a fallible piece of knowledge. The Cartesian may find 
no objections to the view that introspection is not 
1. Farrell, B.A.; Experience, p.39. 
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inspection of all that happens internally. He may suggest 
that at least the conscious states are introspectible. But 
Ryle has here provided arguments against even such a 
possibility - the agitational states are not unconscious but 
are not introspectible. 
Ryle asserts: "Yet nothing disastrous follows from this 
restriction [i.e. only retrospection is possible]. We are not 
shorter of information about panic or amusement than about 
other states of mind. If retrospection can give us data we 
need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no 
reason why it should not do so for all. And this is just 
what seems to be suggested by the popular phrase 'to catch 
oneself doing so and so*. We catch as we pursue and overtake, 
what is already running away from us".-^  And again "I come to 
appreciate the skills and tactics of a chess-player by watch-
ing him and others playing chess, and I learn that a certain 
pupil of mine is lazy, ambitious or witty by following his 
work, noticing his excuses, listening to his conversations 
and comparing his performances with others. Nor does it make 
any important differences if I happen myself to be that 
pupil. I can indeed then listen to more of his conversations, 
as I am the addressee of his unspoken soliloquies: I notice 
le, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.159. 
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more of his excuses, as I am never absent, when they are 
made".l 
A too obvious an objection, for our purposes, would be 
that retrospection works well for some states, especially 
agitational states, and for personality traits, 
characteristics and motives but would it work equally well 
when we come to account for our awareness of present 
thoughts. The retrospective account works well for the 
dispositional whereas thinking appears to be 'occurrent', and 
not a proneness to do something. Ryle could rebut the 
objection by saying, as Lyons points out: "To claim 
knowledge of my present thoughts is nothing other than to 
make claim to be able to run back over my imaginings or sub-
vocal reasonings, or to comment on them if required. So 
knowledge of my own present thoughts is just a case of 
retrospecting, not retrospecting in order to discover and 
attribute some pattern or disposition to myself but just 
retrospecting. It is retrospecting over a short period".2 How 
short is the period? What temporal distance is required to 
differentiate introspecting from retrospecting? According to 
Ryle there is no such thing as introspecting but only 
retrospecting however minute the period maybe. Retrospecting 
1. Ibid., p.162. 
2. Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle, p.91. 
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is inspecting behaviour. But thinking does not necessarily 
entail doing anything externally. The doing can be internal 
and occurrent and not be a disposition to do something. Ryle 
would reply that there are sub-vocal reasonings or 
imaginings. The sub-vocal reasonings would be mental 
reasonings. Ryle could suggest that there are present minute 
or inhibited muscular movementsptherwise employed in 
conversing with others. But this still does not solve the 
problem for it could now be argued that we are aware of our 
thinking which is often reported, and not the inhibited 
muscular movements, which are not reported. If now Ryle 
claims that the knowledge of muscular movements comes from 
what is present below the threshold of consciousness then he 
would be contradicting his own thesis. His argument presents 
retrospection as conscious and directed, but here the report 
seems to be an automatic print-out because of 
neurophysiological hook ups. 
DISPOSITIONS 
The Concept of Mind argues that the Cartesianism has 
made one big category mistake. The official theory has 
described dispositions as falling under the category of 
occurrences, episodes or processes. Ryle wanted that all 
mental phenomena, however putative, should be redescribed as 
dispositions to observable public behaviour. Ryle declares: 
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"There is, however, a special point in drawing attention to 
the fact that many of the cardinal concepts in terms of which 
we describe specifically human behaviour are dispositional 
concepts, since the vogue of para-mechanical legend has led 
many people to ignore the ways in which these concepts 
actually behave and to construe them instead as items in the 
descriptions of occult causes and effects".^ Ryle says; 
"Moreover, merely to classify a word as signifying a 
disposition is not yet to say much more about it than to say 
that it is not used for an episode".2 Ryle is suggesting that 
it is only a matter of semantic taxonomy. Ryle argues that a 
disposition is a behaviour pattern, which is not possessed 
but displayed through a number of behaviour-pieces. Therefore 
the problem with retrospection of thinking, where no 
behaviour is displayed. Dispositions are divided into two 
categories determinate and determinable. The former are cases 
like drinking tea, which is to do one specificable thing. The 
latter are cases like being 'greedy' which is a proneness to 
do a variety of things. Ryle says: "Similarly there is a wide 
range of different actions and reactions predictable from the 
descriptions of someone as 'greedy', while there is, roughly, 
only one sort of action predictable from the description of 
someone as a 'cigarette-smoker'. In short, some dispositional 
1. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.112. 
2. Ibid. 
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words are highly generic and determinable, while others are 
highly specific and determinate, the verbs with which we 
report the different exercises of generic tendencies, 
capacities and liabilities are apt to differ from the verbs 
with which we name the dispositions, while the episodic verbs 
corresponding to highly specific dispositional verbs are apt 
to be the same".-'- Ryle further adds: "Dispositional words 
like 'know', 'believe', 'aspire', 'clever' and 'humorous' are 
determinable dispositional words. They signify abilities, 
tendencies, or proneness to do, not things of one unique 
kind, but things of lots of different kinds".2 Ryle admits a 
third possibility of half way houses, there are semi-
dispositional or semi-episodic words. He names them mongrel-
categories, for, according to him, they are mutations of 
occurrences and dispositions. The dispositional aspect comes 
from the actual display of activities and the occurrent from 
the here and now quality of the concepts. Ryle cites examples 
of this class: "I begin by considering a battery of concepts 
all of which may be brought under the useful because vague 
heading of 'minding'. Or they could all alike be described as 
'heed concepts'. I refer to the concepts of noticing, taking 
care, attending, applying one's mind, concentrating, putting 
one's heart into something, thinking what one is doing, 
1. Ibid., p.114. 
2. Ibid. 
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alertness, interest, intentness, studying, and trying".^ He 
says of these concepts that the criteria for determining 
their presence is cross-questioning, shortly afterwards.2 
Ryle's arguments are poised against what may be called 
'hidden internal causes'. Dispositions are then, for Ryle, 
not hidden but behavioural displays: "But the reason why the 
skill exercised in a performance cannot be separately 
recorded by a camera is not that it is a occult or ghostly 
happening, but that it is not a happening at all. It is a 
disposition or a complex of dispositions, and a disposition 
is a factor of the wrong logical type to be seen or unseen, 
recorded or unrecorded".3 And again Ryle comments: 
"Dispositional statements are neither reports of observed or 
observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved 
or unobservable states of affairs".^ The behavioural displays 
or dispositions attributed to a person does not then entail 
attributing anything to that person, apart from the 
of 
forecasting/the behaviour to be expected of a person, because 
of past experience of that person. It is a causal link and 
according to Ryle the causal link, an inference ticket, is 
1. Ibid., p.130. 
2. Ibid., p.133. 
3. Ibid., p.33. 
4. Ibid., p.120. 
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not a third entity. D.M. Armstrong has taken a strong 
exception to the use of 'anything' above.•*• 
Mellor has argued, favouring Rylean analysis: "The 
special question about dispositions, if there is one, is not 
epistemological. It is not how we know a glass is fragile 
when it is not dropped but what makes it fragile whether it 
is dropped or not. Ryle's view has at least the merit of 
keeping these two questions more plainly separate. Licensing 
the inference from "a drops" to "a breaks" is a matter 
plainly independent of the truth and hence of knowledge of 
the premise. But what gives the licensing its authority? It 
is obviously not a logical authority and, as Ryle insists^ it 
does not derive from the present occurrence of any event. 
What then could the authority be if not some present 
contingent property distinguishing a from a glass for which 
the inference is not licensed."2 Mellor's argument points out 
that Ryle's criteria of pagst experience would not suffice. 
For Ryle the inference from an event is licensed without 
knowledge. 
Armstrong has accused Ryle of being a "phenomenalist".^ 
Ryle has argued that there need be nothing going-on when a 
wire is not conducting electricity and similarly the goings-
1. flmstrong, D.M.: The Materialist Theory of Mind. 
2. Mellor, D.H.: In Defense of dispositions, p.163. 
3. Armstrong, D.M.: A Materialist Theory of Mind. 
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on are not relevant to the reality of a thing's property. 
But Mellor points out: "What makes electrical conductivity a 
less observable property of a thing than its shape is that 
the relevant display, of current flowing through it, is less 
observable as an event than (for example) coming to an end of 
a process of counting a thing's corners".^ Our present pur-
pose is with 'disposition' and not 'licensing authority'. As 
Smith has pointed out that Armstrong's cricitism of Ryle's 
position leaves intact his related views about 'inference-
tickets'.2 It may here suffice to say that Ryle's suggestion 
that past-experiences give the necessary authority could be 
accepted. 
Armstrong has objected to Ryle's argument that in 
attributing behavioural pattern to things or persons one is 
not attributing anything to the thing or the person. Ryle 
had meant by 'anything' to exclude any possible postulations 
of internal or hidden causes. Armstrong's argument is that a 
similar position is adopted by Price when he says: "There is 
no a priori necessity for supposing that all dispositional 
properties must have a categorical basis. In particular, 
there may be mental dispositions which are ultimate...".^ 
Armstrong then argues that Price is a 'phenomenalist' and it 
1. Mellor, D.H. In defense of dispositions, p.163. 
2. Smith, A.D. : Dispositional Properties, p.439. 
3. Price, H.H.: Thinking and Experience, p.322. 
56 
is exactly the same view that both Ryle and Wittgenstein 
present Armstrong suggests that a 'realist' view would assert 
that ".... in asserting that a piece of glass is brittle, for 
instance, we are asserting that it is in a certain non-
dispositional state which disposes it to shatter and fly 
apart in a wide variety of circumstances".^ Armstrong has 
suggested that a 'categorical basis' should be admitted for 
if a 'realist account' is possible. Ryle has created an 
unwanted distinction between a thing and an event. Ryle 
accepts an event, such as breaking of glass (display of 
disposition), because it is observable. The disposition, on 
the other hand, is the property of a thing, which could be 
present, without an event-occurring, and hence not observable 
and so excluded from Rylean behaviourism. According to 
Armstrong change in the intrinsic nature of the thing, which 
is the categorical basis, disposes the thing to behave in a 
certain way. 
Squires has argued that Armstrong has involved himself 
in an infinite regress: "In short, he [Armstrong] is 
attributing a dispositional property to the categorical 
basis, suspiciously similar to that which was originally 
attributed to the object itself. It will entail that the 
categorical basis itself has a categorical basis with yet 
another dispositional property. According to this view , 
1. Armstrong, D.M.: A Materialist Theory of Mind,p.86. 
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then, in attributing a dispositional property to anything at 
all we are committed to the outrageous thesis that there is 
an infinity of categorical bases waiting for scientist to 
suggest appropriate identifications, all sitting inside the 
object like Chinese boxes".^ 
Armstrong attempted a reply to Squires' charge. He 
suggests that change over a time in property of things is 
either due to (a) the thing either acquiring or losing some 
actual or categorical property, or (b) the thing either 
acquires or loses some potentiality which is not an actual 
property of the thing. 
Now, if the second disjunct is true then we are 
quantifying over potentialities, which is the Rylean thesis, 
to use Quinean terms, which would mean a commitment to an 
ontology of potentialities, which amounts to accepting 
'extra-properties' over and above the properties of things. 
Armstrong argues against any such attempt: "If, per 
impossible, a thing could have potentiality over and above 
its categorical properties, the potentiality would be an 
actuality - and so not a potentiality".2 The attack, a hand-
some one, against the phenomenalist yields as an alternative 
1. Squires, R.: Are Dispositions Causes? p. 45. 
2. Armstrong, D.M.: Dispositions and Causes, p.24, 
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a strange thesis. Armstrong suggests, in defence against the 
objection raised by Squires, that the two states are 
identical, that is, that the state which causes the 
potentiality is caused by itself. The categorical state 
responsible for bringing about dispositional display is 
identical with itself and requires no further categorical 
states. The identification is logical in nature (p —> p(t) 
— > [ (tp & ( — > it is true that it is true that p.... and 
so on)] therefore, logical identification of dispositions 
with states of the disposed things can be maintained. But we 
find ourselves in a dilemma for the empirical claim of the 
categorical basis has been reduced to a logical 
identification. 
The basic flaw, according to Cummins, in Armstrong's 
argument is: "Talk of changes of state refer to one state of 
an object succeeding and replacing another, and not to change 
itself".^ It is the state of the thing concerned which 
changes, therefore the state changes, or a new state is 
acquired, and neither does the thing change nor the state. 
Cummins elaborates with an example of the rising of ball 'b', 
in a inflated state, in water when 'b' is let go of. 'b' has 
the disposition of rising if it is not held down and is in an 
inflated state. The 'b' being in a non-inflated state has 
changed to an inflated state. The changed state of inflation 
1. Cummins, R.iDispositions, States and Causes p.198. 
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helps explain why letting go of 'b' (an event) causes a 
rising of 'b' (another event). The inflated state could 
further be expressed in terms of density: 'b' is in a condi-
tion where mass b/volume b is less than 1, which is suffi-
cient for rising, if unhindered. The unhindering and the 
density are sufficient conditions for the rising of 'b'. 
Cummins explains "And the subjunctive construction, rather 
being used to express dispositionality, is being used to 
hedge on ontology, no unhindering or rising of b occurs at t, 
but were an unhindering to occur at t, it would cause a 
rising (The subjunctive construction is not being used to 
attribute a disposition to an unhindering - a disposition to 
cause a rising were conditions propositions - for the point 
of the constriction is to emphasize that no unhindering of b 
exists)".1 
Cummins furthers his arguments: "It isn't X's elevancy 
- i.e. the state of being elevant which is explained jointly 
by the nature of water and X's being in S. Rather it is a 
certain law like generality of behaviour which is explained 
namely (R). (R) Elevant things rise in water if unhindered".^ 
We do explain elevancy by citing a cause of that event.The 
appeal to m/v < 1, that is density, is in explaining 'R' and 
1. Ibid., p.199 
2. Ibid., p.201. 
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not the onset of elevancy. The onset of elevency, which is 
an event, is explained by saying that it is the effect of 
filling of 'b' with air, which is also an event. The appeal 
to categorical basis would be to explain 'R', the disposi-
tional regularity, which seems to require a reference to a 
state of 'b', viz. 'b' is having m/v < 1. But this reference 
is only for explanation of phenomena, therefore categorical 
basis is only an explanation for dispositions. But 'R' is a 
correlation between elevancy and density (mj^ /vj^  < 1). But 
what is this correlation? Ryle had suggested 
' inferencd|tickets' for these correlations. Cummins says this 
correlation is inexplicable for we cannot explain why all 
objects having m/v < 1 are elevents. It is exactly this 
embarrassment which Armstrong tries to overcome by 
identifying dispositions with causes. But here it gives us a 
theory of elevancy acquisition in 'b' without recourse to 
inexplicable causal connections, or inexplicable correlations 
of supposedly distinct states. Therefore as Cummins points 
out: "It seems that we are forced to regard brute 
dispositions as permanent and unalterable by the fact that 
acquisition or loss of such a disposition would be 
inexplicable. In the face of this fact there will be a 
tendency to deal with apparent counter-examples by locating 
the change in the environment of the disposed object, or by 
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searching for a categorical basis".^ So we find ourselves 
again with Armstrong's 'categorical basis' and require an 
interpretation which would offer an explanation of 
dispositions by identifying it with some non-dispositional 
base. The simple relation of conditions would not suffice. 
Stevenson has offered a defence of Armstrong's thesis. 
He argues that Armstrong has offered an empirical 
justification for the categorical basis, which justifies the 
assertion of specific intrinsic property. The law-like 
hypothetical statement which are the Rylean dispositional 
statements'2 are never conclusively falsifiable or 
verifiable, they are empirical assertions of a very high 
degree of generalization. This can be expressed as Fb —> Sb, 
where b is a band, F is force, and S is the stretching. 
Stevenson argues that Armstrong is saying: if 'b' has a 
specific intrinsic property then is will determine the 
dispositional property required by Ryle. The specific 
intrinsic property 'P' can be explicated. Pb & (x) [If Px — > 
(If Fx — > Sx)] and this justifies Pb or Px, which is the 
categorical basis. Stevenson asserts that a failure to find a 
1. Ibid., p.203. 
2. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.43. "For in describing 
these disposition it is easy to unpack the hypothetical 
propositions implicitly conveyed in the ascription of 
dispositional property". 
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categorical basis does not entail that there is no 
categorical basis.-^  
Coder^ suggests that there are two possible positions 
regarding the view towards categorical basis: (I) X possess 
dispositional property P — > X possesses some 
non-dispositional property, which explains the posiiession of 
P by X. Then it is a necessary truth that every dispositional 
property rests upon a 'categorical basis'; (II) Behaviour B 
i-nd circumstances C such that X would exhibit B in C, then X 
has non-dispositional property which is why X exhibit B in C. 
Then, it is necessary that every such subjunctive property 
rests upon a 'categorical basis'. Coder argues from this that 
Squires^ is attacking position (11) which does not entail (I) 
and it is (I) which is Armstrong's position. The entailment 
of (I) by (II) is present provided behaviour has occurred and 
this is something which Armstrong is not proposing. Armstrong 
is only arguing that there must be non-dispositional base 
because of which X possesses dispositional property P. The 
behaviour of X would obviously also depend on the conditions 
C provided behaviour takes place. It could be said, for 
1. Stevenson, L.: Are Dispositions Causes, p.197. 
2. Coder, D.: Some Misconceptions about Dispositions, 
pp.200-202. 
3. Squires, R.: Are Dispositions Causes? p.45 
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example, that an object is disposed to get wet, if immersed 
in water. But this would be false for 'any object immersed in 
water', for example water proof objects, and therefore cannot 
be treated as dispositional property of 'any particular 
object'. This universality, that is Cummins' 'R'l which is 
also Ryle's dispositional property^ cannot attribute a dispo-
sition to any particular object or thing. If the behaviour 
'B' of 'getting wet' is entirely due to the circumstances 'C 
of 'being immersed in water' then it cannot be a feature of a 
thing 'X'. Thus (X) {Cx -•> Bx) is not dispositional, whereas 
(3x) (Cx —> Bx) is dispositional. 
The position which Squires attacks is false because it 
talks about all subjunctive properties and, secondly, if 'C 
is sufficient for 'X' to exhibit 'B' then no further 
explanation would be required, and attributions of non-
dispositional basis would prove to be unnecessary. But then 
this would not be dispositional either for it is only the 
conditions which are the determining factors. A position such 
as this, viz., position (II) above, would be irrelevant. This 
leaves us with position (I) which would be true if (a) 'X' 
exhibits 'B' in 'C and (b) 'B' is due not only to 'C but 
some other feature of 'X'. There must be a reason for 
1. Cummins, R.: Dispositions, States and Causes, p. 201 
[quoted above]. 
2. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind p.43 [quoted above]. 
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attributing dispositional property to 'X'. The 'some other 
feature', will rest upon the categorical basis. 
Lyons! has suggested that the Realists and the 
Phenomenalist are arguing with crossed-purposes. The Realist 
account is a genetic account and hence a causal explanation 
whereas the phenomenalist account is semantic in nature, 
which is about meanings. But Lyons is missing out a point he 
had himself made earlier, in agreeing with Alston, that Ryle, 
as a phenomenalist, is confusing the semantic with 
ontological, for Ryle is attempting an ontological category 
when dealing with dispositions.2 The debate is therefore 
important in order that the point may be conceded and no 
ontological claims of the phenomenalist be accepted. A 
further point is that the Realist account is a fuller account 
because of the ontology which is permissible. We will see 
that Ryle's confusion comes through again and creates 
problems when dealing with thinking. Lyons has taken too 
simplistic a view of the controversy between the Realist and 
the Phenomenalist. Alston has pointed out that it most 
probably is correct to say that 'meaning' of a dispositional 
term, such as brittleness, can be explicated in terms of 
typical reactions in typical circumstances, but the 
'reference' of the dispositional term can not be 'some 
1. Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle, p.54. 
2. Ibid., p. 49 
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internal occurrence', its 'categorical base'.^ But the 
'categorical base' is required for the 'causal explanation' 
of a specific disposition. 
'KNOWING HOW AND 'KNOWING THAT' 
The theory of dispositions presented by Ryle holds 
within it a theory of action, which has as its basis the 
distinction which Ryle presents between 'Knowing how' and 
'Knowing that', which is acknowledged as the greatest 
contribution of The Concept of Mind. The distinction has a 
bearing on our present topic as Ginnane remarks: "Clearly not 
all thinking has to do with what might roughly be called the 
entertaining of propositions. In fact it would hardly be all 
that daring to claim that chapter two of The Concept of Mind 
['knowing how' and 'Knowing that'] has shown, once and for 
all, that it simply could not do so".^ 
Kyle's argument is that pragmatic competence, the 
'knowing how', is more basic than prepositional competence, 
'knowing that'. The pragmatic competence for Ryle, is not two 
performances, either simultaneous or in succession.^ The 
pragmatic competence to do something is a knack, skill or 
ability to act in a fashion which would achieve the desired 
1. Alston, W.J.: Dispositions and Occurrences, p.151. 
2. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts, p.374. 
3. The problem has already been raised above. 
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result and is acquired through practice, or in other words 
repeated performances of the same type. The doing of 
something is one act successfully performed. The successful 
act is to be viewed in light of the whole history of 
performances gone through to get the act right.^ The official 
doctrine argues that one has to first of all learn the 
criteria, rules or principles [ i.e. have prepositional 
competence in the form of 'know that '] which enables 
the correct performance of the act. The act is therefore 
performed in the light of the prepositional competence. 
Ryle has argued that 'knowing how' to do something is a 
disposition to do that something successfully and 
efficiently. The disposition is inculcated over a period of 
time. Ryle has concluded from this that exercise of 
intelligence, because this too is a disposition for Ryle, is 
a public performance and not a private monologue, as the 
official doctrine wants it. Ryle remarks "Overt intelligent 
performances are not clues to the workings of the minds, they 
are those performances."2 Ryle argues that an action is to 
be termed intelligent, if and only if, it is done by the 
agent with thought. Thinking is the doing well, such that if 
an action is not well done the agent is not thinking. Ryle 
1. This we find is the criteria for 'inference-ticket', 
offered by Ryle, see above. 
2. Ryle, G. : The Concept of Mind, p.57. 
67 
says that this is the popular idiom which is taken as 
evidence by the official doctrine, which supports the 
11 
intellectualist legend; Champions of the legend are apt to 
try to assimilate knowing how to knowing that by arguing that 
intelligent performance involves the observance of rules, or 
the application of criteria. It follows that the operation 
which is characterized as intelligent must be preceded by an 
intellectual acknowledgement of these rules or criteria, that 
is the agent must go through internal process of avowing to 
himself certain propositions about what is to be done 
('Maxims', 'imperatives', or 'regulative propositions' as 
they are sometimes called); only then can he execute his 
performance in accordance with these dictates."^ But this 
involves two components of the intellectualist error as Parry 
points out: "There is the claim that intelligent action is 
preceded by another event; then there is the claim that the 
preceding event is an intellectual performance. Does the 
accent fall on "preceding event" or "intellectual 
performance", or on both. One's tempted to think on both."^ 
Let us look at what further Ryle has to say: "To do something 
thinking what one is doing is, according to the legend, 
always tQ do two things: namely, to consider certain 
appropriate propositions or prescriptions and to put into 
1. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
2. Parry, R.D.: Ryle's Theory of action, p.380. 
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practice what these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. It 
is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice."^ 
Ryle is here indicating that the official theory requires two 
separate acts. Ryle adds: "They do not plan their arguments 
before constructing them. Indeed if they had to plan what to 
think before thinking it they would never think at all; for 
this planning would itself be unplanned."2 
Ryle argues from above that "The regress is infinite 
and this reduces to absurdity the theory that for an 
operation to be intelligent it must be steered by a prior 
intellectual operation."-^ Ryle seems to be suggesting that 
any act, mental or physical, does not require a further act. 
So intellectual performances or acts are possible but not as 
preceding covert acts. Ryle says: "To put it quite generally, 
the absurd assumption made by the intellectualist legend is 
this, that a performance of any sort inherits all its title 
to intelligence from some anterior internal operation of 
planning what to do."^ 
Ryle attacks the Cartesian: ' So some prepositional 
competence is a condition of acquiring any of these 
1. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p. 30. 
2. Ibid., p. 31. 
3. Ibid., p.32. 
4. Ibid. 
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competences [pragmatic]. But it does not follow that 
exercises of these competences require to be accompanied by 
exercises of prepositional competences".1 So it is not just 
preceding but also accompanying of intellectual performances 
which is denied. Ryle says of performing correctly: "To be 
intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply 
them, to regulate one's action and not merely to be well 
regulated. A person's performance is described as careful or 
skillful, if in his operations he is ready to detect and 
correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon successes to 
profit from example of others and so forth. He applies 
criteria in performing critically, that is, in trying to get 
things right."2 The applying of criteria is the thinking, 
which, here, for the overt performance is not an intellectual 
performance, but getting of things right. Ryle adds: 
"Training, on the other hand, though it embodies plenty of 
sheer drill, does not consist of drill. It involves the 
stimulation by criticism and example of the pupil's own 
judgement. He learns, how to do things thinking what he is 
doing, so that every operation performed is itself a new 
lesson to him how to perform, better."-^  Ryle suggests: "The 
rules that he observes have become his way of thinking, when 
1. Ibid., p.48. 
2. Ibid., p.29 
3. Ibid., p.42. 
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he is taking ca*e; they are not external rubrics with which 
he has to square his thoughts."^ The intellectual 
performances preceding or accompanying, would obviously be 
external rubrics. So Ryle is definitely denying intellectual 
performance: "What is true of arguing intelligently is, with 
appropriate modifications, true of other intelligent 
operations".2 
Pragmatic competences include thinking and all such 
verbs. Ryle gives such pragmatic competence a separate 
status! "Now higher grade dispositions of people with which 
this inquiry is largely concerned are, in general, not single 
track dispositions, but dispositions the exercises of which 
are indefinitely heterogeneous."3 But he does not mean that 
there are such generalizations which would make human 
behaviour predictable! "It is clear that such statements 
[dispositional] are not laws, for they mention particular 
things or persons. On the other hand they resemble laws in 
being partly 'variable' or open"'* The mongrel-categorical 
statements, which includes thinking are to be explained as 
" given that the bird is migrating and the soldier is 
1. Ibid., p. 47. 
2. Ibid., p.48. 
3. Ibid., p.44. 
4. Ibid., p. 119. 
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obediently fixing his bayonet are both mongrel categorical 
statements, what is the difference which we signalize by 
saying the soldier is but the bird is not, applying his mind 
or acting on purpose? At least a minimal part of the answer 
is this. To say that a sugar-lump is dissolving, a bird 
migrating, or a man blinking does not imply that the sugar 
has learnt to go liquid, that the bird has learnt to go south 
in the autumn, or that the man has learnt to blink when 
startled. But to say that a soldier obediently fixes his 
bayonet, or fixed it in order to defend himself, does imply 
that he has learned some lessons and not forgotten them."-^  
Ryle is here careful in making a distinction between reflex 
or instinct and behaviour. The behaviour is dispositional, 
which is learnt. The disposition is acquired by learning it 
such that when exercising the disposition one thinks about 
what one is doing. Thinking is an integral part of the 
performance, somewhat like self-designing in cloth materials. 
If this is the case then we will have to admit that there can 
be no preceding events either. 
So Ryle is denying the accompaniment or precedence of 
intellectual performances, but not intellectual performances 
themselves. Secondly, Ryle is denying preceding events but 
not accompanying events. And it is an effort to deny occult 
happenings, the favourite of the official theory. It would be 
1. Ibid., p.140. 
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then that Ryle would also deny occult accompanying events. 
The simple accompanying events could be tolerated for they 
are not ghostly or mysterious. The simple accompanying events 
can be inferred through the 'inference ticket'. But it should 
be emphasized that Ryle does not deny intellectual 
performances: "The crucial objection to the intellectualist 
legend is this. The consideration of propositions is itself 
an operation the execution of which can be more or less 
intelligent^less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to 
be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had 
first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would 
be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the 
circle."1 Ryle furthers his argument by citing the example of 
chess-playing, which can be done intelligently. According to 
the official theory the player must first read a rule book 
and then play chess. But, Ryle says, reading cjDuld_its^ 4£-- be 
^inteTTigently or stupidly done and therefore requires a 
further book, and so on. 
Ryle, through these arguments, shows the primacy of 
pragmatic competence over prepositional competence. But 
having taken thinking to be an intellectual performance, and 
capable of being intelligently or stupidly performed, Ryle 
had to argue against the official theory that thinking has to 
1. Ibid., p.31. 
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be done in accordance with rules of thinking. He bunches up 
thinking with overt performances and treats thinking in the 
same way. He says in The Concept of Mind; "First there are 
many classes of performances in which intelligence is dis-
played, but the rules or criteria of which are unformulated. 
The wit when challenged to cite the maxims, or canons, by 
which he constructs and appreciates jokes is unable to an-
swer. Rules of correct reasoning were first extracted by 
Aristotle, yet men knew how to avoid and detect fallacies 
before they learned his lessons, just as men since Aristotle, 
and including Aristotle, ordinarily conducted their arguments 
without making any internal reference to his formulae."^ 
The intelligent act is for Ryle an overt performance, a 
pragmatic competence, acquired by practice and not through 
rule-books. The performance is an overt public knack or 
-^ tri'llty to dc^ scmetiiing-;—'^ To-^ ay—tha±- most—peopie—have— minds-
(though idiots and infants in arms do not) is simply to find 
that they are able and prone to do certain sorts of things, 
and this we do by witnessing the sorts of things they do."2 
The accompanying events, which Ryle does not deny and are 
occult for the official theory are apprehensible through the 
'inference-tickets' and are not mysterious. They are, in 
other words, indirectly witness-able. But the witnessing 
1. Ibid., p.30. 
2. Ibid., p. 59. 
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surely is not sufficient to say whether the act is 
intelligent or not. There must be some criteria for calling 
one act intelligent and another not. The third person if 
asked, like the wit, cannot formulate the criteria. 
Therefore, it can be argued that one can "grasp" the 
relevance of the rule without being able to formulate or 
enunciate it. In other words, contra Ryle, one does not have 
to sit down and enunciate the rules or principles, this, a 
Cartesian can claim is misconceived by Ryle, before acting, 
but nevertheless one could act in accordance with those rules 
or principles, 
Ryle would argue against this piece of reasoning by 
suggesting that in order to be in possession of prepositional 
knowledge one has to 'grasp' it. And 'grasping' is itself an 
operation, which could be itself according to rules, so one 
requires further rules for grasping, and so on. This again 
leads the Cartesian into an ad-infinitum. Therefore, Ryle 
would say, pragmatic competence has to be prior to the grasp 
of the prepositional knowledge. 
Ryle, through his insistence for primacy of pragmatic 
competence, is presenting a case of active agent as opposed 
to the passivity attributed by the official theory. The facts 
of observation or detecting of fallacy could at the most fit 
into the passive picture. But this is not all that a person 
does. A person also works out fallacies. The detecting or 
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observing of fallacies would be incidental, whereas working 
out will be deliberate. The deliberation being itself an 
indication of activity. And most of our pragmatic competences 
are deliberate exercises. But the working out could be an 
'internal operation', permissible in Rylean theory, and may 
be intrinsic or private, but Ryle would not permit this to be 
an occult operation. 
Lyonsl has criticized Ryle, by suggesting, that the 
example (of the wit working out jokes but not be able to give 
criteria or principles he is using) he gives are not suited 
or do not make out the case he wants to make out. Lyons says 
that the example only shows that the wit is not in possession 
of 'knowledge that' and not that 'knowledge how' has primacy 
over 'knowledge that'. Lyons furthers his criticism by saying 
that the wit knows how to make good jokes but he also must 
'know that' this is a good joke. The wit therefore is in 
possession of some prepositional competence. Ryle has 
conceded the point by relating the idea of self-teaching. It 
appears that mongrel categorical or multi-track dispositional 
statements, indicating 'knowing how', would contain some 
'knowledge that'. The pragmatic competence thesis is fully 
applicable only to the cases of determined dispositions. The 
mongrel-category requires intellectual operations or events 
and this would involve some prepositional knowledge. 
1. Lyons, W.; Gilbert Ryle, pp. 65-66. 
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Swann has argued that on Ryle's account all 'knowledge 
that' is reducible to 'knowledge how', if this is the case 
then there is no distinction left for all knowledge will be 
•knowledge how'. Therefore, says Swann, for Ryle, to maintain 
a distinction, he would have to posit an actual occurrent 
possession of knowledge. But such a knowledge would mean an 
internal storehouse of facts. Swann says: "Moreover and 
ironically enough in order to restore the distinction and 
then find a proper logical niche for knowing that, it looks 
as if we must return to that scandalous past when knowing 
that was taken to mean possessing an actual piece of knowl-
edge, privately stored in my ghostly chamber like a document 
in a pigeon hole".-'- The example of knowing French, and thus 
disposed to fluently converse in French, which Ryle gives, 
falls under this analysis. 
But Swann is not careful enough to make a distinction 
between knowledge of propositions and prepositional 
knowledge. The knowledge of propositions, like in the case 
of knowing French is possibly stored but are the rules also 
stored or are the rules 'knowing how' to use these 
propositions. Roland^ does make a distinction between 
1. Hartland-Swann, J: The logical status of 'knowing that' 
p. 113 
2. Roland, J: On 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' 
'knowing how' 'to perforin tasks anid"'J<|jowing hg)^ '\j.^ o answer, 
the latter is a prepositional response. The performance of 
task comes through practice whereas prepositional response 
does not. The prepositional response, might be considered 
privately and might come after intellectual deliberation done 
internally or privately. There might be intellectual 
performance before the prepositional response; not all 
prepositional response is immediate. Ryle doco commit the 
error of assimilating all 'knowledge how' to the general 
model of knowing how to perforj^ ^^ a^akr^ '-N'i^ to^ E^ as not all 
->' 
performances are tasks. • ^ ACCNO. 
Lyons has developed a 'punter exampl^r to Ryle's 
arguments. Take, for example, an in?fe^ ^^ '6^ j(i^ '^ man fording a 
river, something which he has not done before. Now if the 
person successfully fords the river by thoughtful strokes, 
and not succeeding simply by chance, could he said to be 
'knowing how'. Since the success is at the first try then 
there cannot be attempted fordings, no practice is required 
which is Ryle's criteria of acquiring 'knowledge how'. Lyons 
says: "What I am getting at is a very fundamental difficulty 
any analysis of intellectual activities in terms of 
dispositions, namely that it cannot make sense of the pre-
dispositional intellectual activity which eventually becomes 
dispositional. It cannot make sense of learning to play 
chess, but only of playing chess intelligently because one 
has a disposition or proneness to do so. The learning, which 
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was part of the process of inculcating the disposition, 
cannot itself be a disposition."^ The acquiring of 
disposition cannot itself be a disposition. Ryle could argue 
that there can be a second order disposition. But learning 
has no physical counterparts. The learnt could be exhibited, 
but the present continuous, that which is taking place has no 
display. It would be avoiding the question to suggest a 
second order disposition for it could then be asked what 
behaviour pattern does it have and no answer would be 
forthcoming. 
In the account of dispositions, which Ryle gives, we 
have found that there is a need for a categorical basis 
otherwise we have no explanation for dispositions themselves. 
The distinction of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' shows 
that there are activities which cannot be accounted for by 
dispositional analysis, but instead require some non-
dispositional accounting. Lyons has suggested that pre-
dispositional accounting is required in case of learning. We 
had also left open the question of whether accompanying 
"mental events" with behaviour would be rejected by Ryle or 
not. The intellectualist legend is what Ryle is arguing 
against. He, thus denies preceding events or intellectual 
performances and accompanying intellectual performances, but 
1. Lyons, W.: Gilbert Ryle, p.68. 
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there is nothing to be found in The Concept of Mind which 
would suggest a rejection of accompanying events. 
The problems mentioned above become especially apparent 
when dealing with silent, internal, intellectual 
performances, which Ryle admits. A dispositional account, per 
Ryle, would require that some behaviour be present. But this 
does not seem to be coming foisfth for such activities as 
silent reading, mental arithmetic or composing in one/s head. 
Ryle points out: "For, roughly, the mind is not the topic of 
sets of untestable categorical propositions, but the topic of 
sets of testable hypothetical and semi-hypothetical 
propositions."1 The problem is of giving a behaviourist 
dispositional account of intellectual activity where no 
behaviour is present. 
It was these difficulties which had led Ryle to 
disclose that he has been perfunctory with the concept of 
thinking in The Concept of Mind. He points out, in The Concept 
of Mind, the mistake committed by the official theory: "The 
traditional theory of mind has misconstrued the type 
distinction between disposition and exercise into its 
mythical bifurcation of unwitnessable mental causes and their 
witnessable physical effects."^ The dispositional account as 
1. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.46. 
2. Ibid., p. 33 
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we have seen, works well for those psychological predicates 
which have manifested behaviour or 'physical effects'. But 
where there are no physical effects, we are once again stuck 
with the unwitnessable. Ryle gives an example to overcome the 
problem: "One boy may, while thinking about cricket, give by 
rote the same correct answers to a multiplication problem 
which another boy gives who is thinking what he is doing. Yet 
we do not call the parrot 'logical', or describe the 
inattentive boy as working out the problem."^ But the example 
falls short of the problem. For the problem is that when we 
have no behaviours how do we talk about dispositions. The 
inattentive boy is behaving inattentively. 
Carr has pointed out that psychological predicates have 
an air of precedence but this is something which Ryle denies, 
as we have seen above. An acknowledgement of this would have 
defeated Ryle's purpose for as Carr points out: "Clearly in 
the first place such an approach requires us to recognize and 
admit to our ontology a certain class of individual events 
for which the principles of identity and individuation remain 
notoriously unclear."^ it was Ryle's purpose, and why he 
could not admit to a Realist ontology, to somehow steer clear 
of the 'notoriously unclear', he says: "But in looking beyond 
1. Ibid., p.40. 
2. Carr, D.: Logic of Knowing How and Ability, p. 401. 
81 
the performance itself, we are not trying to pry into some 
hidden counterpart enacted on the supposed private stage of 
the agent's inner life. We are considering his abilities and 
propensities of which this performance is an actualization. 
Our enquiry is not into causes (and a fortiori not into 
occult causes), but into capacities, skills, habits, 
liabilities and bents".! 
THINKING: 
Ryle is at pains in The Concept of Mind to give 
thinking a single aspect theory. Ryle says: "We may now turn 
to a new feature in logical behaviour of heed concepts. When 
a person hums as he walks, he is doing two things at once, 
either of which he might interrupt without interrupting the 
other. But when we speak of a person minding what he is 
saying, or what he is whistling, we are not saying that he is 
doing two things at once. He could not stop his reading, 
while continuing his attention to it, or hand over the con-
trols of his car while continuing to exercise care; though he 
could continue to read but cease to attend, or continue to 
drive but cease to take care."^ we have seen earlier that 
thinking also means doing something well with attention, with 
one's mind on the job etc. and this is the sense available 
1. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind. p. 45, 
2. Ibid., p.132. 
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here. But as we have noted earlier that where behaviour is 
available dispositional account functions well, as it does 
here. It is the process verbs which require to be disposi-
tionally described. 
Ryle admits that there is something episodic about heed 
concepts. "So while we are certainly saying something 
dispositional in applying such a heed concept to a person, we 
are certainly also saying something episodic."^ Ryle has 
admitted to the fact that two similar overt actions or 
reactions could spring from two dissimilar frames of mind: 
"Here it is necessary to point out that readiness to answer 
questions about one's actions and reactions does not exhaust 
the heed we pay them".^ so we have to either explain a 
conjunction of similar overt and dissimilar covert 
occurrences or construe the matter in some other way. 
Nevertheless we will have to concede either a dual matter of 
facts or singular matter of facts with different inference 
warrants appended. But as we have seen the inference ticket 
thesis of Ryle remains intact even if dispositional theory is 
rejected. The 'inference-tickets* could lead to both 
hypothetical or categorical. It is a dichotomy which Ryle was 
well aware of : "Save to those who are spell bound by 
dichotomies, there is nothing scandalous in the notion that a 
1. Ibid, p. 134 
2. Ibid, p.132 
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statement be in some aspects like statements of brute fact 
and in other respects like inference licences; or that it may 
be at once narrative, explanatory, and conditionally 
predictive, without being a conjunctive assemblage of 
detachable sub-statements."^ It is the heed concepts which 
bridge the gap. 
Ryle, in dealing with 'heed concepts', allows no 
'occurrence' which could possibly be the cause, although he 
allows 'frame of mind": "In this sense 'expect' is used to 
signify not an occurrence but a standing condition or frame 
of mind."2 Ryle emphasizes the point when talking about 
thinking: "We may apply this picture to one of our central 
issues. Thinking, on the one view, is identical with saying. 
The holders of the rival view rightly reject this identifica-
tion, but they make this rejection,naturally but wrongly, in 
the form that saying is doing one thing and thinking is doing 
another thing. Thinking operations are numerically different 
from verbal operations, and they control these verbal opera-
tions from another place than the place in which these verbal 
operations occur. This, however, will not do either, and for 
the same reasons as those which showed vulnerability of the 
identification of thinking with mere saying. Just as undisci-
1. Ibid., p. 135 
2. Ibid., p. 168. 
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plined and heedless saying is not thinking but babbling, so 
whatever shadow-operations may be postulated as occurring in 
the other place, these too might go on in their undisciplined 
and heedless manner; and they in turn would not be 
thinking."^ So a person would not be classified as thinking 
if he is doing whatever he is doing, including saying, auto-
matically. He should be 'acting' or 'saying', more or less, 
critically, carefully, consistently and purposefully. But 
these are dispositions learned by practice and thus there are 
no prior or concomitant occurrences of extra operations. But 
it should be noted in passing, that Ryle is only talking 
about operations and not events, although he does not ac-
knowledge events as 'causes' but he does not deny their 
occurrences. Fodor has remarked! "I propose to say that 
someone is a realist about prepositional attitude iff (a) he 
holds that there are mental states whose occurrences and 
interactions cause behaviour and do so moreover in ways that 
respect (at least to an approximation) the generalization of 
common-sense belief desire psychology; and (b) he holds that 
these causally efficacious states are also semantically 
evaluable."2 Ryle is not a 'Realist' as we have already seen 
and as such cannot allow 'causal efficacy'. 
1. Ibid., p. 311. 
2. Fodor, J.A.: Fodor's Guide to Mental Representations, 
p.87. 
8^ 
Ryle in The Concept of Mind, takes thinking to be an 
ambiguous term. He says that thinking is ambiguous and vague 
as the term intellect. The first sense of thinking is the 
sense of the English noun 'think' which is a synonym of 
•believe' and 'suppose'. In this sense it is possible to talk 
of a person to think a great many silly things and again 
could say of a person that he thinks very little. The second 
sense in which a person is said to be thinking hard what he 
is doing, when he is paying close attention to, say, playing 
the piano. But this sense does not entitle the person to be 
talked of as pondering or being, in any way, pensive.^ Ryle 
says that apart from these two senses, there is a special 
sense: "It is sometimes said that by an 'intellectual 
process' or by thinking, in the special sense required, is 
meant an operation with symbols such as, par excellence, 
words and sentences."2 it is this special sense which is the 
source of problem for Ryle. 
In order to clear the ambiguity Ryle distinguishes 
between 'thinking' and 'thought'. The term 'thinking' is 
ar^ ylied to the description of the work done. It therefore, 
can be described as careless, insufficient, etc. This will 
come under heed concepts. By 'thought' is meant that which is 
1. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, pp.265-266. 
2. Ibid., p. 266. 
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described by the use of true and false, as Ryle points out: 
"The importance of drawing this distinction is that the 
prevalent fashion is to describe the work of thinking things 
out in terms borrowed from description of results reached."-^  
Ryle acknowledges that since we never find ourselves in such 
acts, the official theory considers the acts to be 'very 
subterranean happenings'. The reason for the confusion of 
'thinking' and 'thought', apart from not catching ourselves 
in the act of thinking, is that: "On some accounts it is a 
defining property of intellectual operations that they are 
governed by the purpose of discovering truth. But bridge and 
chess are intellectual games in which the purpose of 
performing the required intellectual operation is victory and 
not discovery."^ Ryle has here cited a counter-example to any 
such dictum that 'thinking yields knowledge'. Thinking then 
for Ryle, is exercise of skill, be that in discovering truth 
or winning a game. But this is very well for the 'activity 
involving sense' of thinking the special sense still does not 
get an explication in dispositional terms, and this is 
because there is a lack of physical activity in this special 
sense. 
The only source available for the behaviourists to 
establish, what can be called, to avoid controversy, non-
1. Ibid., p.268 
2. Ibid., p.265 
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overt behaviour instead of covert activity, is cross-
questioning. Ryle does allow this when talking about 
retrospection, the cross-questioning has to be immediately 
after, not much time should have lapsed. But the cross-
questioning is an indication of some private internal 
activity. The internal activity is also something which a 
person is immediately conscious of, it is a 'current event' 
and Ryle does not allow this. This perplexity forced the 
behaviourist to talk of such physiological aspects as 
'laryngeal movements' or 'action potentials'. But logically, 
it can be argued, that there is no discernible overt 
behaviour. In fact Ryle does not allow any such neuro-
physiological hook ups. He requires that we be aware of the 
behaviour and therefore cannot take refuge is these 
physiological concepts. Ryle says: "But the precise force of 
this expression 'thinking what he was doing' is somewhat 
elusive."1 The reason for elusiveness is that it cannot be 
determined because the same action could be done both 
thinkingly and from force of habit. 
The explanation for mongrel categoricals, which Ryle 
offers, is: "When a person is described as applying his mind 
to some such specifiable action or reaction, it is legitimate 
to say that he is, in a certain sense of the verb, thinking 
1. Ibid., p.106. 
88 
or heeding what he is doing or experiencing or 'applying his 
mind' to it. This does not mean that he is necessarily 
communing with himself about what he is doing or 
experiencing. He need not, though he may, be murmuring to 
himself comments, strictures, instructions, encouragements, 
or diagnoses, though he is doing this, it is again a proper 
question to ask whether or not he is thinking what he is 
murmuring."1 There is a tentative tone, which is apparent, in 
Ryle's comment. Ryle is stuck for an explanation and thus 
allows the possibility of prepositional accompaniments. 
In saying things Ryle gives 'significance' as the 
criteria to distinguish between thoughtful talk and not 
thoughtful talkingt "It is to do one thing with a certain 
drill in a certain frame of mind, not by rote, chattily, 
recklessly, histrionically, absent-mindedly, or deliriously, 
but on purpose, with a method, carefully, seriously, and on 
the qui vive. Saying something in this specific frame of 
mind, whether aloud or in one's head, is thinking the 
thought."2 Then Ryle further adds : "It is not an after 
effect of thinking the thought such that the author might 
conceivably have thought the thought, but shirked saying the 
thing to himself, or to the world. "-^  There are two things to 
1. Ibid., p. 137. 
2. Ibid., p.279 
3. Ibid. 
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be noted here, firstly a preoccupation with the dualist model 
and secondly, that Ryle is suggesting that thinking of 
thoughts would result in saying of things to oneself or 
somebody else. But in the quotation above he is arguing that 
saying of thingsis not an after-effect. In other words, 
thinking of thoughts is saying of things, at least, to 
oneself. The thinking of thoughts then can be internal silent 
monologues. But earlier Ryle had suggested that communing 
with oneself is not necessary for 'heeding', it would then 
mean that communing takes place, and usually with oneself, in 
thinking proper, that is when the mind is pensive. 
The thoughts for Ryle can be composed of abstract 
terms: "If a person is at a particular moment using an 
abstract term, using it significantly and using it knowing 
its significance, he can be said to be using an abstract 
idea, or even thinking an abstract thought, notion or 
concept."1 Ryle here talks about 'knowing significance' which 
would mean prepositional competence, for how else could we 
derive the significance. But Ryle has denied that in doing 
Lhings, and this includes thinking, prepositional competence 
is required. Ryle has not noticed the disparity as the one 
above, he says: "Experiencing difficulties with the syntax of 
his sentence, he may 'listen for' and 'hear' the appropriate 
1. Ibid., p. 289 
90 
rule of syntax being dictated to him in a tone of voice which 
is half his own and half that of his school master."^ His 
preoccupation with Cartesianism seems to carry the day: "He 
[a person with mind on the job] will be talking or writing, 
heeding what he is saying.,So we can say, if we like, that he 
is at particular moments heedfully deploying his abstract 
terms, premise sentences, conclusion sentences, arguments, 
graphs equations,etc. he is then and there thinking what they 
mean."2 Ryle cannot possibly admit the there and then and, 
thus says though it is legitimate it is hazardous for it 
implies that there is a shadow-process and the writing, etc. 
are its expressions. He writes: "And this is just the 
temptation that is yielded to by those who describe 
theorizing activities as internal fore shadowings of the 
prose-moves made in the didactic telling of an achieved 
theory."3 
Ryle finds himself constantly pushed towards admitting 
a duality: "So if we like to reserve the word 'thinking', in 
the sense of 'thinking out', for some of the prepatory 
pondering labours without which he would not have got his 
theory, then that thinking cannot be described as consisting 
of, or containing, the making of any judgements, save in so 
far as he may have settled some sub-theories en-route, which 
1. Ibid., p. 297. 
2. Ibid., p. 279. 
3. Ibid., p. 280. 
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he was accordingly prepared to deliver to himself, to the 
reporters, or to Scotland Yard in interim reports."1 The 
advantage of such an approach would obviously be that it 
would avoid the Cartesian folly, this is why the emphasis on 
•cannot'. But there are still certain sub-theories which are 
settled with oneself. Ryle says: "Thinking things out is 
described as consisting, at least partly, of constructive 
'seeings' of implications. But this is to describe theorizing 
work by analogies with what is not work but achievement, or 
it is to describe what are actually less or more difficult 
self-schoolships by analogies with achievements, which are 
effortless, just because a long run of previous efforts has 
long since inculcated complete facility in making them."^ if 
thinking is not to be analogous to achievement then where 
does the difference lay? Ryle has said: "Achievements and 
failures are not occurrences of the right type to be objects 
of what is often, if misleadingly, called immediate 
awareness."3 But then thinking would possess the 
characteristic of immediate awareness because thinking 
something out gives results be they discoveries or victories. 
Besides, the self-schoolship must be something which is 
immediate awareness and immediate correction. Ryle says that 
1. Ibid., 281. 
2. Ibid., p. 286. 
3. Ibid., p.144. 
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applying one's mind can be described without research,^ which 
means an immediate consciousness of the happening. 
The solution to this predicament offered by Ryle is: 
"Trying to comply with teaching is part of trying to do the 
thing, and as child learns to do the thing, he also learns to 
understand better and apply better the lessons in doing the 
thing. Hence, he learns, too to double the roles of 
instructor and pupil, he learns to coach himself and to heed 
his own coaching, i.e. to suit his own deeds to his own 
words. The good referee does not blow his whistle at every 
moment of the game, nor does the trained player cease to 
apply his mind to the game whenever he attends to the 
referee's whistle; rather, he shows that he is not applying 
his mind to the game unless he does attend to the whistle. We 
are all trained to be our own referees, and though we are 
not, all cr most of the time, blowing ou^ whistles, we are 
most of the time ready or half-ready to blow them, if the 
situation requires it and comply with them, when they are 
blown."2 This brings in the duality lurking behind The 
Concept of Mind. So Parry remarks: "Thus we conclude, that 
applying criteria is coaching oneself and heeding the coach-
1. Ibid., p. 141. 
2. Ibid., p.141-142. 
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ing."-^  Ryle further adds to clarify: "Similarly, we, if duly 
trained, can, much of the time, deliver to ourselves the 
injunctions, suggestions, and verdicts that are more or less 
pertinent and contributory to whatever is at that moment 
occupying us."2 But this lands Ryle into greater troubles, 
for as Parry points out-: "This is comparable to the referee 
who, after the game, can describe what went on because he was 
involved in giving the 'rulings' and 'rebukings'."^ The 
duality gets emphasized as Ryle says again:"Thinking things 
out involves saying things to oneself, or to one's other 
companions, with an instructive intent."^ 
The refereeing analogy brings to the forefront the 
unaccountability of thinking in the frame work of The Concept 
of Mind. The refereeing or the schooling is an event or 
happening, since it is in the present continuous it is also 
series of continuing events. Parry has put the point aptly: 
"Being able to referee is exercising that disposition - and 
it is going on through out the whole game."^ Parry calls this 
an activity . Let us, for the time being, leave the question 
open whether it is to be counted as activity or not. But an 
1. Parry, R.D.: Ryle's Theory of Action p. 387. 
2. Ryle, G. : The Concept of Mind p. 142. 
3. Parry, R.D. : Ryle's Theory of Action p. 387. 
4. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind p. 294-295 
5. Parry, R.D.: Ryle's Theory of Action, p.388. 
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event cannot be denied. We have been arguing that Ryle does 
not deny accompanying event whereas he emphatically denied 
preceding or accompanying acts. This is what should have 
disturbed Ryle for there certainly is a duality of events, 
and he allows nophysical or categorical basis. The only 
option left open goes against the entire project of The 
Concept of Mind, as Parry puts it: "It seems comparable to 
saying that a person is a composite of body and soul and then 
being told that a soul is non-material, internal person."^ 
This dilemma seems a direct result of such viev/s as: "The 
description of this frame of mind need not mention any 
episodes other than this act itself, though it is not 
exhausted in that mention."^ This is surprising because Ryle 
had promised a dispositional account which would be 
exhaustive. It is some such views which prompt some critics 
to call Ryle an 'interactionist'.^ 
It was thus, I feel Ryle's project to repair the 
concept of thinking for it would yield results which would 
enable either the discovery of a concept of mind or enable a 
repairing of The Concept of Mind. 
1. Ibid., p. 389. 
2. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p.106 
3. Skillen, A.: Mind and Matter, p.515. 
Cliapter-2 
Loqical IIIeqitiMiacu of Yhinkinq 
96 
Frege was over enthusiastic to depsychologize 
'thinking*, he demanded that thinking be dissociated from the 
connotations, it has gathered, of being an entirely 
subjective mental process.^ Fregean lead set Ryle the task of 
attacking the official doctrine, which postulates ideas as 
mental entities. The official doctrine propagated that it is 
these mental entities which give meaning. Ryle's 
characteristic comment is: "To say something significant, in 
awareness of its significance, is not to do two things, 
namely to say something along or in one's head and at the 
same time, or shortly before, to go through some other 
shadowy move."^ Descartes' theory of mind is also a theory of 
meaning.In contrast Wittgenstein said that the meaning of a 
word is not an experience or a process, for no process could 
have the consequence of meaning. In 'talking thoughtfully' 
there are no two processes such that 'talking thoughtlessly' 
misses out on one of the pair of parallel processes. 
Ryle's The Concept of Mind has as its major 
preoccupation the demythologizing of mental concepts by 
establishing a single aspect dispositional description. But 
Ryle found that the central Cartesian concept, paradigm of 
mental activities, proved to be un-yielding to his 
1. Frege, G: The Thought. 
2. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind p. 279 
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dispositional analysis. A theory of meaning contra the 
Cartesian theory, as Ryle realized, has to provide a 
sufficiently adequate use of the verb 'thinking' if it is to 
be accepted as an alternative. Ryle says : "It might be 
suggested that at moments when the astronomer says to 
himself, in his head, ... orbit..., then at that moment, he 
is actively having in mind what the word 'orbit' means 
provided, of course, that he is thinking what he is saying to 
himself, and not just absent-mindedly parroting the word. Is 
there a particular, recollectable experience of actively 
having in mind what is signified by the word that is 
currently coming off one's tongue?''^ Ryle then goes on to 
give example of the wasted and futile efforts of Locke, 
Berkely and Hume to locate ideas among recollectable 
experience of a person thinking. 
Ryle argues: "An actor's part may be running through 
his head while he eats and walks, even though he wishes it 
would stop. If he is not deliberately rehearsing his part or 
even considers the merits and demerits of his words, he can 
deny that he is thinking, while allowing that he is saying 
significant things to himself. Conversely, a poet, essayist 
or philosopher may be trying hard to find the word, phrase, 
or argument that he needs, but the time when he is thinking 
1. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol.11, p. 477 
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what to say is the time when he still has nothing to say. In 
some thinking, the soul is only stammering to itself."^ A 
thesis which runs counter to The Concept of Mind. In denying 
significant sayings, Ryle intends to deny the Cartesian 
theory of meaning. Wittgenstein writes: "When I think in 
language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself 
the vehicle of thought".2 Both the philosophers insist on 
rejecting the Cartesian theatre of meanings, to them it is a 
bogey. 
In the above quotations Ryle also rejects 'correctly 
repeating something' as a criterion of thinking, which is 
different to the position he took in The Concept of Mind, 
where he says: "We should not allow that a person has been 
unable to think how the tune went, who had whistled it 
correctly or gone through it in his head. Doing such things 
is thinking how the tune qoes".^ 
Kyle's investigative method can be portrayed in his own 
words: ."The logical type of category to which a concept 
belongs is the set of ways in which it is logically 
1. Ibid., p. 261 
2. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigtaions, p.107. 
3. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p. 254. 
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legitimate to operate with it."-'- Wittgenstein had also 
remarlced that meaning is the function of language. The use of 
an expression, containing the concept, under investigation, 
gives the construction which is allowed for the concept. With 
Wittgenstein, the linguistic philosophers have taken 
propositions to be simple. Since propositions are simple we 
can only talk about the use of different occurrences of the 
concept, under investigation. Frege and Russell had failed in 
their endeavours by talking about the reference of an 
expression. It would prove, so Ryle thought, to be more 
fruitful if we talked about the expressions themselves. 
Kyle's first consideration, in dealing with the 
'concept of thinking', is to look at the claim for logical 
legitimacy of various identifications which different 
theories give to thinking. Ryle felt guilty at the rather 
underhanded dealing of the concept of thinking by 
philosophers, including himself, he wrote: "Consideration of 
the problems tackled, e.g. by the Wurzburg School and its 
successors makes a philosopher like myself feel qualms of 
professional guilt."2 The philosophical theorists have misled 
psychologists to misconceive their subject matter and method 
of investigation. The psychologists have found themselves at 
1. Ibid., p. 10 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 294 
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opposite ends as Vinacke points out: "On the one hand is the 
belief that given proper conditions, any mental process can 
be broken down into its elements, and these described. This 
is opposed, on the other hand, to the conviction that there 
are unanalyzable aspects of thought. The former position was 
held by structuralists, from Wundt to Titchner. The latter 
position was developed by several different investigators, 
most notably by the Wurzburg School."^ Ryle acknowledges that 
philosophers have continuously tried to renew, 
unsuccessfully, their definition of thinking: "...Thus they 
decoyed the experimental psychologists into the profitless 
enterprise of trying to provide systematised information 
about these mythical introspectibles - or, later on, the 
equally mythical unintrospectibles."^ 
Ryle adopted for the analysis of thinking the notion of 
generality. The structure of non-complex propositions cannot 
be obtained by micro-analysis, for concepts are not, 
detachable parts of a proposition and thus cannot be the 
subject of further propositions, but by making the 
investigation more general. The concepts, involved in 
propositions, are differences, which can only be brought out 
by the notion of generality. Ryle was still convinced of this 
formula when he took up 'thinking' after The Concept of Mind, 
1. Vinacke, V.E.: The Psychology of Thinking, p. 43 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 295 
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the first thing he asks is: "What does thinking consist of?"^ 
By this Ryle wants to ask what is there in the instances of 
thinking which makes them fall under the concept of thinking. 
Thinking for Ryle cannot be 'broken down' into simpler 
elements, he warns: "It is natural to suppose, then, that 
'thinking' stands also for specific process or activity, 
composed in various ways out of some common, recurrent, 
element."2 The prescription Ryle gives is: "The title 
•thinking' is not reserved for the labours of trying to 
decide things. I am thinking if I am going over, in my head, 
the fortunes of the heroine of a novel that I have been 
reading; or if I am re-savouring a well turned argument, 
though I have long since accepted its conclusion. Or if I am 
drifting in idle reverie from one topic to another. Only some 
thinking is excogitation; only some thinking is work, only 
some thinking has a topic or a problem."-^  Here we find that 
Ryle is including more under the 'concept of thinking' than 
he did in The Concept of Mind . 
This change most probably is due to Ryle's recognition 
that there are cases of thinking which are 'occurrences of 
thoughts'. Moulton points out: "The 'occurring of a thought' 
1. Ibid./P. 256 
2. Ibid., p. 296 
3. Ibid, p. 258. 
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is merely a starting expression when not proceeded by one's 
trying to think of the object in question, it is also an 
achievement expression when it is preceded by an effort to 
think of the object. Daydreaming, on the other hand, is a 
semi-autonomous process or drifting which one may permit to 
occur when not otherwise'occupied. In contrast 'pondering' is 
a straight forward activity verb, since it must be actively 
carried on by someone and it may be done deliberately, 
slowly, carefully and so forth. The entertaining of thoughts 
is an essential factor or aspect of all of these occurrences, 
and so if we are warranted in drawing inferences about the 
nature of thoughts from the logical grammar of any verb, we 
must include either the entire family, relevant to the topic 
or at least one specimen of each logical type within that 
family. Any slimmer basis will inevitably yield a distorted 
account."^ It is the view which led Ryle to adopting a method 
of generality and rejecting any microscopic study. 
Ryle suggests that if we look at all the forms of 
thinking it would suggest three things: (1) Thinking is 
equally involved for both the conversationalist and the 
knot-tier. But that no silent soliloquies or images of knots 
are necessarily involved; (2) silent thinking, which is not 
silent necessarily, does not have as its essential ingredient 
any one particular species of items, such as words, images 
1. Moulton, D.L.: Thinking and Time p. 76 
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etc. (3) silent thinking can occur without any processions 
at all. The arguments are against the misconceptions of 
philosophers that 'thinking' can be identified with some 
essential ingredient, which will be found in all thinking, 
such as 'internal monologue', 'sequences of episodes of 
images', 'the bringing up of ideas before the mind', etc. 
The issue is important, for these identifications are quite 
often found in contemporary literature, for example Lloyd 
says: "So unless he can now state some proposition (which he 
had not believed), we hesitate to agree with a man that he 
has been thinking."-'-
Ryle's arguments against the logical legitimacy of 
identifying thinking, with some essential ingredient, can be 
subsumed under four categories: The first argument is against 
the 'apparatus thesis' of thinking which suggests that an 
instrument is required for thinking,just like a knife is 
required for cutting cheese. The second is against the 
argument that thinking is composed of some material or 
substance, just as a table is made of wood. The third 
confronts the view that thinking requires some kind of 
medium, somewhat like swimming requires water. The final 
argument is against the thesis that thinking can be discussed 
in respect of a vehicular model, that thinking will have some 
1. Lloyd, A.C.: Thinking and Language, p.37. 
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mode of transportation, in the same way as goods are carried 
by trucks, lorries etc. 
Ryle wants to rid traditional philosophy of all those 
elements which are interwoven with thinking. He has argued 
against framework for thinking which would make some elements 
(or supposed goings-on) the essential ingredients of 
thinking. He argues that any vehicular, apparatus, etc. model 
would be primarily at fault - a mistake he had committed in 
The Concept of Mind. He argues in the papers that there is no 
specifiable apparatus or vehicle or process which would be 
found for all thinking. Ryle has denied all these separately 
and with equal vehemence but sometimes he also seems to argue 
against all of them, clubbed together. For example, he says: 
"In either case we are presupposing that thinking, of 
whatever sort, must, so to speak, employ a concrete apparatus 
of some specifiable kind or other, linguistic or pictorial or 
something else."^ Among the philosophers, who hold that 
language, picture or something else is necessary, for 
thinking, some hold the apparatus thesis, others hold the 
'vehicular model' and yet others the 'process model'. Ryle in 
arguing against language is rejecting all these theses. Of 
the vehicular model he says: "The generic term 'symbol' is 
1. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 395-396 
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sometimes used to cover all the postulated vehicles of 
thinking."^ 
Ryle finds any identifications or ingredients of 
thinking to be radically'misguided, he says: "Both views are 
entirely wrong, wrong not because thinking ought instead to 
be identified with mere or organized processions or bits of 
something else instead, but because this very programme of 
identifying thinking with some procession or other is 
radically misguided."2 Ryle consistently maintains that 
'thinking' does not contain anything isolateable: "I suggest 
that part of the difficulty that the experimental 
psychologists have had in isolating any ingredient acts or 
states common and peculiar to thinking, is just this same 
difficulty that of isolating something which is not there to 
isolate."3 Ryle, thus, writes that there is no a particular 
happening which could be said to be necessary for thinking: 
"No singing without noises, no testimonial - writing without 
ink - marks, no thinking without..., but we can nominate no 
proprietary things or sets of things to fill this gap".'* 
1. Ibid., p. 396. 
2. Ibid., p. 465. 
3. Ibid., pp. 296-297. 
4. Ibid., p.399 
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The events, which might be present in thinking, for 
Ryle are polymorphous and as such are not subsumable under a 
single general title. Thinking, Ryle says, is very different 
from others activities. He says: "I mean this. If during a 
certain period I had been, say, singing or mending a gate or 
writing a testimonial, then when recounting what I had been 
doing. I could if required mention the concrete ingredients 
of my activity, namely the voices that I have uttered, the 
hammer-blows that I had struck and the ink-marks that I had 
made on the paper."^ In singing the production of sound is 
necessary but no such necessity is present in thinking. This 
dilemma is presented by Ryle: "We could stretch our slogan, 
if we hanker for a slogan, to read 'No thinking without 
adverting to something or other, no matter what', but then it 
would be as empty as the slogan 'No eating without food', 'No 
building without materials', and 'No purchases without 
commodities'."2 The reason for the empty slogan, for 
thinking, is that there is nothing which is necessarily 
counted as constituting thinking. 
If thinking has nothing isolateable are we to 
understand by this that we cannot even isolate an event? In 
other words, are there no events taking place? Ryle does not 
1. Ibid., pp. 392-393. 
2. Ibid., p. 405. 
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preclude the possibility of an event/ but he does reject any 
identification of such an event. Moulton has pointed out: 
"Thinking is itself an event or happening, something, as Ryle 
says, in which we can be engaged. The occurring of an event 
or happening entails that something takes place or changes 
since this is the definition of an event."^ Ryle says: "There 
are a host of widely different sorts of toilings and idlings, 
engaged in any one of which is thinking."^ Ryle is emphatic 
on the point: "Where certain specific sorts of incidents be 
going on for some one to be counting, any of a wide variety 
of heterogeneous incidents can be going on when he is 
thinking."-* It is Ryle's contention that ct \ heterogeneity 
which allows no identification of thinking. There are no 
particular or specifiable kinds of changes or happenings with 
which thinking can be identified. 
The change is not even numerically identifiable or 
isolateable, as Ryle remarks: "The difference between merely 
thinking of how fine these roses are and thinking how she 
would have admired them is not like the difference between 
having made eleven and having made twelve phone calls, namely 
1. Moulton, D.L.: The Concept of Thinking p. 359. 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 261. 
3. Ibid. 
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a difference in the number of happenings to be recorded."^ 
The dispositional attempt is clear in Ryle's remark. 
A dispositional analysis, as we have seen in the last 
chapter, for Ryle means not giving any vent to a process 
view. Ryle does not deny mental processes is evident 
through-out his articles on thinking, for example, he says: 
"Notice that I am not saying that stretches of thinking and 
games of cricket are not processes."2 The assertion is that 
thinking can be a process when it is a stretch of thinking, 
in other words, when it is not a stretch then thinking would 
be something very different to a process. The point seems 
rather trivial but for Ryle's analysis it has a great 
importance. He usually produces counter-examples to the 
process-view by citing such cases which are examples of 
•occurrences of thought' or to put it briefly, 'thought 
events' or 'instances'. 
Ryle's initial attempt in the papers is to overcome the 
shortcomings of The Concept of Mind by further developing his 
dispositional analysis. But Ryle keeps coming up with the 
problem of specifying time and place for the thinking which 
occurs. Ryle feels a gnawing inconvenience in the 
specification of duration of thinking. Ginnane has argued 
1. Ibid.,p. 401 
2. Ibid., p. 299. 
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that thinking can be, at least in principle, assigned time 
and place. But the description of event, that is the 
description of change taking place, is sui generis. Lacey has 
objected to the sui generis of Ginnane: "We must distinguish 
between mysteries that " are totally unacceptable without 
simply throwing in the philosophical sponge, and obvious ways 
of making this distinction is to demand that mysteries should 
not contain logical contradictions."^ Ryle does not claim 
thinking to be mysterious; he suggests that a specific 
thinking process is describable but no general 
description of thinking is possible. This argument is usually 
juxtaposed with a strong anti-Cartesian streak, for example 
he repeatedly says: "A stretch of thinking is not a process 
of ephemeral incidents of having-concepts-in-mind. There are 
no such incidents, and if there were, a mere procession of 
them would not amount to thinking."^ 
Wittgenstein has posed a similar view: " 'Is thinking a 
kind of speaking?' One would like to say it is what 
aistinguishes speech with thought from talking without 
thinking. - And so it seems to be an accompaniment of speech. 
A process, which may accompany something else, or can go on 
1. Lacey, A.R.: Thoughts and Sui generis, p.130. 
2. Ryle, G: Collected papers Vol. II, p. 448. 
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by itself."^ Ryle has followed the cue: "Lastly, we do not 
reserve the title 'thinking' for inner processes."2 The 
argument is against the notion that all thinking is 'inner 
process' or 'internal operations'. In The Concept of Mind 
Ryle admits intellectual performances which can be described 
as internal operations. In the papers, in order to make out 
his case,Ryle cites the example of the thinking of a child 
muttering while calculating, architect fiddling with toy-
bricks and pianist composing by striking the notes. 
Ryle says : "... the 'thinking' of the non-absent 
minded, non-delirious talker is not a separate act or 
procession of acts, or a separate process of anything."^ in 
his papers there is a deliberate effort to get away from the 
duaJity of The Concept of Mind in dealing with thinking. But 
if not all thinking is process then some thinking is 
occurrence of thought or 'thought-event'. 
His main thrust might be to show that thinking involves 
no states or changes, for he says: "His thinking terminated 
in no results: it aimed at none."^ Ryle, as in The Concept of 
Mind, draws a distinction between 'thinking' and 'thought'. 
1. Wittgenstein, L: Philosophical Investigations p. 107 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 258 
3. Ibid., p.469. 
4. Ibid., p. 400. 
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It is the former with which Ryle addresses himself right 
through the papers. He is in search of a criterion for acts 
of thinking. Hartnack has aptly put the distinction between 
thinking and thought : "Thoughts are not identical with the 
formulation or stating of them. Yet whenever there is a 
thought, it is also formulated or stated. A thought may be 
such activities as to draw a conclusion to assert a 
proposition, to have doubted it, to have rejected it, to have 
set it forth as a proposal or hypothesis."^ Hartnack had 
already pointed out the difference earlier: "To think, in the 
sense of to speculate or ponder, is an attempt to find out; a 
thought is, therefore, either true or false, or is successful 
or not. But it is nonsense to say that a mental image is 
either true or false, or is successful or not."2 The 
comparison is between mental image and thought. It is 
assumed, by some philosophers, that thinking requires some 
kind of mental imagery. Hartnack is pointing out that even 
where thinking could yield prepositional results it would be 
absurd to suggest that there was mental imagery. The concept 
of mental imagery gives vent to separate processes or 
'goings-on*, which Hartnack too, wants to deny. Ryle has 
taken a similar stance which becomes more apparent as we 
proceed towards his 'adverbial account'. To prove this point 
1. Hartnack, J.: On Thinking p. 550 
2. Ibid., p. 544. 
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Ryle brings in such instances as day-dreaming, which he 
classes as thinking acts. 
If thinking is taken to be a process it must involve 
some thing which the process changes or transforms. Fodor, 
for example, says: "There must be mental symbols, because, in 
a nutshell, only symbols have syntax, and our best available 
theory of mental processes - indeed, the only available 
theory of mental processes that isn't known to be false 
needs the picture of the mind as a syntax-driven machine".^ 
Ryle had anticipated such an argument : "Thinking, 
they say, is operating with symbols, where 'symbol' is taken 
to stand for a genus of which verbal expressions are only one 
species".2 Ryle outlines two distin.ct senses of the general 
term 'symbol', to distinguish it from linguistic expressions, 
in order to avoid the confusion which has arisen from a loose 
usage of these terms in defining thinking. The first use is 
the "... most familiar use of 'symbol', words and, a 
fortiori, phrases, sentences and arguments are not symbols at 
all."3 In ordinary usage, Ryle says: "... we think of them 
[symbols] as signs doing duty for other expressions 
Symbols, in this use, are indeed proxies. They are proxies 
1. Fodor, J.A: Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation, p.94 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 262 
3. Ibid, p.263. 
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for other expressions, which are not themselves, in their 
turn, substitutes for still further expressions."-^ There 
would otherwise be a regress. The second use is technical 
occurring in such dicta as 'thinking is operating with 
symbols' and here/says Ryle: "Thinking, .... is operating with 
symbols, where 'symbol' is taken to stand for a genus of 
which verbal expressions are only one species."^ It is very 
important not to fall into equivocality here. If we were to 
use 'symbol', as in 'thinking is operating with symbols', we 
should realize its technical connotations, otherwise we are 
always in danger of equating, as Ryle has pointed out, 
'signify' with 'stand for' and 'stand for' with 'do duty 
for' or 'represent' .3 
When we think we do not always find ourselves dealing 
with symbols, which represent things we are thinking about. 
The technical usage simply adds a generic term or classifies 
a number of candidates under a single heading. The genus 
'symbol' includes such species as 'verbal expressions', and 
as such it could simply be said that 'thinking is 
prepositional'. Ryle had already raised objections to this, 
in The Concept of Mind, when dealing with pragmatic and 
prepositional competences. The 'methodological behaviourists' 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid p. 262. 
3. Ibid p. 264. 
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had argued that thinking is laryngeal movements involved in 
the production of phonemes. Quine argues against any such 
view:"A geometer or an engineer may think by means also of 
little incipient tugs of the muscles that are used in drawing 
curves or twirling cogwheels" .-'• 
There is yet another problem in suggesting that 
thinking somehow uses 'symbols'. If we suggest this it would 
become very difficult to distinguish the 'use of symbols' 
from 'speech'. The correlation between thinking and saying 
would become obsolete. Lloyd has pointed this out: "For by 
making it consist of symbols, it fails to distinguish thought 
from language, just as both Plato and J.B. Watson in their 
different, ways fail, or decline, to distinguish them".2 
Ryle has objected very clearly to any equating of 
'thinking' with speech: "Even when a person has been thinking 
in English or French, he may not have said anything to 
himself in complete prose. Perhaps his ponderings moved in 
detached words, tentative and broken phrases and were 
promissory jottings of sentences. When his ponderings are 
over we may expect him to tell in ordered prose what he has 
decided, but we have no right to demand that his ponderings 
themselves had the continuity of a lecture or the fluency of 
1. Quine, W.V.O.: Mind and Verval Dispositions p. 85 
2. Llyod, A.C.: Thinking and language p. 36 
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an ordinary remark. Conversely, he might have been conducting 
a glib internal monologue without having been thinking hard 
or even at all".^ The simple presence of language, even if it 
is in the form of usage, is no guarantee of thinking. It is 
not a sufficient criteria for identifying cases of thinking. 
Language as expression differs from mere babbling in that it 
has a tentatively consistent form or, at least, one that 
appears or has the intention of consistency; thinking does 
not necessarily have any such consistency. 
In The Concept of Mind Ryle had misidentified the use 
of language as thinking: "At least an important part of what 
we mean by 'intellectual powers' is those specific capacities 
which are originally inculcated and developed predominantly 
by didactic discourse, and are themselves exercised, inter 
alia, in teaching the same lessons or adaptations and 
expansions of them in further allocations".2 There Ryle had 
talked about thinking in the idioms of coaches, umpires and 
school teachers. But Ryle rejects this view in his papers on 
thinking. He suggested in The Concept of Mind, that thinking 
means schooled performances: "Intellectual powers are those 
which are developed by set lessons and set examinations. 
Intellectual tasks are those or some of those which only the 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol II p. 262 
2. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind p. 291 
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schooled can preform. Intellectuals are persons who have 
profited from the highest available education, and 
intellectual task is edified and edifying talk. Native or 
untutored knacks are not classed with intellectual 
proficiencies, and even arts learned by mere imitation, like 
skipping, playing snap, and chatting, are not spoken of as 
intellectual accomplishments".^ He found this explanation 
perfunctory, for he had to admit a duality for internal 
intellectual performances. 
The view is reversed in the papers: "Notice, too, that 
not all things we class as thinking are subject to epithets 
of coaches or umpires. A man in a day dream is thinking, but 
he is not day-dreaming hard, efficiently, vigorously or 
successfully; nor yet is he dreaming inefficiently, loosely, 
carelessly, or unsuccessfully. He is not navigating well or 
badly; he is just drifting".2 And again: "The thinking of the 
child when he invents new strategies in hide and seek, or 
when he chuckles at a practical joke may well be quite 
unarticulated or unschooled thinking, but 'thinking' it must 
be called if we are to be able to say that the strategem was 
a stupid one or that what he chuckled at was not the 
1. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers Vol. II, p.268. 
2. Ibid., pp. 299-300. 
117 
practical joke that he took it to be, but a hostile or 
careless act".^ 
There is a similar rejection in Hartrack: "It is 
fallacious because it fails to distinguish between thought 
and the expression of it. That this distinction is necessary, 
as I have argued is seen by the fact that a presupposition 
for the expression of thought is thought itself."2 Ryle also 
disagrees with the view that language is necessary. He is 
more radical in his rejection: "I do in fact think that an 
unworded argument belongs where an unworded quatrain 
belongs-nowhere. But I am not following this up, for le 
Penseur may be reflecting, though neither arguing nor 
composing a poem, a speech or a repartee".^ There is no doubt 
that there is a connection between thinking and language but 
this does not necessitate an equating or drawing of an 
analogy. Foder has rightly pointed out: "What connects the 
causal history aspect of Holme's story with its plausible 
inference aspect is precisely the parallelism between trains 
ol thought and arguments: the thoughts that effect the 
fixation of the belief the P provide, . often enough, good 
grounds for believing that P. (As Holmes puts it in another 
1. Ibid, pp. 490. 
2. Hartnack, J: On Thinking p. 551 
3. Ryle, G: Collected Papers, Vol. II p.472 
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Story/ 'one true inference invariably suggests others'). Were 
this not the case -were there not general harmony between the 
semantical and the causal properties of thoughts - there 
wouldn't, after all/ be much profit in thinking".^ It is only 
a matter of profit that in thinking language is usually an 
element/ for thinking most of the time results in saying, but 
not all the time. 
In the arguments against language Ryle says: 
"Conversational remarks are not circumstance detached. What I 
converstionally say hinges in some measure on what you have 
just said; and your remark was not subject to my choice or 
control.... So the notion, quite popular among philosophers, 
that thinkers in saying things to themselves are therefore 
conducting something like inward conversations is not merely 
insufficient, it is wrong. Our composing speakers are trying 
not to compose non-conversational, internally threaded 
sequences of dicta".^ Any framework which suggests the 
equation of thinking and language suggests a private 
monologue.Ryle objects to this equation vehemently: "Consider 
the dictum that in thinking the soul is talking to itself. It 
is clearly too wide and too narrow.^ The conversing is 
1. Fodor, J.A; Fodor's Guide to Mental Representations,p.92 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 491 
3. Ibid p. 261 
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neither necessary nor sufficient. Ryle suggests, in The 
Concept of Mind, that thinking aloud is also thinking, which 
was not so placed in traditional schools. Wittgenstein, too, 
agrees with this saying: "Imagine peole who could only think 
aloud. (As there are people who could only read aloud)."^ 
Wittgenstein wants to assert that 'thinking aloud' should be 
counted among the proper specimens of thinking. 
Ryle says: "Incidentally, not only is it quite wrong to 
say that ia Penseur is merely voicing things to himself, in 
his head or under his breath, but it is also too restrictive 
to say that he must be saying things to himself at all".^ 
Ryle has consistently maintained this view, even in his 
'adverbial account'. This should not be misinterpreted to 
mean thabthere is no thinking activity which requires saying 
things aloud or sotto voce, Ryle says: "There ere, however, 
certain special thinking-activities which certainly do seen 
to require our saying things in our head or sotto voce or 
aloud, and we need to examine, what there is about these 
special-activities that require inward or outward production 
of words and phrases".3 
1. Wittgenstein, L: Philosophical Investigations p. 107 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 487 
3. Ibid p. 394 
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Ryle takes up the following examples to answer the 
question: (1) Preparation of after-dinner speech: "The 
thinking was itself a peice of hunting, phrase-concocting,, 
and sentence mending. It was thinking up words, phrases and 
sentences."1 (2) Multiplying: "Certainly, multiplying does 
not consist merely in saying numbers aloud or in one's head'; 
but we are ready to allow that it requires this, or some 
alternative, in the same sort of way as singing a song 
requires, though it does not reduce to, the uttering of 
noises."2 (3) Arguments: Ryle suggests that thinking of 
arguments requires words and phrases. (4) Would-be lecturer: 
"As what the will-be lecturer is here and now saying to 
himself is mooted and examined for its possible future 
educative effectiveness, so what 1^ Penseur is here and now 
saying to himself is mooted and examined for its chances of 
being a contribution to his own conquest of his own 
problem."^ 
Ryle suggests that there are special types of thinking 
and this model will not hold for all thinking: "Now if, 
improvidently, we pick one of those three [the above 1-3] 
special varieties of thinking as our universal model, we 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid, p.492. 
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shall be tempted to say, as Plato said, that 'in thinking the 
soul is conversing [or perhaps 'debating'] with herself', and 
so postutate any peice of meditating or pondering whatsoever 
has got, so to speak, to run on the wheels of words, phrases 
and sentences."1 He says further: "In short, I suggest at 
least part of the thick descr.iption of what le Penseur is 
trying to do in saying things to himself is that he is 
trying, by success/failure tests, to find out whether or not 
the things that he is saying would or would not be utilizable 
as leads or pointers".2 Ryie maintains that the vehicular 
model will not hold for all thinking. He is also suggesting 
that not all thinking necessarily yields expression of it, 
for some of it is searching. He further argues that some 
thinking is such that it is not propositional. Wittgenstein 
also made the same point while declaring: "Speech with and 
without thought is to be compared with playing of a peice of 
music with and without thought."^ This position might be an 
echo of the Fregean thesis that thought is itself 
imperceptible unless garmented in the clothes of sentences, 
phrases or words. But Ryle has clearly made a distinction 
between thinking and expressing of it. Ryle has argued that 
'thought-concieved' might be expressed in language, or in 
1. Ibid p. 395 
2. Ibid p. 494 
3. Wittgenstein, L.: Philosophical Investigations p. 109 
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prepositional form, which in his view, is not the only 
vehicle. The thought can be communicated using other vehicles 
too. 
The 'thought' is garmented, Ginnane warrants: "A 
particular proposition cannot be identified with any 
particular sentence. Neither can a thought. That is why 
having a thought is not like talking to oneself".^ Witt-
genstein has also noted: "Misleading parallel: the expression 
of pain is a cry - the expression of thought, a proposition. 
As if the purpose of the proposition were to convey to one 
person how it is with another: only, so to speak, in his 
thinking part and not in his stomach".^ We have mentioned in 
the 'Introduction' that there has been a deep-rooted 
confusion between 'thought' and 'thinking'. Sellars, for 
example, says that thinking at the distinctly human level is 
essentially verbal.^ It is this essentiality which is 
objected to by Ryle. Sellars is an upholder of The Analogy 
School, which argues that thinking is analogous, at least 
formally, to language.^ Ryle does not deny that some thinking 
1. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts p. 390 
2. Wittgenstein, L: Philosophical Investigations p. 104 
3. Sellars, W: Conceptual Change p. 82 
4. For example, Searle, J.R.: What is an Intentional state? 
p. 75 "Intentional states represent objects and states 
of affairs in exactly the same sense that speech 
acts repRsent objects and states of affairs." 
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might be so: "Having the idea in question did not require my 
saying anything to myself, in the way in which singing does 
require uttering noises and repairing does require either 
hammar or wire-tying or bolt tightening or something of the 
same concrete sort."-'- Ryle is only arguing that no 
requirement of language is necessary and that thinking does 
not entail the garment of language. He says: "The phrase 'in 
French' and 'in English' do attach natively to verbs of 
saying; it does not follow that they attach to verbs of 
thinking unless the thinking happens to be thinking what to 
say or how to say it."2 
This denial has led to some confusion. Sibley argues 
that it is not clear whether Ryle is not asserting that there 
could be pure and naked thought, a view similar to that of 
Price. Price argues that there must be sensible or quasi-
sensible media 'in' or 'with' which we think.^ This is not so 
for Ryle who asserts: "Incidentally, not only is it quite 
wrong to say of ie Penseur that he is merely voicing things 
to himself, in his head or under his breath, but it is also 
too rstrictive to say that he must be saying things to 
himself at all."^ Le Penseur might be deliberating on a 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 393 
2. Ibid., p. 397 
3. Price, H.H. : Image Thinking, p.139. 
4. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking 
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problem which may not require 'saying of things' but this 
does not mean pure and naked thought, for he may be garmeting 
his thoughts with sounds, if he is composing. For Ryle no 
particular vehicle, apparatus, tool etc. are necessary for 
thinking, each peice ot. thinking would have its own mode, 
depending upon the nature of thinking. For example, Ryle 
says: "This reflecting can be very crudely described as 
operating from and with propositions; and the thinking of 
these thoughts has indeed a certain chilly disengagement from 
the urgencies of the moment, as well as certain 
impersonality".1 But at the same time Ryle does insist: 
"Conversational remarks are not circumstance detached 
so the notion, quite popular among philosophers, that 
thinkers in saying things to themselves are therefore 
conducting something like inward conversations is not merely 
insufficient, it is wrong".^ we must repeat, to emphasize the 
point,that Ryle only rejects the identification of thinking 
and language.^ 
The confusion has arisen from some remarks made by 
Ryle, such as: "... In either case we are presupposing that 
thinking, of whatever sort, must so to speak, employ a 
1. Price, H.H.: Image Thinking p. 139 
2. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol. II, p.487. 
3. Ibid, p.422. 
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concrete apparatus of some specific kind or other, linguistic 
or pictorial or something else".-^  There are two points here, 
firstly, Ryle is saying that for all thinking no specifiable 
apparatus is possible but he does not say that there is no 
specifiable apparatus for any thinking; secondly, what he 
means is put aptly by McCann: "How indeed is one to show that 
all thinking is action by showing first that it is not even 
an event? The claim that thinking lacks a result is not the 
claim that there are no episodes of thinking, but rather that 
thinking does not logically require episodes that fall short 
of being episodes of thinking."2 There is no logical 
requirement of specificiable kind of appratus. This is not 
meant to suggest that no apparatus is required at all. Sibley 
has himself withdrawn his objection by saying: "... if, at 
least at times, Ryle is arguing for the extreme position 
that, in general,thinking requires no embodiment, he also 
seems to admit one kind of exception: some thinking 
necessarily involves words rehearsed either subvocally or 
aloud".3 But Sibley misses the point Ryle makes that some 
thinking requires numerals, some requires toy bricks, and so 
on. 
1. Ibid, p.491. 
2. McCann, H: On Mental Activity, p.594. 
3. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking, p.101. 
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Ryle agrees that trains of thoughts may be language 
dependent, but he rejects a generalization of this formula. 
Fodor explains the point further: "What you want to make 
thinking worth the while is that trains of thoughts should be 
generated by mechanisms that are generally truth-preserving 
(so that 'a true inference (generally) suggests other 
inferences that are also true)'. Argument is generally 
truth-preserving; that/ surely, is the teleological basis of 
the similarity between trains of thought and arguments."1 The 
teleological basis, as pointed out, earlier, is present in 
some thinking, but not in all thinking. Therefore can 
not be made analogous to language. Ryle rejects any theory 
which makes thinking a preservation or searching of truth.^ 
He often cites 'idle reverie', re-savouring of an argument, or 
thinking over yesterday's football match, as part of the 
rejection. 
The above examples help Ryle to deny that attention or 
concentration is required in thinking. Ryle also means to 
include awareness of 'mental activity' or 'thought' under 
this denial, that is why he has chosen the example of 'idle 
reverie'. McCann has argued that a distinction can be drawn 
1. Fodor, J.A: Fodor's Guide to Mental Representations,p.92, 
2. Ryle, G. : Collected Papers Vol. II p. 258 : "Nor do we 
limit the work of pondering, deliberating, considering 
as activities of arriving at truths". 
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between passive and active mind. He suggests that the 
content's first appearance is before a passive mind, when no 
activity is present, which occurs after the appearance.^ 
Concentrating one's attention is the property of the active 
mind. This hints at the distinction between the 'occurrence 
of thought' and 'activity' of thinking. 
We have seen that the problem of awareness had come up 
in The Concept of Mind in the context of the activity of 
thinking which is neither audible nor visible. The only 
recourse for Ryle there was a neuro-physiological hook-up of 
some kind, which of course would go against the whole project 
of The Concept of Mind. Ryle takes up a stance, in the 
papers, to avoid the error committed by him in The Concept 
of Mind. 
There is yet another point for not bringing in the 
concept of attention or concentration. One pays attention 
only when one is aware 'of something' or 'that something', 
both being an awareness of the content. The 'awareness of is 
the strong sense in which one can be aware of the heat of the 
day. The 'awareness that' is the weaker sense in which one 
can be aware that there is a landscape whilst taking a walk. 
The former is the outcome of directing or focusing attention 
on something. The difference is of being aware of an 
1. McCann, H: On Mental Activity p. 596 
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awareness of a state of affairs, which means conscious 
awareness, and being aware of some state of affairs. The 
conscious awareness is the 'having of thoughts'. While in the 
weaker sense it is mere thinking, which includes 'idle 
reverie'. It is this distinction which Norman Malcolm makes 
in his article, 'Thoughtless Brutes',1 to demarcate animals 
gifted with language from those not so gifted. The animals 
gifted with speech, according to Malcolm, are the only ones 
who could be said to 'have thoughts'. The point to be 
noticed here is that awareness has its epistemic connotations 
already denied by Ryle. 
Ryle, in rejecting the process-view, denies that all 
thinking yields epistemic or decisional results, contrary to 
his position in The Concept of Mind. The inclusion of 'idle 
reverie', 'abortive thinking' etc. under the category of 
thinking excludes any talk about thinking in terms of the 
results it may produce. Ryle further argues, in the papers, 
that sometimes we cannot even tell what our thinking was. 
This indicates a sharp departure from The Concept of Mind 
where a cross-questioning, at ""east shortly afterwards, 
would determine the thinking. Urmson criticises Ryle for not 
distinguishing between primary and secondary cases of 
Malcolm, N: Thoughtless Brutes p. 5-20 
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thinking.^ The 'primary' would include all such cases of 
thinking as calculating which are result oriented. The 
'secondary' would include such phenomena as 'idle reverie' 
which produces no results. The reason, says Urmson, for 
including the secondary cases in the category of thinking is 
because of the similarities which can be drawn up with the 
primary cases. But Ryle's arguments are not limit'^ d to the 
distinction between primary and secondary cases, for he could 
easily ask as to where would one place 'abortive 
calculating? Price has pointed out: "Here we may notice that 
it is peculiarly difficult to describe an abortive thinking-
process, one which didn't come off. Just because the telos 
was not achieved, we don't know how to record the episodes 
themselves."^ 
For Ryle thinking is dispositional, an ability, which 
is not observable not unless and until there is some 
behavioural display. But with 'thinking', as we have noticed 
in the previous chapter, the behavioural display is not 
always necessary. It is because of this that Ryle is so 
insistent on denying results. He most probably noticed this 
when dealing especially with the mind qua pensive, in The 
Concept of Mind. In the papers Ryle, most probably, is 
forwarding an argument suggesting that thinking is a kind of 
1. Urmson, J.O.: Polymorphous Concepts. 
2. Price, H.H.: Thinking and language p. 337 
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propensity for which description of behavioural pattern would 
not be necessary. This is a pointer to his polymorphous 
account. Ryle, for example, says: "What a thinker is doing 
with (or about or to) the expressions that occur makes all 
the difference; and there are a score of widely different 
things that he may be doing with (or about or to) them".^ 
McCann^ has pointed out that result is a change of a 
sort, an instance of which is logically required for an 
action, such that murdering of X would require the death of 
X. The requirement here has the feature of necessity or 
entailment, which is the completion aspect, i.e., for murder 
to take place death must occur. The death is the completion 
aspect of murder and also its result. A murder would not have 
taken place if it did not result in death. Results then could 
be 'events' which are necessary for those actions whose 
results they are. McCann says: "When an action is one of 
bringing about a certain change, that change may be called 
the result of the action in question."-^ Then, for Ryle only 
those thinkings which bring about a change or result can be 
actions and not all thinking as such. 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 265 
2. McCann, H: Volition and Basic Action p. 452 
3. Ibid. 
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Ginnane has argued that for a change to have occurred 
the following must be specified: "(a) how long the change 
took, (b) the successive courses or phases of the change, (c) 
the property or properties of the thing in question which 
underwent change (e.g. its colour, shape, size, position, 
mass,electric charge, etc.), (d) which parts of the thing 
were affected and in what order, (e) the nature of the agency 
responsible and the manner of its action, (f) the precise 
difference in the states of affairs before and after the 
change (i.e. apart from purely circular difference that one 
state was before, and the other after, the event) ".-^  
In case of 'occurring of thought', which is employed by 
Ryle as the basis for denial of process view, condition (a) 
could be set aside on the ground that occurring of an event 
does not require a specification of a duration. The 
successive phases or courses of change may not be applicable 
as Lacey points out: "In Aristotelian tradition there are two 
kinds of change, involving respectively a continuant which 
changes in some of its properties and the coming to be or 
passing away of the subject itself. Therefore a change can be 
adequately dealt with logically by being described as a 
coming to be of something."2 in The Concept of Mind Ryle says 
1. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts p. 384 
2, Lacey, A.R,: Thoughts and sui generis, p. 131 
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that dispositions are coming to be of something but he does 
not allow changes in the properties of things. Lacey adds: 
"What comes to be, however, may well be sui generis though 
Ginnane-'- rightly warns against using propositions here - one 
could add that even if propositions are entities they are 
timeless, and so hardly subjects of coming to be."^ Ryle, 
too, has rejected any identification of thinking with 
propositions. The condition (c) would lead us to materialism, 
which is rejected both by Ginnane and Ryle. The Rylean thesis 
does not allow any apparatus of thinking. The parts affected 
by change could only be answered if condition (c) or an 
apparatus model is accepted. The condition (e) is included in 
(b). The condition (f) is ambiguous in that it could mean 
either the changes in or of apparatus which can be taken up 
either in the behaviourist or the neuro-physiological 
materialist accounts. In fact, as far as 'thinking* is 
concerned only (a), (b) and (c) are relevant, the rest would 
follow naturally. 
Brandt and Kim, in their joint article, say: "To say 
that there is an event is to say that some logically 
contingent property (set of properties) is instantiated at a 
specific time and location ... "location' ... [is] a techni-
cal term which may be, but need not be, construed to refer to 
1. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts p. 389 
2. Lacey, A.R.: Thoughts and Sui generis p. 131 
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physical position".-^ It is this technical sense of 'loca-
tion' which is taken advantage of by Ginnane when he declares 
that the thought occurred is located here and now. Kim also 
provides us with a linguistic explication: "Linguistically, 
we can think of ' [ (xn,t) ,P].' as the gerundive nominalization 
of 'Xn has P at t'. Thus '[(Socrates, t)', drinks 
hemlock]' can be read 'Socrates drinking hemlock at t'. 
Notice that [(x,t)P] is not the ordered triple x, t and 
p; the triple exists if x,t and P exist; the event [(x,t), P] 
exists only if x has p at t."^ 'p' is a property — a change 
in property or coming to possess a property is crucial for an 
event. It is this problem of identifying a property which 
leads Ryle into a different direction. It is this property 
syndrome that Ginnane to resort to the notion of sui generis. 
The exemplification of property of particular instances is 
possible for Ryle but it is not possible, according to him, 
to attribute an essential feature which would be common in 
all thinking, which could be said to change. Ryle denies any 
such exemplification because he would like to declare that 
the bone of contention is restricted to a debate between the 
Materialists and the Cartesians. The property, if 
exemplifiable, would then require a 'categorical basis', if 
1. Brandt, R.B., and Kim, J.: Logic of Identity Theory, 
p.516. 
2. Kim, J: On Psycho Physical Identity Theory p. 222-223 
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Cartesianism is to be ren>ected. Ryle denies any materialist 
reductions, together with the denial of Cartesianism. 
Both Ryle and Ginnane hold that a physicalist account 
will not do. Jaeger writes: "What people do take seriously is 
the corresponding question about properties and events, an 
event being the exemplifying of a property by a thing at a 
time. Given same distinction between mental and physical 
properties, we may say that a mental event is the 
exemplifying of a mental property while a physical event is 
the exemplifying of a physical property. The extreme 
physicalists claiin that every mental property is a physical 
property, from which it follows that every mental event is a 
physical event. The moderate physicalist claims that every 
mental event is a physical event, but denies that every 
mental property is a physical property. The key to moderate 
physicalism is the rejection of the inference 'from 'a's 
exemplifying mental property M at t=a's exemplifying physical 
property P at t' to 'mental property M = physical property 
P',"-^  As we have already seen, Ryle would not allow the 
identification of either the event or the property. Kyle's 
argument, discussed in the previous chapter, shows the 
concept of 'mental distinctness', which led him to a double-
aspect theory of thinking in The Concept of Mind . In the 
papers the same argument is reiterated. 
1. Jaeger, R.A.: Notes on logic of Physicalism, p. 424 
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The position which Ryle seems to hold is that there is 
an 'occurrence of thought' but that it is not to be 
acknowledged as a bona-fide event. A bona-fide event would be 
one for which (a) the moment of its occurrence is 
specifiable, at least in principle, and either (b) the event 
is instantaneous or (c) its duration is also in principle 
specifiable.l Moulton says that if the concept of 'occurrence 
of thought' is not a concept of a bona-fide event then it 
must fall under some other logical category, such as 
achievement terms.Thinking, for Ryle, is not an achievement 
term for it does not necessarily yield a result. Achievement 
is also rejected by Ginnane. Moulton writes: "The problem 
consists in the fact that each of these alternatives appears 
to be unacceptable".^ - a position similar to Ryle's. 
We need not go into any great detail here, it would 
simply do to mention that Moulton treats 'occurrence of 
thought' as a starting verb. From which he suggests that 
starting-verbs cannot logically be said to have a duration. 
He says: "To move at all is to have started. There can by 
definition be no duration during which one is starting 
1. These are the characteristics of a bona-fide event as 
exemplified by Moulton, D.L.: Thinking and Time p. 62. 
2. Ibid., p. 63. 
136 
although one might be trying to start during a period."^ 
Moulton cites the starting of a car as an example. He also 
asserts that starting is not a genuine event. He means by 
this that starting is not an event over and above the 
'moving' as winning is not an event over and above the 
running of a race. Ryle also expresses some such views: "He 
was not just having words, but, perhaps, rummaging for and 
finding them. They met a need. It is tempting to put this 
point by saying that he was not just having words but using 
them - the difference being between finding a hammer and 
hammering a nail with it."2 The hammering of a nail already 
implies the having of a hammer in one's hand. Similarly Ryle 
says: "He is pondering, undecided, unsettled. He is in a 
state of search, and very often, though not always, in a 
state of bafflement, that is, of not yet knowing what to do 
in order to solve his problem".^ it is not very clear from 
Kyle's writings whether he wants to treat 'occurrence of 
thought' as a starting verb. He was well aware of the logic 
of starting verbs, in Dilemmas he says: "... Other verbs are 
verbs of starting. ...Now starting and stopping cannot 
themselves have starts and stops, or a fortiori, middles 
either. Noon does not begin, go on and finish.... It [noon] 
1. Ibid., p.68. 
2. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 265 
3. Ibid., p. 424 
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cannot itself go on for a time, however short. It is not a 
process or a state."^ Moulton agreeing with this says that 
the function of 'start' is not to denote a process, activity 
or state, but to signal some change. Therefore, it should be 
said that since Ryle denies process - view of thinking, 
sometimes the 'occurrence of thought' is a start. The 
'occurrence of thought' as a 'starting-verb* must have 
successors like 'achievement-verbs' or must have preceding 
events or processes of which it is an upshot. We have already 
realized that Ryle cannot allow such an account, but at the 
same time he does not want to deny psychological events. 
The 'enumeration principle* which Ryle enacts in The 
Concept of Mind is carried to his papers. Ryle argues that 
since one cannot tell how many events of thinking had taken 
place therefore it would be improper to call them 'events'. 
Sellers criticizing Ryle, although talking about volitions, 
points out that the answer to his question 'How many 
volitions in reciting Little Miss Muffet backwards?' depends 
upon the proficiency of the reciter and the way we decide to 
chop up the mental activity. Sellars says: "Precisely the 
same difficulty can be raised about the number of public 
events that occur when the recitation takes place."^ The 
1. Ryle, G: Dilemmas p. 103 
2. Sellars, W: Fatalism and Determinism, p. 159, referring 
to Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind p. 65. 
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argument applies to the 'enumeration-principle' in general. 
The answer, to such questions, depends upon how events are 
classified and how we like to treat, say for example, 
thinking in general. The 'enumeration principle' in no way 
settles the dispute whether there are thinking events. It 
simply raises the issue, which is linguistic and not 
ontological. The 'thought' or its 'content' is not itself an 
event, it is the occurrence which is an event and Ryle does 
not deny this. The thought or content may be prepositional in 
nature and propositions are not events. 
There is yet another distinction, already mentioned, 
which can be taken up here to clarify the issue. It can be 
claimed that the 'occurrence of thought', the start, is the 
purview of the passive-mind, whereas what happens to the 
thought afterwards, or what are claimed to be processes, such 
as deliberating, pondering, etc. are the signs of mental 
activity. Taylor has made a similar claim. He classifies 
dreams, reveries and thoughts, by which he means the thoughts 
that merely occur or are evoked by external stimuli, as 
mental passivity. He uses the phrase, 'entirely passive 
cognition'. The rest of thinking, such as pondering, 
contemplating etc., what Ryle calls the proper-specimens of 
thinking, Taylor classifies as mental activity.^ The point is 
more clearly stated by Frankfurt who says that turning one's 
1. Taylor, R: Action and purpose. 
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mind in a certain direction or deliberating systematically 
about a problem are activities in which a person engages 
himselfy according to him, these are our active passions.-^ He 
further adds that we are passive by-standers to thoughts 
which occur to us. McCann'highlights this point : "All the 
same, there are forms of thinking that are active. For 
although the first appearance of content before my mind is 
something with respect to which I am passive, I need not be 
passive regarding what happens after it gets there."^ 
Ryle does not invoke any such distinction. But it seems 
difficult to see how else he could possibly account for 
'occurrence of thought' and 'process of thinking' which he 
clearly distinguishes. The problem for Ryle, obviously, is of 
accounting for all thinking in terms of doing. He cannot thus 
talk about passivity. It could be due to some such 
difficulties that Ryle in his 'adverbial account' denies that 
thinking is an activity. Before giving the adverbial account 
of thinking Ryle only denies that a particular activity is 
necessary for thinking. 
For Ryle the rejection of the apparatus theory is 
projected to keep himself aloof not only of the 
1. Frankfurt, H: Freedom of the will and the Concept of a 
person p. 240 
2. McCann, H: On Mental Activity p. 595 
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Duplicationists but also the Reductionists. The 
Duplicationist position was already exposed in The Concept of 
Mind as a category-howler. In the papers on thinking he 
opposes both the camps. One for reducing thinking to mere 
physical activity, the 'nothing-else-but' thesis. And the 
other for giving thinkin'g the 'other-world' status, the 
'something-else-as-well' thesis. The denial of apparatus 
thesis implies that thinking cannot be related to or 
identified with or reduced to neuro-physiological correlates. 
White advances a similar view: "We do not think with our 
mind, or with our brain, in the same way as we see with our 
eyes or hear with our ears".^ This denies not only the 
physicalist view but also the 'methodological behaviourist' 
theories of thinking. Ayer points out: "For even if the 
connection was uniform, it would still be contingent. To say 
that someone was thinking without moving his larynx might be 
empirically false, but it would not be self-contradictory. 
And the same would hold true for any other physical correlate 
that might be assigned to the process of silent thought".^ 
The deterent factor is the contingency of any such relations. 
The Concept of Mind shows Ryle not to accept the 
reduction of psychological predicates to neuro-physiological 
correlates because he thinks that the meaning of the two 
1. White, A.R. :The Philosophy of Mind, p.90. 
2. Ayer, A.J.: Thinking and Meaning, p.9. 
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expressions is different. Place and Smart argue that the 
different meanings of referring expressions does not preclude 
the possibility of the expressions referring to one and the 
same thing. Nothing should be ruled out a priori as being 
contingently identifiable with something-else. The rejection 
of apparatus thesis is the logical outfome of the rejection of 
process view. Russell criticised Ryle for not giving any 
credence to men of science.-'- Hunter has aptly pointed out: 
"It might be objected that we are getting things all 
backwards here in laying so much emphasis on the use of the 
word 'think' and puzzling over what there could be in the 
nervous system that would correspond to its various uses. Are 
we not thereby enshrining our pre-scientific hunches and 
prejudices, requiring that whatever empirical investigation 
shows, it must be consistent with what we have been inclined 
to suppose prior to such investigation?"^ 
Ryle argues that thinking is more than the chronicle of 
'goings-on'. The neuro-physiological events would fall under 
the category of 'goings-on' and a mere assemblage of them 
does not amount to thinking: "We can begin to see why it is 
that the narrative of a peice of my thinking cannot be merely 
the chronicling of actual, monitored happenings 'in my head'. 
1. Russell, B.: The Concept of Mind, pp.8-9. 
2. Hunter, J.F.M.: Wittgenstein and Materialism, p.522. 
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For the content of the thinking comprises its tenor and to 
describe its tenor is prospectively to mention its natural or 
easy sequels". •'• Nathan, in a way, sums up the Rylean position 
in the following passage: "... it seems to be part of our 
general notion of a purely physical process that it is no 
more than a sequence of mere happenings and actions are to be 
distinguished from mere happenings, so it is hard co see how 
any particular discovery about physical processes could ever 
make it standard to say that a purely physical body acts'.2 
Ryle has been hard pushed to account thinking in terms of 
activity but not entirely in terms of bodily acts or at least 
not until the 'adverbial account'. He suggests that the 
relationship of thinking with the 'goings-on' is similar to 
that of history to 'mere chronicles'. It is of these 
chronicles that Ryle says nothing is found in them which is 
necessary or sufficient for thinking. But as far as the 
Reductionist thesis is concerned no other cogent arguments 
are present in Ryle's papers. 
We have argued right through that Ryle does not deny 
'thinking events'. He repeatedly asserts that there are 
incidents. But there is no commitment as to what kind of 
events they are. Ryle says: "The recepients of the metaphors, 
used to describe 'thinking', is expected to discount details 
1. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol.11, p.404. 
2. Nathan, M.N.L.: Materialism and Action, p.507. 
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of the thinking incidents, without which there cannot be any 
thinking".! Again he asserts: "It is the plot of the story 
which is of importance when talking of thinking and not its 
detailed goings-on".2 He seems to be more concerned with 
denying any essential features to the events: "What is meant 
to be discerned is community of plot, not similarity of 
incident. But, of course, there is no plot where there do not 
exist some incidents or other".-^  But these comments pertain 
to the kind of description of operations a man gives, as 
opposed to those given by machines, which would simply give a 
description of the detailed "goings-on". But here the 
metaphor of 'plot' is not clear. A 'plot' has coherence as a 
logical property. Ryle, as we have seen, already rejected any 
such criteria for thinking. 
Ryle has consistently argued that nothing is necessary 
and sufficient to explain thinking, and hence thinking cannot 
be explained through any particular vehicle, apparatus, 
medium, stuff, or process. His view is that there is nothing 
in particular which could constitute a definition of 
thinking. At the same time he does not deny the use of any 
particular tool or apparatus for thinking. He proclaims: "The 
1. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers Vol. II, p.259. 
2. Ibid, p.265. 
3. Ibid, p.259. 
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verbal noun 'thinking' does not, as we knew in our bones, all 
along, denote a special or proprietary activity in the way in 
which 'singing' does. Thinking is not one deptartment in a 
departmental store, such that we can ask what line of goods 
does it provide, and what type of goods does it, ex-officio, 
not provide? Its proper place is in all the departments — 
that is, there is no particular place which is its proper 
place, and there are no particular places which are not its 
proper place".•'• 
Ibid., p.405. 
Chapter-iJ 
The Meaning of 'Thinking' 
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Ryle's efforts to analyse thinking was not only an 
attempt to overcome the shortcomings of The Concept of Mind 
but also to do away with the misconceptions which had been 
popularised as a doctrine. Ryle has given two positive 
accounts of thinking. The first, which is the theme the 
present chapter, is that thinking should be treated as a 
'polymorphous concept'. The second which will be discussed in 
the next chapter, is the 'adverbial account' of thinking. 
Wittgenstein has remarked in Zettel that ; "One learns 
the word 'think', i.e. its use, under certain circumstances 
which, however one does not learn to describe."^ We are all 
acquainted with the concept of thinking but the description 
has not been learnt. Or as Ryle has pointed out the 
descriptions learnt are radically misguided. 
Wittgenstein says: "But I can teach a person the use of 
the word ! For a description of those circumstances is not 
needed for that."^ Wittgenstein feels that a description of 
circumstances will give us a criterion for identification of 
the concept. Wittgenstein adds: "I just teach him the word 
1. Wittgenstein, L.: Zettel p. 114 
2. Ibid., p. 115 
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under particular circumstances."^ Ryle takes up the task of 
describing, if possible,the circumstances of the use of the 
concept of thinking. We have seen, in the last chapter, that 
a number of alternative descriptions are found to be 
inadequate to identify all the cases of thinking, even the 
paradigms pose a problem. Thinking seems to shy away from any 
description. 
This drawback in the very concept of thinking led Ryle 
to develop the alternative theory of polymorphy. Ryle 
suggests, through the polymorphous character of thinking, 
4 
:ivities,'thinking are t< that the activities'thinking are too heterogeneous to be 
subsummed under a general description. Thomson agrees with 
Ryle :"When we describe or refer to 'thinking' it is evident 
that we are using a highly ambiguous concept. The words or 
its synonyms mean quite different activities according to the 
context and manner in which it is used".^  There is no single 
meaning of 'thinking'. 
The vendibility of Rylean philosophy hinges upon his 
unusual skill of noticing and labelling groups of concepts. 
Urmson writes: "Few Philosophers can have been more fertile 
than Gilbert Ryle in detecting groups of concepts with some 
1. Ibid., p. 116 
2. Thomson, R: The Psychology of Thinking, p. 13 
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noteworthy characteristics and christening them.''^  His 
premises are, usually, long lists of ordinary language words 
with some common denotations or connotations, which he 
subsumes under a category, and where necessary coins a new 
term or phrase, to distinguish them from other closely 
related concepts. There is, as a product of this method, a 
constant flow of new terms ready to use and neatly 
classified. Ryle has shown this idiosyncratic skill in the 
analysis of thinking and has labelled the concept of thinking 
'polymorphous' . 
Ryle writes: "And if we have not got its plot, we have 
not got any part of the story but only a welter of, so far, 
pointless details. A pure chronicle of the occurrence of 
expressions (or of images, hummed notes, glimpses or 
fingerings of plasticine) would not yet be even the beginning 
of a history of the thinker's pondering".2 This remark 
denigrates the traditional, classical or official doctrine 
which holds thinking to be a particular kind of occurrence. 
It is surprising how quickly the polymorphous account 
was accepted. Philosophers with immensely diverse leanings 
have commended the Rylean thesis. Price has endorsed the view 
1. Urmson, J.O.: Polymorphous Concepts, p. 249 
2. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol.11, p.265. 
149 
in his 'Thinking and Language': "No doubt the question 'what 
does thinking in general consist of is a misleading one, 
because there are so many alternative sorts of things it 
might consist of."-^  Although/ as Moulton has commented, this 
is contrary to Price's- own principles. Price seems to 
endorse the Rylean thesis but it is only apparently so, for 
in a later work he says: "The human mind, it seems, must 
always have sensible or quasi-sensible particulars [i.e. 
perceptions or images, respectively] to 'carry' [i.e. to 
bring to mind and keep it there] its thought, sensible and 
quasi-sensible media in which to think."^ Ryie does not admit 
any such description of thinking, he says: "I want to deny 
that it even makes sense to ask, in general case, what 
special sort or sorts of things we think in".^ Price's 
statement is not about the meaning of the concept of 
thinking, which is what Ryle wants, it is about the content 
of thinking. The difference between the two attempts can be 
brought out in White's words: "... it is important to 
distinguish clearly between an examination of the features of 
'thought' and an examination of the features of thought. In 
the former we are analysing a concept; in the latter, a 
1. Price, H.H.: Thinking and Language p. 332 
2. Price, H.H.: Thinking and Experience p. 238 
3. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol. II, p.396. 
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phenomenon. The former is philosophy the latter, 
psychology." .-*• Kyle's is a conceptual analysis whereas Price 
is attempting a psychology. 
Armstrong, a staunch materialist, acknowledges that 
thinking is polymorphous. He says: "The Concept of thinking 
is a somewhat polymorphous one."^ Hamlyn too endorses the 
polymorphy : "Where philosophers and psychologists have 
attempted to provide an analysis of a piece of thinking, they 
have tended to ask what thinking consists of, what are its 
components. It is true that they have often asked much more, 
demanding what thinking in general consists of, but as Ryle 
had maintained, the concept of thinking is polymorphous to 
the extent that no answer is possible to the general 
question."3 Ginnane avoids the label but acknowledges the 
thesis: "It is obvious, then, that the range covered by 
"thought" and cognate expressions is an extremely complicated 
one. In fact, one can hardly talk of a range at all here; it 
is rather more like a series of ranges going off in different 
directions, or in different dimensions. Whether one 
characterizes the complexity by saying that the expression 
thought covers more than one concept, or tnat there is only 
1. White, A.R.: Philosophy of Mind p. 87 
2. Armstrong, D.M.: A Materialist Theory of Mind p. 343 
3. Hamlyn, D.W.: Stream of Thought p. 65 
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one concept but with several modes of application, is not in 
question here".l Moulton gives an explanation for the 
acceptance of the Rylean thesis: "According to the classical 
view, thinking is a particular type of mental occurrence and 
the concept of thinking is essentially the concept of this 
mental occurrence. On this view the concept of thinking is 
monomorphous and the implied seat of this occurrence is the 
mind. In sharp contrast to this traditional position many 
philosophers today regard the concept of thinking as 
polymorphous."2 This helps in explaining Ryle's position. 
He,as seen in the last chapter, holds that no particular 
occurrence or anything is peculiar to thinking. The Concept 
of Mind was an attempted exposition of the category-howler 
committed by the classical or official theory. The articles 
on thinking advocate an alternative. It is the opposition to 
the Cartesian doctrine inherent in 'polymorphy' which makes 
the label and the thesis so attractive for diverse 
philosophers. 
The previous chapter shows the elusiveness of the 
concept of thinking. It appears that there are no ingredients 
peculiar to thinking. Ryle, committed to the framework of 
1. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts p. 377. 
2. Moulton, D.L.: The Concept of Thinking p. 355 
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The Concept of Mind . could not envisage an analysis of 
thinking which would depict thinking as not an activity. The 
philosophical behaviourist requires an activity to display a 
disposition, in terms of which the mind can be described. In 
the papers Ryle realized that there is no particular activity 
which can be called thinking. However, Ryle insists that 
thinking nevertheless is an activity. He, therefore, suggests 
that these are widely different kinds of activities which are 
subsumed under the concept of thinking,such as calculating, 
reflecting, reasoning, etc. But not all thinking is 
calculation, not all thinking is reflection, not all thinking 
requires logical construction; thinking could be any one of 
these and again none of these. Ryle gives reasons for this: 
"The concept of thinking is polymorphous. There is no general 
answer to the question 'what does thinking consist 
of?' ....there need be nothing going on in any one of them 
[activities called thinking] such that something else of the 
or 
"1 same speciesigenus must be going on in another one of them 
Earlier he had remarked: "So it seems reasonable to expect 
thinking to yield to the same treatment [like the chemist's 
treatment of compounds]. But this is a mistake. There is no 
general answer to the question 'what does thinking consists 
of'?"2 Ryle feels that thinking cannot be treated on the 
1. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol.11, p.261. 
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analogy of chemistry, which comes from the doctrine of the 
triparatite division of the soul. He says: "This tripartite 
dogma itself suggests analogies from chemistry. "-*-
Ryle's arguments for polymorphous account are an 
offshoot of his attack on the classical theory. Ryle is 
explicit about this: "Such a supposition is encouraged by the 
age-old dogma that our mental life is subdivided into three 
distinguishable strands or strata, Cognition, Co«<ation and 
Feeling."2 The tripartite division of the soul places 
'thinking' under the category of 'Cognition'. Ryle argues 
against this placement and says that not all thinking 
terminates in a result. It is to forbid such placements that 
Ryle includes ' idle-reservie', 'doodling', 'occurrence of 
thought, etc. under the title of thinking. This is an 
important inclusion, which definitely would not be accepted 
by a classical theorist. 
The polymorphy of concepts was detected by Ryle in The 
rvot 
Concept of Mind but he did/pay any attention to it there . It 
is the lack of essential features, not just among incidents 
of different kinds of instances, of thinking^but also among 
different incidents of one instance, which is the main 
1. Ibid., p. 296 
2. Ibid. 
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characteristic of a polymorphous concept. Imagination can be 
one such mental activity, of which Ryle says: "Nor do we say 
that they are all exercising their imaginations because we 
think that, embedded in a variety of often widely different 
operations, there is one common nuclear operation which all 
alike are performing, any more than we think that what makes 
two men both farmers is some nuclear operation which both do 
in exactly the same way. Just as ploughing is one farming job 
and tree-spraying is another farming job, so inventing a new 
machine is one way of being imaginative and playing bears is 
another".•'• It is this 'one common nuclear operation' which 
Ryle could not locate and hence he called the concept of 
thinking polymorphous. 
In The Concept of Mind Ryle's main concern was to 
somehow, via dispositional analysis, to bring thinking to the 
public realm. It was important for him to do so for two 
reasons: (1) Thinking was conceived as the central pillar of 
the Cartesian doctrine and (2) Ryle thought that thinking was 
the basic activity of the mind, which echoes the Cartesian 
thesis. He says: 
"For a boy who does his calculating aloud, or on paper, 
may be reasoning correctly and organising his steps 
Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.243. 
155 
methodically; his reckoning is not the less a careful 
operation for being conducted in public instead of in 
private. His exercise is therefore an exercise of a mental 
faculty in the normal sense of 'mental'. 
"Now calculating does not first acquire the rank of 
proper thinking when its author begins to do it with lips 
closed and his hands in his pockets. The sealing of lips is 
no part of the definition of thinking. 
"A deaf and dumb person talks in manual signs. Perhaps, 
when he wants to keep his thoughts to himself, he makes these 
signs with his hands behind his back or under the table. The 
fact that these signs might happen to be observed by a Paul 
Iry would not lead us or their maker to say that he was not 
thinking. 
"Moreover, the fact that a person says things to 
himself in his head does not entail that he is thinking. What 
makes a verbal operation an exercise of intellect is 
independent of what makes it public or private. "•'• 
Ryle has pointed out that in the official doctrine the 
mind is supposed to by definition, consist of inaudible and 
invisible acts. In other words, the official doctrine holds 
1. Ibid., p. 34-35 
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the mind to be inexplicable in overt terms, for this would 
imply a contradiction in terms, as they defined them. In the 
quotations above there is a recognition of proper specimens 
of thinking. All other distinctions are overlooked by Ryle 
and his emphasis is on ar<_aing that logically thinking can be 
a public activity. His argument basically is that covertness 
is no criterion, of thinking. Ryle felt that the argument of 
The Concept of Mind show privacy not to be necessary for 
thinking. The only task which remains is to show that 
thinking can be consistently described as an 'activity'. The 
Concept of Mind showed, fairly successfully, that thinking is 
a performance which is both covert and overt. But is covert 
only in so far as the person does not want to reveal his 
thoughts. It is the Cartesian misappropriation which makes it 
out to be a hidden process, occult and not accessible to the 
other or private to oneself. He makes the point and intention 
explicit: "But to admit, as we must, that there may be no 
visible or audible difference between a tactful or witty act 
and a tactless or humourless one is not to admit that the 
difference is constituted by the performance or non-
performance of some extra secret acts."-'- He adds: "It is his 
visible performance that they admire, but they admire it not 
1. Ibid., p.33. 
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for being an effect of any hidden internal causes but for 
being an exercise of a skill".^ 
Ryle argues, in the papers, that the expression, 
saying, embodiment or manifestation of thinking is apart from 
thinking in which it may or may not terminate. He has argued 
that manifestation, of whatever kind, is not necessary for 
all thinking. He has given examples of thinking, which do not 
aim at a result and examples of 'abortive thinking'. 
Taylor argues that there is a 'going-on', to use Ryle's 
terminology, which is a happening in our heads. The 
difference, he says, is not that of privacy or publicity but 
that of between secrecy and publicity. He says: "We think of 
desires and decisions as primarily private and as made 
public. We should do better to think of them as primarily 
public. When we make a decision of which we tell no one, our 
model is the usual public decision".2 Hudson agrees: "All 
such activities [like calculating] can also be carried out 
'in our heads'; but to say that any kind of activity can be 
carried out 'in our heads' would be quite pointless unless it 
1. Ibid. 
2. Taylor, D: Thinking, p. 247 
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could be carried out overtly."^ Hudson is propagating a kind 
of internalization of an otherwise overt activity. Ryle holds 
some such view in The Concept of Mind, for he remarks that 
the art of reading silently was mastered in the middle ages. 
An 'inner activity' it nevertheless is; the purpose of such 
internalizations can be manifold but most importantly it 
provides an economy of effort and time. Hudson gives a Rylean 
type analysis: "Philosophers mis-think that what goes on 'in 
our heads', such as pondering, calculating etc. are task 
activities for reverie and day-dreaming are certainly not 
task activities."2 This is the view that Ryle holds in the 
papers for he includes 'idle reverie' under thinking. But the 
final analysis which Hudson offers shows a disagreement wilh 
Ryle for he says: "Nevertheless, most of these thing are 
either the result of typical components of task activities; 
or were once components of task activities; or are typical 
associates of them."^ Hudson gives prominence to certain 
types of thinking or, to put it in another way, he thinks 
that expressions referring to different instances of thinking 
are to be classified as major and minor. But he gives no 
reason for distinguishing between the two. It is the absence 
1. Hudson, H.: Why we cannot witness or observe what goes 
on 'In our Heads', p.218. 
2. Ibid., p.219. 
3. Ibid. 
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of such a criterion because of which Ryle argues that there 
is only the category of thinking of which both reflection and 
'idle reverie' are members, he Penseur sitting idly could 
well be engaged in either idle reverie or reflection. There 
are no 'outward criteria' for distinguishing between the two. 
Ryle abandons the criterion of 'cross-questioning', in the 
papers. He argues that sometimes it is not even possible to 
tell what one has been thinking. Therefore, Ryle cannot even 
use the distinction of 'privacy' and 'secrecy' to his 
advantage. Further, it is not clear whether he can talk about 
internalization in the context of the papers, perhaps he 
cannot. 
Ryle does not, with the 'polymorphous account', abandon 
his dispositional analysis, he says in The Concept of Mind; 
"... To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a 
particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a 
particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a 
particular condition is realized".-^ Later on he says: 
"Dispositional statements are neither reports of observed or 
observable states of affairs nor yet reports of unobserved or 
unobservable states of affairs. They narrate no incidents. 
But their jobs are intimately connected with narratives of 
incidents, for if they are true, they are satisfied by 
1. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind p. 43. 
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narrated incidents."1 Ryle often talks about thinking in the 
papers, as if it is a narration of incidents, like when he 
says thinking is the plot of the story, or thinking is the 
history and not the chronicles. 
There are two different levels of the concept of 
thinking which Ryle explicates as being the indication of the 
concept having the characteristics of polymorphousness. The 
first is the macro-description and the other is the micro-
description. The macro-description is a set of arguments to 
show that there is a multiplicity and heterogeneity in the 
activities which can be subsumed under the concept of 
thinking. The concept of thinking is polymorphous because no 
activity is peculiar to thinking. Ryle asserts that there is 
no activity the presence of which would necessarily and 
sufficiently mean thinking. The micro-description deals with 
the particles or features of the activities which are 
classified as activities of thinking. The argument presented 
here is that there are no features which can be described as 
being common among the various activities of thinking. Even 
what are called the proper specimens of thinking do not have 
any common feature. In other words, there are no essential 
features which if present would mean thinking. The meaning of 
1. Ibid p. 120. 
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thinking cannot, according to the 'polymorphous account', 
even be explicated in terms of micro-descriptions. The macro 
and micro are the different levels of descriptions of the 
'goings-on' in thinking. It seems then that polymorphous 
concepts will be those for which a micro or macro description 
of criteria is not possible. Ryle says that there is nothing 
to be found in any micro or macro description of the concept 
of thinking such that a criterion could be evolved for the 
concept. 
It should, at once, be made clear that the 
characteristic of being polymorphous belongs to a concept . 
The technical term 'polymorphous' is only applicable to 
concepts. This is to say that a particular instance of 
thinking could have an element which could be essential to 
it. For example, multiplying would require the activity of 
calculating which would have the essential feature of dealing 
with numbers, sets, etc. and the production of result. It is 
possible, therefore, to say that someone has miscalculated, 
whereas it cannot be said in any meaningful sense that one 
has done some mis-thinking, apart from suggesting that a 
false belief is arrived at. 
It should also be emphasized that Ryle does not claim 
that thinking is featureless. A similar view is expressed by 
Farrell, concerning experience:"This argument so far has 
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simply not shown that experience is featureless. All that it 
has shown, if that, is that our experience has no features 
that can be described, or discriminated, or reported in a 
laboratory. But the fact that it lacks such features does not 
entail that it lacks all features."^ Ryle in fact never 
denies the 'goings-on' he rather says that there need not be 
any 'goings-on', such that they may also occur in another 
instance of thinking. 
The polymorhpy is a peculiarity of the activity of 
thinking. Ryle might have had in mind something akin to what 
Classen says: "The assumption is that there is some specific 
way that things are which happen to be non-physical, that 
there is some special characteristic that things that are not 
physical have: in short to coin a term after the manner of 
C D . Broad, that there is some unique non-physical making 
characteristic. But as I intimated, this assumption is surely 
illegitimate. Non-physical things do not have any particular 
characteristic which 'earmarks' them as non-physical, but 
rather all sorts of heterogeneous characteristics. The only 
thing that non-physical things have in common is the lack of 
something, namely, the lack of one or more of the defining 
characteristics of the physical".^ For Ryle thinking lacks 
1. Farrell, B.A.: Experience, p. 32 
2. Classen, P : Thalberg on Immateriality p. 567. 
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the defining characteristics because of its heterogeneity. 
Thinking Ryle holds is indefinitely heterogeneous in such a 
way that the multiplicity of the activities are not covered 
by a defining mark. Thinking is, then, the disposition to 
behave in any of the heterogeneous ways and there is nothing 
common between one piece of behaviour and another. 
The arguments for heterogeneity are so strongly 
presented by Ryle that Sibley has confused it for a separate 
account.1 The heterogeneity is shown by Ryle, initially, by 
dwelling upon the multiciplity of activities. But here too 
Ryle argues that there is no essential activity which is to 
be present in all thinking. We have called this the 'macro-
description'. Ryle's citing of diverse activities is only 
meant to support his negative task of rejecting the 
supposition that thinking can be defined as a particular type 
of activity. Any such definition would mean that the concept 
of thinking is monomorphous. The arguments of heterogeneity 
almost reduces the traditional argument to absurdity, and 
shatter the arguments previously in force, which paves the 
way to the polymorphous account of thinking. Ryle argues by 
citing cases of thinking which have no activity in common. He 
takes great pains to show that even the paradigm cases of 
1. Sibley, F.N. : Ryle and Thinking p. 80-81 
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thinking, the proper specimens, when scrutinized reveal 
great diversity. The mistake of earlier philosophers Ryle 
says is due to the fact that"... reflecting does, or does 
seem to, qualify as an autonomous activity, therefore ...[all 
thinking] seem to need to be construed as signifying some 
extra autonomous things that .j_s_j. fthe thinker 1 must be 
privily doing, besides what we see him autonomously doing."^ 
Sibley, in his argument, suggests that there is a 
difference between heterogeneity and polymorphy. The notion 
of 'polymorphous concept', according to him, suggests that at 
times a particular activity, otherwise identified as an 
activity of thinking, does not mean thinking, whereas 
heterogeneity suggests that various activities are activities 
of thinking. Ryle says: " the activities a thinker may 
perform are not only heterogeneous, but are also activities 
that might be performed without the performer thinking."^ 
Sibley, most probably, misses the point which Ryle is making. 
The heterogeneity is an indication that no particular 
activity is necessary for thinking, whereas the 'performer 
not thinking' shows that no particular activity is sufficient 
for thinking. Ryle has consistently maintained that there is 
nothing, in particular, which is necessary and sufficient for 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol II p. 470. 
2. Ibid. 
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thinking and this is why he calls thinking a polymorphous 
concept. Ryle does not mean by this that in thinking no 
activity is present, for this would counter his project of 
dispositional analysis. Ryle specifies: "It is natural (but 
mistaken) to suppose then, that thinking stands also for some 
specific process or activity, composed of various ways, out 
of some common, recurrent elements, you would say quite 
rightly that 'gardening', 'working' and 'housekeeping' cover 
a great number of widely different things There are no 
ingredient activities common and peculiar to gardening or to 
working .... or to thinking."^ 
Ryle says: "Or, to put it less bluntly, the word 
'thinking' covers a wide variety of things, some, but not all 
of which embody, in differing degrees and respects, such 
things as drills, acquired knacks, techniques and flairs."^ 
This reaffirms the project of The Concept of Mind. But Ryle 
realized that these drills, Knacks, techniques and flairs are 
so diverse that it is only proper to call thinking 
polymorphous and it would be vain to search for some specific 
activity or thing to identify with thinking. Ryle realized 
1. Ibid p. 296. 
2. Ibid p. 299 
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that on the behavioural level there is nothing which could 
identify thinking. 
The 'macro-description' is the level of behavioural 
dispositions, which are indefinitely heterogeneous and 
therefore thinking is • not I disposition to do a specific kind 
A 
of thing. There are a wide variety of things a person is 
disposed to do when thinking. The micro-description is an 
account of the 'features' of these behavioural dispositions, 
which are also indefinitely heterogeneous and none are 
peculiar to thinking. 
Ryle regards some other concepts too as polymorphous, 
such as, working, gardening, housekeeping,, farming. Ryle says 
that there are other concepts which subsume heterogeneous 
activities, with nothing in common or any recurrent features. 
The concept of work has no general description. He says: 
"Work is a polymorphous concept. There is nothing which must 
be going on in one piece of work which need be going on in 
another. Nothing answers to the general description 'what 
work consists of. None the less, each specific job is 
describable. The workman can be told what he is to do. the 
concepts of fighting, playing, housekeeping, and farming are 
also polymorphous concepts, whereas the concept of boxing and 
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apple-picking are nearly enough non-polymorphous. "•'• A non-
polymorphous concept is one where a specific activity or a 
group for specific activities can be described. Ryle says of 
work: "There need be no action, inner or overt, performed by 
the policeman on his beat, which he may not also perform when 
strolling round the same streets when his work is over."2 The 
possibility of inner action, like in The Concept of Mind, is 
accepted by Ryle. But here Ryle is only talking of the 
macro-description. He says : "Nothing need to done, thought 
or felt by the professional footballer at work that might not 
be done, thought or felt by the amateur at play."3 We have 
here the Rylean view on micro-description which he elaborates 
further: "Some sorts of work are done with some sorts of 
tools, others with other sorts. But sometimes the same work 
might be done with alternative tools. Some work does not 
require tools at ali. ... Some sorts of work are done with 
special materials, like string or Carrara marble. But the 
work might be done with different materials, and some work 
does not require materials at ali. ... An artist's model need 
not even be attending to her work."'* Ryle is arguing that for 
1. Ibid., p. 261. 
2. Ibid., p. 260. 
3. Ibid., p. 260-261. 
4. Ibid., p. 260. 
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polymorphous concepts no particular or specific micro-
description is forthcoming. A specific micro-description is 
not possible for what it describes might not be present at 
all in some other instance. But some micro-description will 
always be present. Further, Ryle does not claim that some 
instances of polymorphous concepts are such that in them no 
activity is present. If, as Ryle claims, there is no overt 
activity then there must be some 'covert activity*. In other 
words, what might be necessary for one piece of work is not 
even a part of another piece of work. These seems to be 
nothing at the micro or macro-level of descriptions which 
could be necessary and sufficient to pick out an instance of 
polymorphous concept. Ryle says: "Not all work is for pay; 
not all work is unpleasant; not all work is tiring."^ The 
non-availability of a necessary and sufficient micro-
description is an important indication of the presence of a 
polymorphous concept. 
Moulton objects to work being considered as a 
polymorphous concept: "The notion of thinking or of (say) 
kicking is essentially the notion of something occurring or 
being done about or to an object even though in the case of 
thinking or of (say) staring the object is not thereby 
altered. The concept of thinking is not, therefore, to be 
1. Ibid. 
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classified logically with the concept of working: On the 
level of activities it is not polymorphous."^ Moulton has not 
in his objection taken into account, what is otherwise a 
predominant theme in Ryle, the micro-description. The 
alteration of object would be a micro-description. Ryle 
mentions the model who might be sitting perfectly still or 
she might even fall asleep in which case she cannot be 
described as altering anything. For Moulton 'activity' 
seems to be restricted to performances which lead to results. 
Moulton could have argued that thinking cannot be categorized 
with work, for thinking is sometimes an 'occurrence' whereas 
for Ryle no work could occur. 
As already mentioned Ryle says that the dictum, 'in 
thinking this soul is conversing with itself, is both too 
wide and too narrow. It is too wide for the act of conversing 
does not entail thinking, even if it is significant things 
which one says to oneself. It is narrow for it does not pick 
out all the cases of thinking, for example it would not 
include a case of thoughtful tying of knots, where no talking 
or words are present. Ryle treats work in a similar fashion. 
These are for Ryle the two paradigms of polymorphy. There are 
no specific activities or activity features which are 
1. Moulton, D.L.: The Concept of Thinking, p. 357. 
170 
necessary and sufficient to describe the concept of either 
thinking or working. There is nothing which fits in the 
description 'No thinking without...' or 'No working 
without...' 
Urmson explicates ' the thesis of thinking being a 
polymorphous concept in terns of 'action-contents'. Urmson 
says: "Let us, for syntactical convenience, coin the 
expression 'action-content' as equivalent to 'that of which 
the action consists'. It might seem, then,that the concept 
of X-ing is polymorphous if there is no action-content which 
is both necessary and sufficient condition of X-ing".^ Urmson 
immediately points out the shortfalls of any such criterion 
for polymorphous concepts: "Consider the action-concepts 
expressed in English by words beginning 'ab ..." abandon, 
abbreviate, abdicate, abduct, abet, abjure, abolish, abridge, 
abrogate, abscond, absolve and abuse, it is surely clear 
without argument that the action-content is in none of these 
cases a necessary and sufficient condition of their 
application."2 Urmson rightly points out that if this is the 
criterion of polymorphy then there would be too many 
candidates and as such it does not pick out something which 
would show thinking to be a unique kind of concept. But as we 
1. Urmson, J.O.: Polymorphous Concepts p. 251 
2. Ibid. 
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have argued a polymorphous concept is not only which has no 
action-content as necessary and sufficient but also has no 
feature of the action-content as necessary and sufficient. 
Take, for example, abbreviating there is no action-content 
which is necessary and sufficient. The action-content is 
widely heterogeneous kinds of activities. But the activities 
of abbreviating have one thing in common that is all the 
activities would be activities of 'making something smaller'. 
In other words it could be said 'No abbreviating without 
making smaller', which is not possible for either thinking or 
working. 
Urmson has failed to bring out the feature aspect of 
polymorphous concepts. Urmson goes on to argue that the 
interpretation should be that no action-content is necessary 
for the concept to be applicable. This, Urmson, suggests 
would leave out such concepts as hurrying, for hurrying 
requires at least some action. But we have already shown that 
any such interpretation of Rylean thesis is a 
misunderstanding, for Ryle does not want to say that no 
action-content is necessary but that no specific content is 
necessary. Urmson's interpretation keeps thinking away from 
the otherwise long list of concepts by suggesting that 
thinking might not be an activity at all. 
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Urmson points out: "A concept will clearly be 
polymorphous, formally, if some one or more of the necessary 
conditions other than action-content which we have so easily 
found are treated as .being a ^necessary and sufficient 
condition of its application. If some feature other than 
action-content is necessary and sufficient condition of the 
application of a concept, action-content will clearly be 
neither".1 We have pointed out in the last chapter and also 
in the present chapter that Ryle denies any such features to 
be present for thinking. 
Urmson's concepts are heterogeneous only at the macro-
level of description but not at the micro-level of 
description. Urmson's example of hurrying gets left out, from 
T 
the list of candidates for polymoHphy, not because some 
action-content is necessary but because it has the essential 
feature of 'what ever is being done must be done at a great 
speed'. Urmson himself raises doubts to his initial 
formulation of Rylean position, he says: "It cannot be so 
prevalent a feature [of the polymorphous concepts] as this 
that Ryle wishes to isolate."^ That Urmson opts for the 
necessary conditions is clear from what he says of prunning: 
1. Ibid p. 257. 
2. Ibid., p. 251. 
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"Thus it is a necessary condition of prunning that the action 
should consist of the cutting of twigs and branches from a 
bush or a tree; but it is not a sufficient condition, since I 
may do this when gathering roses or collecting wood for fire, 
neither of which counts as prunning, though I may chance to 
do it in a way in-distinguishable from the performance of a 
skilled pruner. I must perform an action with this content 
with the intention of imposing the future growth of the plant 
pruned, if it is to be counted as a case of pruning".-^  
Urmson's example here only goes to show that some necessary 
feature is required before the cutting of twigs and branches 
can be said to be prunning. Ryle can easily argue that 
prunning is a pretty specific activity and is not 
heterogenous at the feature-level or micro-level of 
description. 
The general noun thinking or working then are 
polymorphous concepts, for they cannot be assigned any 
criterion of applicability, or descriptivity, either at the 
macro or micro-level. There are two alternative approaches to 
an analysis of a general noun. One could adopt either the 
definitional or the criterial approach. Ryle has opted for 
the latter. The criterial approach is to yield the conditions 
1. Ibid., p. 255. 
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or set of conditions which will determine In instance or 
instances of the concept. The range of the instances covered 
by the concept, is not limited but particular instances can 
be labelled in accordance with the prescribed criterion. 
The meaning of thinking then would be, its criteria of 
applicability. X is said to be a criterion of Y, if we are 
also asserting a rule of inference between X and Y. The 
implication would be either 'implicit' or 'explicit'. The 
'explicit rule' is one which is taught, formally or 
infOiTmally, and has a daily usage. The 'implicit rule', on 
the other hand, cannot be specified but the usage continues, 
and as such always has the possibility of specification. The 
'implicit rule' can be stated by saying that it is a class of 
knowledge claims where a criterion cannot be legitimately 
demanded.1 Canfield has pointed out: "Another feature of 
criteria as here understood is that it is not required that, 
where the users of a language employ a criterion we or they 
be able to state the criterion."^ There are also examples of 
the kind where no description of the criterion can be 
1. Ruben^D-H : A Note on Justification: It's Definition and 
its Criterion p. 554: "Now, a philosopher might argue 
that criterial questions do not always make sense, for 
there is a class of knowledge claims about which it is 
absurd to enquire about the criteria in which one is 
warranted to any of those claims". 
2. Canfield, J.V.: Criteria and Rules of Language p.73 
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legitimately demanded, in the non-linguistic sphere such as 
the case of chicken-sexing. The fact that some implicit but 
viable criterion or workable hypothesis is used in chicken-
sexing, which the chicken-sexer is unable to formulate, can 
be confirmed by the successes of the sexer. 
The general noun 'thinking', in ordinary language, is 
used with a fair amount of consistency. The consistency of 
use is an indication may be of an implicit criteria. Kyle's 
attempt may be seen as an effort to make this implicit 
criteria explicit. The method chosen for this purpose by Ryle 
is the method of generality. The only way of making an 
implicit rule explicit is by seeing how it works in various 
contexts and then to detect its normal or standard use. 
Hamlyn argues: "To provide an account of a concept, we have 
to see how the concept is used in its normal or standard 
uses. Thus we can discover its logical properties and be 
furnished with criteria for the application of the 
concepts".! This means that having discovered the logical 
properties of a concept an explicit criteria for its 
application can be framed. Ryle claims that no logical 
properties are discoverable for the concept of thinking. Ryle 
lists the obvious and standard usages and finds that they 
have nothing in common. 
1. Hamlyn, D.W.: Stream of Thought p. 81 
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The characteristics or properties, mentioned as the 
criteria for something being 'X', are not separately, but 
logically necessary and sufficient for that thing being 'X'. 
For example, an apple has the criteria of being red/green, 
roundish, pulpy etc., but these characteristics are not by 
themselves separately necessary and sufficient to name it an 
'apple'. Though these characteristics seem to be a logical 
part of the meaning of the general noun 'apple', they are 
not empirically related for the substrttction or the lack of 
anyone of them does not exclude the object from being called 
an apple. Lyons has argued that a thing being subsumed under 
a general noun is a matter of just having enough of the 
relevant criteria being together in the world.^ The 
recognition of criteria or common features is easily possible 
for 'single-meaning' nouns. But where a noun does not have a 
single meaning a recognition of 'family resemblances' is the 
only possibility to obtain criteria. 
It may be suggested that Ryle could have tried to 
evolve a disjunctive statement as a criterion of thinking. 
The presence, in such a case, of more than one disjunct would 
mean thinking. But Ryle rejects any such attempt. He even 
rejects the idea that various instances of thinking may have 
1. Lyon, A: Criteria and Evidence , p.216 
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a family resemblance. Ryle has repeatedly asserted that the 
activities and features of thinking are extremely 
heterogeneous. The heterogeneity embedded in thinking then is 
far greater than can be covered by family resemblances. But 
this leaves us in a very awkward position, as Urmson points 
out: ".... clearly one or more sets of conditions must be 
jointly sufficient for the application of any concept, if we 
are to be able to know that we have correctly applied it, if 
no set of conditions were sufficient for the application of 
the concept X-ing we should never be able to say of anyone 
with certainty that he was X-ing, or know exactly what we 
were asserting of him in asserting that he was X-ing".^ A 
polymorphous concept, as Ryle maintains, seems to be such 
that it is difficult to apply it to an instance with any 
certainty. Von-Wright says that if the sufficient condition 
of an event's occurrence means all degrees of complexity, as 
Ryle seems to hold about thinking, that is all the logical or 
lexical possibilities, with no curtailing, then the only 
condition which will be sufficient would be the most complex 
one. But this would involve the knowledge of all the 
relations, of the event occurring, which it might possibly 
have or have had.^ it is exactly some such thing which is 
1. Urmson, J.O.: Polymorphous Concepts p.255 
2. Von-Wright, G: The logical problem of Induction p. 80 ff 
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attempted by Ryle, in adopting the notion of generality in 
the analysis of thinking. 
Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance' is a 
means of identifying events etc. when there is no generic 
sameness of content, which would justify the application of 
the same general noun. The word 'game' has no necessary 
conditions but different contents could severally be 
sufficient condition for its application. The word 'game' 
cannot be accorded any conditions at the macro-level. There 
are extremely heterogeneous groups of activities which could 
all be done when a game is being played with no particular 
type of activity as essential to playing. At the micro-level, 
too, there is a heterogeneity but is such that it can easily 
be subsumed under a disjunctive statement. A number of 
disjuncts together would enable the application of the noun 
'game' to any particular instance. A number of disjuncts, 
from a list of disjunctive features would indicate that a 
game is in progress. A lack of a number of disjuncts would 
rule out the 'goings-on' from being labelled a game. 
Family resemblance is a device of bringing into use 
concepts which would otherwise be rejected as not having 
single referents. But if a noun is applied to a variety of 
things it is supposed that certain common features, or 
essential features, are present to warrant its application. 
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So either there should be an essential feature or a set of 
essential f*^ atures before we could say that the general noun 
is being used, each time, in the same sense, or with the same 
significance. Simon points out: "This is not to deny 
Wittgenstein's claim [of family resemblance], but only to 
point out that when we do use a word to apply to things that 
share no common essential feature, we are using it in 
different senses^ We can say that a word is being used in the 
same sense if we are prepared to cite a common feature".^ 
'Family resemblance' for Wittgenstein was meant to 
indicate kinship among the member of a family. The family 
could be biological or of things covered by a general noun. 
Ryle argues that in any one instance of thinking there need 
be nothing 'going, -on' the same as in another instance of 
thinking. It is because of this reason that Ryle rejects 
the concept of 'family resemblance'. According to Ryle 
there is not even a family resemblance, between 
various instances of thinking, even of the generic 
nature. The reason why no generic likeness can be 
found is that there are no necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the applicability of the general noun 
'thinking'. Neither the context nor the usage indicate any 
conditions which might be necessary and sufficient. It 
1. Simon, M.A.: When is a Resemblance a Family Resemblance 
p. 411. 
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seems that an instance of thinking is only 'contingently' an 
instance of thinking. 
But 'family resemblances' between things subsumed under 
a general noun or in a biological family is also contingently 
so. It is only a contingent matter that the required 
characteristic of 'family resemblance' is present in a 
member. But once it does possess this characteristic it is 
necessarily included in the family. The characteristic, if 
possessed, is sufficient and necessary for the thing to be 
included in a family as a member. The family, then, seems to 
possess a network of similarities. The lexical necessity 
follows from the word possessing a 'family of meanings'. 
The biological family poses an interesting point. It is 
always possible, for membership of a family is only 
contingent, that there might be a member which seems to 
possess no characteristics sufficient to indicate a kinship. 
The member then would be a member only because it is a member 
of the family. •'• Ryle's arguments on 'thinking', in the 
papers, seem to suggest something similar. He takes up, as 
cases of thinking, instances which are so disparate that 
there seems to be no characteristics which could nominate the 
1. Ibid., p. 409-410. 
181 
activities or the instances for the membership of the 
general noun 'thinking'. It seems only a contingent matter 
that 'day-dreaming' is called thinking. It possesses no 
characteristics, according to Ryle, which are also present in 
other activities characterized as thinking. It is just that 
the 'language-game' somehow permits the membership to day-
dreaming. Day-dreaming then seems to be a member of the 
family covered by thinking because it is a member. 
We have already pointed out the inconceivability of 
something being subsumed under a single general noun and not 
possessing some essential characteristic, apart from its 
membership. A general noun cannot possibly be applied to any 
individual unless and until it posses^^at least, one feature 
which is a justification for the application of the general 
noun. There is bound to be, especially for the biological 
family, at least, a genetic factor which establishes the 
membership, if no other features are available. The genetic 
factors, in a biological family, are not necessarily 
manifested. There need not be any 'outward criteria' for 
allotting the membership. In such a case the genetic 
relationship will be the justification of the membership. But 
with Ryle, as with Wittgenstein, all psychological processes, 
or 'inner processes', stand in need of 'outward criteria'. 
The arguments presented by Ryle demand manifestations, 
externality etc. before a thing is recognizable.The genetic 
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factor cannot be accepted by Ryle, for as he cannot allow the 
notion of 'categorical basis'. But through our arguments we 
have also noticed that nowhere does Ryle deny a 'mental 
event'. In the previous chapter it was found that Ryle allows 
the 'occurrence of though't'. The event, as we have seen, must 
be propertied, or characterizable, or have features, 
something which Ryle admits but denies that they are 
necessary and sufficient. 
We have seen that X can be a member of a biological 
family but may not have any resemblance, apart from genetic. 
The membership issues from the network of similarities 
present at the genetic level. For general nouns, Simon 
forwards a suggestion: "...the distinction between 'normal' 
terms, for which essences might very well be posited and 
'family resemblance' terras, for which the positing of 
essences appears impossible, resides in the distinction 
between paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic instances. Not 
every member of every family bears all the features that are 
characteristic of that family, but every family nevertheless 
has its nuclear members."^ The genetic level then is the 
level of the structure of parad^'gms, in accordance with which 
the network of similarities is recognized. Simon remarks: 
1. Ibid., p. 416 
183 
"The notion of a paradigm explains how it is possible for 
things that are connected by merely a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing to be properly 
subsumed under' the same general term; it explains how it is 
that things that share ho common essential features can be 
connected by 'family resemblances'.-^ Simon points out : ".... 
that there is no set of features that properly constitutes 
anything that possesses them*as a game, but rather that this 
set of 'essential features defines not a game but merely a 
paradigm case of game,"2 The paradigm might be in some cases 
an implicit construction, somewhat like self-designing. The 
language - game designs within itself a paradigm. 
We have seen, in the previous two chapter, that Ryle 
does not, at least, explicitly deny a mental event. In the 
last chapter we noticed that Ryle utilizes the 'occurrence of 
thought' to show that 'results' are not necessary for all 
thinking. We take this to mean that Ryle allows 'thinking 
events' to occur. He argues, at the same time, that thinking 
is an activity. It would be correct to say that Ryle uses 
'occurrence of thought', or 'thinking event', as a means to 
show that not all thinking is 'bringing about' of results. 
1. Ibid., p. 415 
2. Ibid., p. 413. 
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In other words, in his arguments, comprising of the negative 
task, to show that thinking cannot be identified with any 
activities, he cited examples of thinking instances where 
there is an 'occurrence of thought. There was a hint in 
Moulton's comment, quoted above, that thinking might be both 
an 'occurrence' and a 'bririg"«about' .1 In the previous chapter 
we had hinted that Ryle did not want that all thinking be 
such that it 'brings about' a result. It is thus possible to 
say that Ryle while talking of the concept of thinking holds 
both that it can be an 'occurrence', or an event, and a 
'bringing about', or an activity. 
Ryle, attaches two different meanings to the general 
noun thinking. The first is that of event or 'occurrence of 
thought' which is not an activity, and the second is that of 
'bringing about' or act of thought which is an activity. The 
ambiguity, presumably, creeps in here because too large a 
class is nominated for thinking, ranging from reflection to 
idle reverie. Ryle argues that a 'family of meanings' is not 
possible for thinking : "The concept of thinking being 
polymorphous,chronicles of two stretches of thinking need not 
contain any homogeneous episodes, and the episodes assembled 
in the chronicles of one stretch of thinking can also be as 
1. Moulton, D.L.: The Concept of Thinking, p.351, quoted 
above. 
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heterogeneous as you please. "•'• He suggests further: "When we 
want to compare the policies of traders in quite different 
types of trade, the techniques of house keepers with quite 
different manages, or the clumsiness of athletes in quite 
different sports, we need to and find idioms, which while 
neutral between the disparate details of other activities, 
are appropriate to the similarities and difference? between 
the policies, techniques, and clumsiness of the agents."2 The 
idioms are made up of non-polymorphous expressions. Ryle 
repeatedly advances arguments asserting that in 'thinking' it 
is the histories or plots, and not the chronicles, which are 
important for a description. But the histories or plots must 
have similarities before it can/said that they are of 
"thinking' and not of something-else. 
For Ryle 'idioms' are graphic descriptions of otherwise 
polymorphous concepts for which no descriptions are easily 
available. We presume by this that Ryle does not intend to 
suggest that non-polymorphous concepts do not or cannot have 
graphic descriptions. The philosophical behaviourists draw a 
distinction, as we have seen in chapter I, between, to use 
Rylean terminology, determinate and determinable disposi-
1. Ryle, G. : Collected Papers Vol. II , p. 265 
2. Ibid., p. 267. 
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tions, which are related to specific and non-specific 
predicates, respectively. Wittgenstein would have said that 
non-specific predicates are the 'family terms'. We have been 
arguing that specificity for 'family terms' comes from 
'family resemblances', linked to a paradigm by a nexus of 
similarities. Ryle draws a distinction between 'family terms' 
and polymorphous concepts. His suggestion of idiomatic 
expressions to describe polymorphous concepts is a substitute 
for the specificity obtained for 'family terms' through its 
paradigm. Armstrong points out that 'family terms' themselves 
exhibit greater or lesser degree of 'scatter'. The mental 
concept, says Armstrong, for behaviorists possess a high 
degree of scatter.-^  We have been talking about 'scatter' in 
terms of 'family resemblances'. The scatter will depend upon 
the size of the family and the remoteness of resemblances 
among the members. Ryle's use of polymorphous concept then 
seems to indicate an indefinite level of scatter. 
Ryle has himself talked about 'proper specimens', the 
nuclear members, to use Simon's phrase, of thinking: "Just as 
there are hundreds of widely differing operations including 
apple picking, to be occupied in any one of which is to be 
doing farm-work, so there are lots of widely differing 
1. Armstrong, D.M.: A Material Theory of Mind, p. 59-61. 
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operations, including multiplying which are proper specimens 
of thinking."1 This idea forms a recurring theme of The 
Concept of Mind. In the papers, however, he argues that the 
proper specimens are themselves heterogeneous. Ryle does not 
develop any arguments as to why certain operations can be 
labelled proper specimens of thinking. Urmson points out: 
"Again, Ryle's insistence that we want histories and not 
chronicles of thinking is no doubt correct, but how could we 
give a history, as opposed to chronicle, of drifting in idle 
reverie from one topic to another?"^ A point brought out at 
the end of the previous chapter. Urmson further adds: "The 
history is surely possible only when we have primary thinking 
which has a form - a beginning,a middle or an end - distinct 
from mere temporal succession,"^ Urmson means by primary 
what Ryle calls 'proper-specimens'. It can thus be said 
'proper specimens' are those which have an end or a result. 
In the terminology we have preferred, the proper specimens 
are those operations of thinking which are the 'bringing 
about' of thought. Ryle takes 'occurrence of thought' to be 
an activity, if we assume that 'polymorphous view' was 
intended as an activity account of thinking. So it should be 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 261. 
2. Urmson, J.O.: Polymorphous Concepts, p.264. 
3. Ibid. 
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said that proper specimens are the 'bringing about* and the 
rest of what Ryle classifies as thinking lies in the category 
of 'occurrences of thought'/ when nothing is 'brought about'. 
In the previous chapter we have shown an interplay between 
these two meanings in Ryle's rejection of various theses. 
Ryle noted in the papers, as in The Concept of Mind, 
that the verb 'thinking' in the present continuous is 
ambiguous. Ryle says: "It is a vexatious fact about the 
English language that we use the verb 'to think' both for 
the beliefs and opinions that a man has and for the pondering 
and reflecting that a person does; and that we use the noun 
'thought' both for the truth or falsehood that he accepts, 
and for the activity of reflecting which, perhaps, preceded 
his acceptance of it."-^  We have restricted ourselves, as Ryle 
does, to the activity of thinking and found that Ryle's usage 
of thinking could mean either the 'bringing about' or the 
'occurrence' of thought. Ryle's arguments also show a third 
category of thinking that is that of resavouring a well 
formed argument which is neither idle reverie nor reflecting. 
But this category has affiliations both to idle reverie and 
reflecting in that it does not achieve any results, for the 
results are already reached, like idle reverie, but has the 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 392 
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form which is the end product of reflecting. Ryle forms three 
categories to cover all the cases of thinking: (1) 
reflecting, (2) resavouring and (3) idle reverie. The 
topography of thinking shows idle reverie to be peripheral 
to thinking, for it can easiy be argued that 'idle reverie' 
should not be included in-the concept of thinking. 
The reason why Ryle takes up thinking with such 
vehemence is that if thinking can be given a dispositional 
account all other mental concepts would readily yield to 
dispositional analysis. The philosophical behaviourists, 
nevertheless, find themselves in perplexity beyond 
dispositional analysis. Armstrong says that 'one's anger with 
Jones' may manifest itself in multifarious fashion. It may 
result in striking Jones, doing ill, keeping absolutely quiet 
or even in going to sleep. Armstrong says that none of these 
pieces of behaviour necessarily mean anger with Jones. It is 
here, says Armstrong, that philosophical behaviourist's 
account of family resemblance plays an important role in 
showing how varied manifestations are possible. But with 
thinking, like in the case of ie Penseur meditating, it is 
possible, as Ryle notes, that there may be no manifestation 
or no possibility of manifestation, as in the case of 
'abortive thinking'. Ryle gives another example to make his 
point. He says that two person waiting on a platform might 
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behave in exactly the same way whereas one might be waiting 
for a train and the other might not be. There is no 'outward 
criteria' to decide between the two. But 'waiting' can be 
determined by cross-questioning which is not possible in the 
case of thinking, according to Ryle. 
The central cases, or paradigm examples of mental 
concepts for philosophical behaviourists are those where a 
strong discernibility of behaviour is possible. Each concept 
has as its paradigm example a strongly discernible behaviour 
pattern. The peripheral cases will be those where 
discernibility becomes very difficult. The discernibility 
criterion comes from the theory of learning presented by the 
philosophical behaviourists. Wittgenstein says that the 
meaning of a word depends on how one has 'learned' to use it. 
Ryle talks about 'knowing how' to use, apply etc. It is 
'knowing how' to differentiate between behaviour of anger 
and, say, that of joy. Further one has to 'know how' to 
differentiate between central and peripheral cases subsumed 
under a concept. In the case of thinking Ryle does not allow 
this. But at the same time he holds that there are 'proper 
specimens'. He also holds at places a view that there might 
be 'family resemblances' between various cases: "To look for 
some common and peculiar ingredients of all thinking is like 
looking for an ingredient common and peculiar to cat's 
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cradle, hide and seek, billiards, snap and all other things 
which we call games."^ Later he abandons the project, 
because of an ambiguity he did not detect in his use of the 
term thinking, and says: Surely part of what stumps us in 
our vain presupposition that our bill needs to be filled by 
just one uniform and nominateable Xing; but I am not 
therefore going to resort to the now overhallowed 'family 
likeness' device so long before reaching, what it is 
for, the last resort".^ 
Thomson has suggested: "The psychologist in trying to 
study 'reasoning' or 'reflective thought' is not studying a 
straight forward process like 'respiration' or 'digestion' or 
'sleeping', but must select most or some of a number of 
different types or species of activity each of which is 
properly describable as 'thinking' or 'reasoning'".^ He 
further adds: "Yet in spite of their differences, it is 
likely that there is some common attribute or set of 
attributes in virtue of which this particular activity or 
that may be called 'thinking'. It may be that 'thought' is a 
disjunctive as well as a polymorphous concept".^ we have 
detected that thinking is either a 'bringing about' or an 
1. Ibid., p. 297. 
2. Ibid., p.473. 
3. Thomson, R: The Psychology of Thinking, p. 17. 
4. Ibid. 
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•occurrence'. Thomson suggests that thinking is a disjunctive 
and polymorphous. We have been arguing that this disjunction 
is what led Ryle to call thinking polymorphous and not use 
the Wittgensteinian concept of family resemblance. 
Later, while giving the 'adverbial account of thinking' 
Ryle comments that the thinking of a tennis player should be 
taken as a central case, and a theory of thinking should then 
be suggested. This view led Ryle to the 'adverbial account' 
as an alternative theory, before which he commented: "My 
thought or apprehension of the ridiculous incident was not 
the cause of my being amused. It was partly constitutive of 
it, somewhat as the headside of a penny is indeed part of 
what makes it the penny that it is, and yet is obviously 
not a separately existing agency that causes the penny that 
it is".l 
Taylor has said that it is difficult to see how 
thinking can sometimes be an act but that it is even more 
difficult to see how 'the raising of one's arm' can be an 
act. The metaphysical peculiarities are not only produced by 
regarding thinking as an activity, they are duplicated.2 Ryle 
in The Concept of Mind observed this duplication and in his 
'adverbial account of thinking' attempts to forge a way out 
of it. 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II p. 421 
2. Taylor, D: Thought and Purpose. 
Chapter-^ 
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The previous chapter shows that there are great 
difficulties in maintaining an activity view of thinking. The 
'polymorphous account' yields an ambiguity. Probably the 
ambiguity might be due to the inclusion of too divergent 
an activities under the concept of thinking. Ryle did 
not/however, narrow the class of activities included in 
thinking even after the failure of the 'polymorphous 
account'. Instead, he abandoned his dispositional analysis 
and presented the 'adverbial account'. The 'adverbial 
account' is presented mainly in his last article 'Thinking 
and Reflecting', although traces of it can also be detected 
in the earlier works. 
The 'adverbial account' abandons the effort to describe 
thinking as an activity and instead treats thinking as a 
grammatical particle. Polymorphy of thinking was readily 
accepted by philosophers of very varied leanings. The 'ad-
verbial account' it seems is not accepted by any philosopher. 
The position of The Concept of Mind was abandoned 
because it yielded a two-fold theory. Ryle could not 
acknowledge a theory where the 'mental' is said to cause 
action. He wanted to oppose any theory, such as that 
proposed by Prichard, which argues that actions are not 
movements but causes of movements. Prichard identified 
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actions with mental episodes causing events} Ryle could not 
acknowledge 'mental events' because otherwise he would be 
forced to say that they are the causes of bodily actions. For 
him this would imply that my 'willing' the window to be 
opened is to be counted as an action. The theory that there 
are acts of volitions was exorcised in The Concept of Mind. 
Ryle's 'polymorphous account' was meant to develop an 
'activity' theory of thinking which would and avoid any 
reference to mind, soul or spirit. The project was very much 
in keeping with what Wittgenstein says: "And we do here what 
we do in a host of similar cases: because we cannot specify 
any one bodily action which we call pointing to the shape (as 
opposed, for example, to the colour), we say that a spiritual 
(mental, intellectual) activity corresponds to these words".2 
Ryle was perplexed with the concept of thinking and 
says in his article 'A Puzzling Element in the Notion of 
Thinking' to rid himself of the duality: "Thinking is not a 
rival occupation to those special occupation in that our time 
has to be parcelled out between them and thinking".^ But 
later on he reverts back and acknowledges that some thinking 
1. Prichard, H.A.; Acting, Willing and Desiring p. 187-
198. 
2. Wittgenstein, L: Philosophical Investigations p. 18 
3. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II,p. 405. 
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could be rival occupations: "If he is reflecting about some 
intellectual problem, even a problem about tennis, he is not 
then and there giving his mind to his game. If he is engaged 
in the one activity, then he is wholly and partly disengaged 
from the other. They are rival occupations. It is by this 
special family of distinctively intellectual operations that 
the notion of Reason has traditionally been monopolized".^ 
But this is a realization that the paradigm of thinking has 
been traditionally misconceived. In his 'adverbial account' 
Ryle eventually attempts to rid himself of the threat of 
dualism: "That is, because reflecting does, or does seem to 
qualify as an autonomous activity, therefore such adverbial 
expressions as 'on purpose', 'vigilantly', 'carefully', 
'cunningly', 'tentatively', 'experimentally', 'resolutely', 
etc. seem to need to be construed as signifying some extra 
autonomous things that the tennis player must be privily 
doing, besides what we see him autonomously doing."2 He 
adds: "I think what I aim to do, if I can, is to show that it 
is the notion of engaged thinking, like that of the tennis 
player or the conversationalist, that is the basic notion, 
while that of disengaged thinking or reflecting, like that of 
1. Ibid., p. 423 
2. Ibid., p. 470. 
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le Penseur> is supervenient."^ Ryle makes 'engaged thinking' 
the paradigm. We will have to see whether this new paradigm 
is not an artificial device - a departure from our ordinary 
use of the verb 'thinking'. 
It should also be noted that Ryle, even as late as the 
above quotation, in constructing his 'adverbial account', 
does not deny that thinking is a 'going-on'. He only denies 
that the going-on is autonomous. Ryle repeatedly argues over 
the point: "In short, the thinking of the non-absent minded, 
non-delerious talker is not a separate act or procession of 
acts, or a separate procession of anythings. ...His thinking 
is not an autonomous action or activity; or a concurrent 
procession of autonomous anything."^ Ryle does not accept the 
dichotomy of mental and bodily actions, but he still does not 
deny 'mental happening'. Ryle rejects only the autonomous 
status of 'anythings', that is 'goings-on'. He maintains the 
same logical illegitimacy for the concept of thinking, as in 
the 'polymorphous account', he says: "I am rejecting this 
vehicle-passenger model altogether. Adverbial verbs are not 
verbs for autonomous doings, and so not of autonomous doings 
which, like bicycling and strumming, need some apparatus or 
1. Ibid. p. 471 
2. Ibid. p. 469 
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Other. "-^  The reasons for the rejection of the 'vehicle model' 
are different here, for a grammatical distinction is invoked. 
Ryle after the polymorphous account, realized that if a 
unitary or single description is possible it will be by means 
of bringing in the concept of accompaniment similar to that 
of Wittgenstein, who says : "While we sometimes call it 
'thinking' to accompany a sentence by a mental process, that 
accompaniment is not what we mean by a 'thought' - Say a 
sentence and think it; say it with understanding, (sing this 
tune with expression. And now don't sing it, but repeat its 
expression! - And here one actually might repeat something. 
For example, motions of the body, slower and faster 
breathing, and so on)".2 The suggestion is that there cannot 
be any 'expression' without an autonomous doing. Ryle had 
earlier, as we have seen in the chapter on 'Logical 
Illegitimacy', divorced 'expression of thought' from thinking 
and reasoned that not all thinking results in 'expression of 
thought'or 'saying'. It was this reasoning which incorporated 
'occurrence' in the concept of thinking, for where no result 
or expression is available we cannot talk about 'bringing 
about' or activity. The alternative Ryle chooses is declaring 
that thinking is not an autonomous activity. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Wittgenstein, L: Philosophical Investigations, p. 107. 
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It appears from the above quotation as if Ryle also 
excludes 'events' or 'goings-on' under the umbrella of 
anythings. But it is important, and should be noted, that 
Ryle is denying 'autonomous anythings', and thus leaves room 
for non-autonomous 'anythings'. It could be argued that Ryle 
is similarly not denying non-autonomous activities. But this 
view cannot be maintained, for an activity is meant to 
possess an autonomous status. Ryle, we feel, wants to argue 
that on the plane of description the 'anythings' or 'goings-
on' are indescribable they can only be described or form a 
part of description of an autonomous activity. 
The 'descriptive restriction', which Ryle proposes, is 
to class verbs of thinking as 'adverbial verbs'. The adverbs, 
grammatically speaking, require a verb, which describes an 
autonomous doing. Ryle says: "I want to draw your attention 
to a special class, a pretty fluffy edged class, of active, 
tensed verbs which we could easily be tempted into mistakenly 
treating as verbs of doing. I am going metaphorically to 
label them 'adverbial verbs', though this label is not to be 
taken very seriously".^ The label is only meant to be 
metaphorical. But Sibley has pointed out: "The doctrine, but 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 467. 
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not the label, is familiar from The Concept of Mind".^ Ryle 
says in The Concept of Mind; "When I do something 
intelligently, i.e. thinking what I am doing, I am doing one 
thing and not two. My performance has a special procedure or 
manner, not special antecedents".2 The 'not special 
antecedents' could mean that the 'goings-on', if not the 
activities, are not antecedents but accompaniments. Ryle says 
that 'attend' and 'drive', is a pair which suggests 
synchronous but perhaps concealed processes which is not so, 
for it is quite idiomatic to replace 'heed-concepts' that 
are verbs by adverbs. He says: "We commonly speak of reading 
attentively, driving carefully, and conning studiously, and 
this usage has the merit of suggesting that what is being 
described is one operation with special character and not two 
operations executed is different 'places', with peculiar 
cables between them."^ in The Concept of Mind, as shown in 
the first chapter, he classifies thinking as a heed-concept. 
Ryle suggests thinking is an adverbial verb, like 
'hurrying' of which Ryle says: "I label the verb 'hurry' an 
'adverbial verb', partly because any completed sentence 
containing it could be paraphrased by a sentence containing 
1. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking p. 78. 
2. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind p.132. 
3. Ibid. 
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a proper verb of doing qualified by the adverb 'hurriedly* or 
the phrase 'in a hurry'."^ The three features of adverbial 
verbSf by virtue of which both hurrying and 'thinking' are to 
be so called are ; (1) "If told that someone is hurrying we 
have not been told what he is doing but that he is doing 
whatever he is doing at an abnormally high speed."2 it was 
found in the polymorphous account that thinking as a 'doing' 
cannot be specified. (2) The command 'hurry' is only the 
beginning of a command, it cannot yet, context apart, be 
obeyed or disobeyed.3 similarly, command 'think' cannot be 
obeyed. (3) "I might put the point by saying that hurrying is 
not an autonomous action or activity as walking, typing or 
eating are.'"* Ryle's argument is that the first two 
similarities between 'thinking' and 'hurrying' force us to 
consider thinking in the same way as we consider hurrying. It 
would thus be right to say that since hurrying is not an 
autonomous activity thinking should also be so considered. 
Thinking, according to the 'adverbial account', is non-
autonomous and requires some other autonomous activity to 
1. Ryle, GJ Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 467 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
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complete it. Thinking is unsaturated and incomplete if we 
adopt Frege's terminology. It is, precisely, this lack which 
makes the 'adverbial verb', like hurrying, unindicative of 
what activity is being performed. The activity is the 
embodiment or expression of the 'adverbial verb', which is 
the manner of doing things, and it is from this embodiment or 
expression that the adverbiality can be discerned. But it 
should be borne in mind that the activity, nevertheless, 
is non-constitutive, as Ryle maintained in the polymorphous 
account. The 'adverbial verb' is the 'skill', the 'plot', 
etc. of the 'doings'. Ryle points out: "The command 'walk', 
'type' or 'eat' is an obeyable command and not the less so 
for being pretty unspecific. If I then eat lobster or bread 
or shoe leather I am obeying the command to eat. But to obey 
or to disobey the command hurry, I must do some autonomous X 
like eating or humming, etc., for there to be hurried or 
unhurried X-ing that tallies with or flouts the understood 
command, no matter whether the command is specific or 
unspecific."1 
Ryle explains the term 'autonomous' relating it to the 
activities of a conversationalist: "He qualifies as having 
been thinking what he was doing, namely making a contribution 
to a conversation, not because, besides the uttering that he 
1. Ibid. 
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was doing, there was another autonomous thing that he was 
also doing and might have continued doing after this uttering 
has stopped. There was some degree of initiative, care and 
self-coaching in his talking. But none of these elements was 
an autonomous action or activity" .-I- Ryle has reverted back 
to the position he took in The Concept of Mind where thinking 
was to be treated in 'referee's terms' or 'school teacher's 
term', with the difference that there thinking was 
autonomous and here it is not.2 The representation of 
thinking is in the activity called conversing. The thinking 
is dependent on this activity for its continuation. In other 
words, 'adverbial verbs' do not continue after the activity 
ceases and therefore does not have an autonomous status. But 
this should not be mistaken with the notion that all thinking 
is dependent on 'conversation'. Every piece of thinking has 
its own representation. Ryle writes: "We cannot ask whether 
the required thinking that he did, was in its turn 
done in Russian, German, gestures or images."-^  A position 
consistent with the 'polymorphous account'. 
We should, first of all, look at the concept of 
activity as presented by Ryle, since 'adverbial account' is a 
1. Ibid., p. 468. 
2. See chapter "The Perfunctory Ryle" above 
3. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 468-469. 
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denial that thinking is an activity. Ryle suggests that only 
those things are to be counted as activities which require 
effort, involve care and may be tiring. Ryle's position was 
very different in The Concept of Mind where he says that 
thinking is not an achievement, which is effortless. This 
analogy is possible only because of the long run of previous 
efforts has long since inculcated complete facility in 
thinking things out. Sibley has argued that in the 'adverbial 
account', Ryle is putting on a philosopher's restriction on 
activity: "I believe that there is no reason to employ 
activity in this way, nor is it the only use sanctioned by 
common speech. Ryle's is a philosopher's restriction 
Plenty of durational happenings that we might naturally call 
activities do not consJ.st in procession of events and 
changes."^ But the example cited by Sibley does not make the 
point, for Sibley says that weight-lifting is one such 
activity. Ryle would readily admit that weight-lifting is an 
activity, for it is tiring and requires an enormous amount 
of effort. It is true, as Sibley claims, that it does.not 
comprise of processions of visible events and changes. Once 
the weight is lifted it is part of weight-lifting to prevent 
other events from taking place and thus resist any change. 
1. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking p. 94 
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Ryle argues that an activity has the characteristics of 
effort, exhaustion, etc. but this is an argument which 
distinguishes the 'bringing about' from 'occurrence', which 
is effortless and does not exhaust. In other words, this is a 
distinction between activity and event. It should not be 
assumed from this that all activities will be exhausting. 
The features are disjunctive, in that if one feature is not 
present other features will be, like effort or intention. 
Sibley has taken full advantage of this difficulty in Ryle's 
account. He holds while discussing durational activities: "Of 
course, unlike such 'process activities', as lifting the 
weight, they [durational activities] ... cannot be done fast 
or slowly; so too with such activities (if we may call them 
such) as watching, listening for irrelevances, or attending. 
But even some of Ryle's activities, like angling, to which we 
might add floating, sea-bathing and diving, which do involve 
episodes and changes, cannot be fast or slow."^ Sibley's 
argument is designed to show that some of Ryle's activities 
cannot be done slowly or quickly and therefore do not adhere 
to the 'adverbial thesis'. But this is exactly what Ryle 
wants that there be neutral activities which can not be 
qualified by adverbs, so that he can talk about such 
activities which can be so qualified. An example which is 
1. Ibid., p. 95 
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more telling for Ryle's account, and we will see that Ryle 
himself admits to this difficulty, is that of a little girl 
at a birthday-party playing hide-and-go-seek. The little girl 
holds perfectly still behind the curtain. Would this count as 
an activity for Ryle? The obvious reply would be that it 
cannot be counted as activity for there is no doing, no 
neutral X-ing or physical movement. But it is odd, not to 
call it an activity. The oddness comes from the fact that 
ordinarily we consider action to be more than an event or 
events. Ryle here himself misses the point he had made 
earlier in the following passage: "His playing may be 
judicious or ill-judged, but his thinking how to play is not 
yet itself judicious or ill-judged thinking. It may be quick 
or slow thinking, and efficient or inefficient thinking; but 
he is not yet trying to think efficiently how to play, but 
only trying to play efficiently".^ This case is likewise, 
applicable to the little girl who is efficiently holding 
still. The adverbs are applicable and so the 'hiding behind 
the curtain' must be counted as an activity. It is not a mere 
event. 
Hamlyn points out : 'Behaviour', 'conduct', 'activity' 
and 'action' are words of one particular type, though there 
are differences of use between them. 'Movement', 'reaction'. 
1. Ryle, G. Collected Papers Vol. II, p.428. 
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'reflex', and the like are of a very different type".^ The 
latter are events simpliciter the 'occurrence', whereas the 
earlier are actions proper, Hamlyn has outlined some such 
distinction: "... reflex movements are not by themselves the 
sorts of movements which could constitute behaviour on 
particular occasions; reflex movements occur and are not made 
by the subject, they are not self-adjusting or purposive, in 
the sense that we could ask the subject why he made the 
movement".2 Hamlyn further clarifies his point:"We have seen 
that there are occasions on which we can describe the 
movements, but on which there is nothing that can be 
described as behaviour, though where the dividing line comes 
may will be a moot point. A reflex is clearly not a piece of 
behaviour".^ 
Later on Hamlyn had argued: "While physiologists knew 
little about the structure of the nervous system they were 
content to deal with such things as reflex action, which is 
essentially a movement in any sense, though not one which is 
made by a person, a reflex merely occurs, and we cannot ask 
for the reason for it, except, perhaps, in terms of a theory 
1. Hamlyn, D.W.: Behaviqir, p. 72 
2. Ibid., p. 67 
3. Ibid., p. 63 
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of evolution".1 This implies that where a reason can be 
assigned to an event we may talk about action. The 
'occurrence', in the physiological sense, is the reflex and 
the 'bringing about', as we have been arguing, is the 
action. Hamlyn aptly says : "Human movements are not all 
reflex-like, by any means, and there is some justice in the 
claim that the simple reflex is, in any case, an 
abstraction".2 The 'adverbial account' then is an attempt to 
overcome the ambiguity of the 'polymorphous account', in 
which thinking is argued to be an activity, but at times it 
is described in terms of reflex. The 'adverbial account', in 
order to avoid this ambiguity, denies that thinking is an 
activity. As to whether the adverbial account also denies 
reflexivity is open to questions, but nowhere it is 
explicitly rejected. What is also not clear from the 
exposition of Ryle's adverbial thesis is whether Ryle regards 
the mind then is a passive entity [that is recipient of 
events] or he is denying mind altogether, which he did not do 
in The Concept of Mind. The denial of 'mind as active' leads 
Ryle into difficulties particularly when he tries to explain 
the thinking of Le Penseur# which is ordinarily depicted by 
the present continuous verb, as a ''bringing about'. The 
1. Ibid., p. 64 
2. Ibid. 
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•adverbial account' is unable to cope with the mind qua 
pensive, the explication of which was the basic project of 
Ryle's papers. 
Ryle has elaborated a distinction on the descriptive 
plane: "There is, I think a good deal of promise in this 
assimilation of the thick description of what le Penseur is 
doing in saying things to himself to that of what the will-be 
lecturer is doing in lecture preparing".^ Although Ryle is 
only talking about thinking involved in 'saying things' but 
the distinction is applicable to all thinking, in his scheme 
of 'adverbial account'. 
Ryle distinguishes between 'thin' and 'thick' 
descriptions to differentiate between autonomous and non-
autonomous. The 'thick' description describes the non-
autonomous involvement: "The first point is that the 'thick' 
description of them [activities of a golfer] contain 
reference to having in mind will-be or may-be approach 
shots".2 The 'having in mind' is the adverbial qualification. 
A 'thin' description is, according to Ryle, a description of 
the purely physical 'goings-on'. Ryle distinguishes between a 
twitch of the eye and a wink to emphasize the difference 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers Vol. II, p. 492. 
2. Ibid., p.474. 
210 
between a 'thick' and 'thin' description. The mere twitch of 
the eye, a reflex, would need a 'thin' description, for it 
contains no adverbs. A wink would, on the other hand, be 
described by using adverbs and as such would be a 'thick' 
description, describing notices, intentions, purposes etc. 
The event described in winking is the same as the description 
of the twitch. In other words, it can be said that the purely 
physical goings-on are the same. 
The 'thinnest' possible description would contain no 
adverbs or reference to 'having in mind'. It would be a 
description of pure physical movements or reflexes. The 
adverbs, according to Ryle, are parasitic upon these 'thin 
descriptions', which they qualify. The 'thick' descriptions 
are rejoinders and explanations for human behaviour. They are 
the descriptions of engagements of agencies. A wink is 
described by Ryle as: "The signaler while acknowledging that 
he had not had an involuntary twitch but (i) had deliberately 
winked, (2) to someone in particular, (3) in order to impart 
a particular message,(4) according to an understood code, (5) 
without the cognisance of the rest of the company, will 
rightly deny that he had thereby done or tried to d© five 
separately do-able things."^ But in what sense are the 
categories mentioned above, non-autonomous? Can it not be 
1. Ibid. 481. 
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claimed that 'inner world processes' are capable of being 
carried on independently. Ryle rejects any such thesis, as we 
have already seen. 
A denial of independent or autonomous descriptions for 
Ryle amounts to a denial of independent or autonomous that 
which is being described. Sibley claims that an 'activity' 
occurs with its 'adverbial features': "Real activities that 
occur occur with their adverbial features, whether we 
described /fully or not."^ Sibley argues that a wink is 
described as * voluntary' and twitch is described as 
'involuntary' both of which are adverbs. Although Ryle does 
not say it clearly but he seems to imply everywhere that 
adverbs have opposites. The epithets voluntary or 
involuntary are not applicable to the movements of non-living 
things, for which the 'thinnest' possible description is 
sufficient. The description of 'doing' cannot possibly be 
'thin' enough to exclude any reference to the human agency 
which 'brings about' the movement. 
The forging of the distinction between 'thin' and 
'thick' descriptions betrays a conceptual confusion, in Ryle, 
over event and action. This distinction has been 
misappropriated by Sibley who says : "I suspect that one main 
1. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking, p.85. 
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reason why Ryle rejects an activity view is that, by doing 
so, he rules out certain untenable views that a popular but 
restrictive concept of an activity encourages. Ryle is, 
apparently, conunitted to this view himself, and so, in that 
sense is right to deny that thinking is an activity 
additional to the neutral X-ings. I shall call it the 
procession or process concept of an activity".-^  
We have already mentioned that Sibley accused Ryle of 
bringing in a philosopher's restriction. He says: "Ryle's 
denial of an activity account of thinking doubtless has 
important negative value. It excludes those objectionable 
suppositions already exposed in CM [The Concept of Mind] 
that tennis-playing or conversing must be interspersed with 
or controlled by burst of silent word or image manipulating, 
that the Penseur's secjuences of subvocal talk must be 
controlled by similar but more hidden sequences. But these 
views result from holding that thinking is an activity in the 
restricted process sense".2 But Ryle had already, prior to 
the 'adverbial account', rejected, in very clear terms, any 
process -view while considering thinking to be an activity. 
He, therefore, does not need to reject it again under the 
1. Ibid., p. 93 
2. Ibid., p. 95 
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guise of process activity. We feel that there is little 
weight in the argument advanced by Sibley. A more convincing 
argument would be, as we have seen so far, that Ryle has 
confused event and action. He has assumed that action is an 
event. It is the 'event' aspect, goings-on, occurrence of 
thought etc. which Ryle could not account for. At the end of 
the previous chapter we had come to the conclusion that there 
is an ambiguity in Kyle's treatment of thinking. It should 
now be said that Ryle, therefore,was compelled to opt for 
denying the view that thinking is an activity. The 
controversy over action and event is found even in 
contemporary philosophical literature. Bach puts the point by 
remarking that: "Plenty of ink has been spilled over these 
conundrums, but I am not going to review them here. Suffice 
it to say that they arise only on the supposition that 
actions are events."^ Ryle's treatment requires at the 
descriptive level to distinguish between an event and action. 
The 'adverbial account' is a suggestuJA that human 
actions are described with 'qualifying phrases' and sometimes 
these are adverbial. Ryle argues that thinking is such a 
qualifying phrase and is not itself an activity. Let us take, 
for example, Peter's walking at a time 't', it can exhibit 
the property of strangeness. It is the act of walking which 
1. Bach, K: Actions are not Events p. 117 
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can be said to be strange. If we take the event, which is 
described as Peter's walking, that is mere physical movement, 
at time 't', it cannot be said to be strange. This argument 
is forwarded by Cornman, who thereby distinguishes between 
action and event.^ This point can be put differently as 
Solomon does: "Actions are distinguished from events on the 
grounds that they are extentionally related in a complex way 
to actions which are intentional. Thus, my watering the 
groceries is an action though it is not intentional because 
it is so related to at least one act that is intentional, 
namely, my trying to water the flowers."2 The intentionality 
is one of the qualifying phrases, or in Ryle's terminology an 
'adverbial verb'.Ryle argues that thinking, or any 'adverbial 
verb', requires a neutral X-ing. Now the neutral X-ing cannot 
be anything but an event which requires qualifying. The 
actions are already qualified but events never are. Ryle 
presented his case, rather unfortunately, in a way which does 
not take him very far. He talks about neutral X-ing as if it 
is a doing. It is thus required by his thesis that this doing 
be qualified. As we have been arguing any doing, or human 
action, is already qualified and so is not neutral. In other 
1. Cf. Nathan, M.N.L.: Materialism and Action, p. 503 
2. Solomon, R.C.: Psychological Predicates p. 489. 
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words, Ryle requires that the doing be further qualified. But 
it is very difficult to see what advantage this would have. 
The difference between action and event is that an 
event cannot involve any intentionality. It is this very fact 
that has led philosophers like Hampshire to say that all 
actions are intentional. But this does not deny that actions 
involve an event or events. If actions were not different 
from events they would be 'colourless movements of events of 
the world', to use Solomon's phrase.^ The point is put rather 
aptly by Sher: "Actions after all have received philosophical 
attention precisely because they have seemed to be a 
metaphysically basic class, fundamentally different from and 
irreducible to, mere physical happenings".2 
We have noticed in Ryle's arguments that he wanted to 
know how many actions are performed in performing some mental 
activity. We had labelled this as 'enumeration principle', 
which presents a famous Rylean antagonism. Ryle repeats the 
same argument,in the adverbial account, he did when dealing 
with the example of wink. This shows clearly that there is a 
confusion between action and event in Ryle's arguments. He 
seems to be counting an event as an action. Bach cites the 
1. Ibid., p. 488 
2. Sher, G: Sentences in the Brain ? p. 98 
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example of a camper killing a coyote: "We can ask how many 
events the camper brought about and the answer is five (at 
least). However, we need not say how many actions he 
performed, i.e. whether his moving his finger, his pressing 
the trigger, his firing the gun, his shooting the Coyote, and 
his killing the Coyote count as one action or five. In a 
sense he did not perform a series of actions one after 
another but in one stroke brought about a series of events 
one after another".-^ But then are we to conclude that 
actions require a procession of events? No, we are to say 
that events, or mere physical happenings, are not actions. 
Ryle had confused that a procession of event*s necessarily 
means an action. He also thinks that a human event is always 
an action. Ryle counts both winking and twitching as 'doing' 
and does not differentiate between action and mere physical 
movement, reflex, happening, or event. A wink is brought 
about whereas a twitch is an occurrence. It is because Ryle 
does not distinguish between action and event that he could 
not explicitly acknowledge mental events, for he felt that 
this would mean mental action, which he wanted to deny. The 
reason why opening of window, to let in fresh air, is to be 
counted as a single action is not clear in Ryle's account. 
For him the number of events is synonymous with number of 
1. Bach, K: Actions are not Events, p. 118 
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actions. The reason why opening of window is to be counted as 
a single action is that once the initial movement has been 
made there is nothing further which needs to be done by the 
agent in opening the window or cooling the room. Similarly, 
when Smith pulls the trigger, nothing else needs to be done, 
such as firing the gun and killing Jones.1 But these 
examples should not mislead one to think that a number of 
events are required by an action, sometimes an action is 
simply the 'bringing about' of a single event. Actions, then, 
are the 'bringing about' of an event or events. 
Ryle cites the example of a golfer's practice approach 
shots and says: "The first point is that the 'thick' 
description of them [practice shots] contains references to 
having in mind. The second point is that practice shots are 
in some degree detached or disengaged from the conditions 
under which match approach shots have to be made .... I 
suggest already that his partial detachment from 
circumstances points up the road to le_ Penseur 's total or 
near total detachment from what exists and is going on around 
him."2 Ryle talks about an ascending parasitism leading to 
pensive thought which is 'pure voluntaries', he says: "As his 
circumstance dependence and apparatus dependence decrease, so 
1. Thalberg, I: When do causes take effect ? p. 583. 
2. Ryle, G. Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 474-475. 
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his practice actions approximate more and more closely to 
being 'pure voluntaries', that is, things the doing of which 
is within his absolute initiative and option."^ His 
repetitions are an emphasis on the theme: "Rather what he fie 
Penseurl is 'thinly' doihg is completely or in a high degree 
circumstance detached and apparatus free.... It is a pure or 
nearly pure 'voluntary'.... His pensiveness does not require 
total absence of visible X-ing, but the X-ing must be very 
much his own 'ad-lib'."2 The 'ad-lib' is the 'bringing about' 
of events. 
Ryle's arguments before he developed his view of 
'adverbial account' present a comprehensive description of 
thinking with both the 'bringing about' and 'occurrence' of 
thought being counted as thinking. The emphasis here, on 
'voluntaries', pure or nearly pure, raises suspicion. We may 
put the matter by using McCann's words, who says: 
"Accordingly, volition cannot be conceived as merely 
accompanying the actions performed by means of it. Rather, it 
is essential to them, being the key element in the process 
necessary for the results of those actions to count at all as 
1. Ibid., p. 475. 
2. Ibid., p. 478. 
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changes brought about the agent."^ Earlier McCann had said: 
"... volition too is thought and hence not possessed of a 
result."2 McCann takes volitions to be somewhat adverbial in 
nature, although he is not explicit. McCann's theme and 
treatment of violations.seems to be very much like Ryle's 
treatment of thinking. Thus, for McCann, volition gets no 
description as a verb. But as McCann points out, and as 
earlier maintained by Ryle, results are not necessary for 
volitions. Ryle is thus shifting his focus to results. His 
asserting of the tennis player's thinking as a paradigm 
betrays this shift. 
Davidson argues in similar way that actions are events, 
a 
Both Ryle and Davilson seem to agree on descriptions of 
actions: "If I fall down, this is an event whether I do it 
intentionally or not. If you thought my falling was an 
accident and later discovered I did it on purpose, you would 
not be tempted to withdraw your claim that you had witnessed 
an event".3 it may be inferred that Davidson's argument 
suggests that actions are events and nothing else. It is in 
some such fashion that Ryle describes thinking as an adverb. 
For Ryle there is a neutral X-ing which can be described 
1. McCann, H: Volition and Basic Action, p. 467. 
2. Ibid. p. 466 
3. Davidson, D: The Logical Form of Action Sentences, p.88 
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"thinly* or 'thickly'. The 'thick' descriptions comes from 
the adverbial phrases. But, as we have argued earlier, the 
X-ing cannot be an action, since all actions assume at least 
some adverbiality, therefore they cannot be neutral. Hamlyn 
rightly points out: "In any context, then, in which it is 
possible to describe a person's behaviour, it seems possible 
also to describe the movements exhibited by him. Such 
descriptions will not serve the same purpose, and do not 
belong to the same level of generality. Indeed, it is fair to 
call descriptions of behaviour interpretative. With movements 
we are concerned with physical phenomena, the laws concerning 
which are in principle derivable from the laws of physics. 
But the behaviour which we call 'posting a letter' or 
'kicking a ball' involves a very complex series of movements, 
and the same movements will not be exhibited on all occasions 
on which we should describe the behaviour in the same way. No 
fixed criteria can be laid down which will enable us to 
decide what series of movements shall constitute 'posting a 
letter'. Rather we have learned to interpret a varying range 
of movements as coming up to the rough standard which we 
observe in acknowledging a correct description of such 
behaviour as posting a letter"^ 
Hamlyn, D.W.: Behaviour, p. 62 
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Hamlyn's terminology is different to ours, he talks of 
movement and behaviour where we talk of event and activity. 
Hamlyn's account raises a pertinent point, which we, too, 
hinted at at the beginning of this chapter, that non-
describability of complex chronicles is not restricted to or u 
a special feature of thinking. 
Davidson has argued that in action - sentences, such as 
'X makes it happen that p' or 'X' brings about p, it is not 
only p which is an event but that the entire sentence is an 
event description. For Ryle p is an action and the entire 
sentence is a 'thin' description of action. Ryle would say, 
according to his 'adverbial account', that actions can be 
described with adverbial features, like*X makes it happen 
that p thinkingly or wittingly or intentionally'. Davidson 
has argued that inspite of adverbial features the action 
remains an event. Bach criticizes Davidson, and his criticism 
is equally applicable to Ryle: "Davidson conveniently ignores 
the difference between reading the phrase 'my falling down' 
as an action description and as an event description. As an 
action description it could be paraphrased as 'my bringing 
about my falling down', in which my falling down occurs as an 
event description."^ Ryle is correct in asserting that the 
1. Bach, K.: Actions are not Events, p.115. 
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sentence is an action-description but he is wrong in not 
acknowledging within it an event-description. Davidson is 
right in including an event description in action-sentence, 
but he is wrong in asserting that it is only an 
event-description. Neither of the philosophers acknowl-
edge that action is ' bringing about* of events. 
The advantage of analysis of action in terms of 
'bringing about' of events is aptly brought out by Bach: 
"Similarly, we need not worry about individuation in the case 
of actions, construed as instances of the relation of 
bringing about between agents and events. Since an action is 
performed if and only if someone has brought about an event, 
we need not count action but only agents and events".^ It is 
thus possible to bypass Ryle's objection of enumerating of 
actions. It is because of this difficulty in enumerating that 
Ryle abandons his arguments which favour the treating of 
thinking in terms of 'bringing about' or 'activity'. The rea-
son for rejecting actions, which are thinkings, should not be 
enumeration, for actions are relations and events embedded in 
them can be enumerated. The mental happenings or events 
should not be counted as actions not because the actions 
cannot be enumerated but because they are not actions at all. 
1. Ibid. p. 119 
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Ryle's 'adverbial account' evolves a paradigm, thinking 
of a tennis player, which has a precise manifestation and for 
which the adverbiality is appealingly appropriate. The 
movements of the tennis, player easily fulfils the criterion 
of description, by using verbs, since the movements are 
'brought about' by the player. Any further description would 
be qualified by adverbs. According to what we are arguing, 
the tennis player is active, going through actions and thus 
entitled to a 'description' in terms of verbs, and this 
activity can further be qualified by 'adverbs'. The change of 
locution which Ryle is proposing, runs counter to the 
ordinary usage of 'verb' and 'adverb'. The analysis we have 
been offering, as a criticism of Ryle, also shows that the 
tennis player's thinking can be analysed in terms of events 
which are embedded in action-sentences and these action-
sentences can be further qualified by adverbs. The weakness, 
of the Rylean thesiS/ becomes apparent when we come to analyse 
le Penseur's thinking. Ryle says, of ie Penseur; "Le Penseur 
is in some degree detached from what is going on around him; 
but the tennis-player's thinking almost consists in his whole 
and at least slightly schooled attention being given to, 
inter alia, the flight of the ball over the net, the position 
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of the opponents, the strength of the wind, and so on''.^  He 
says further; "He [ie Penseurl is detached, disengaged, 
absent, from all such doings."2 There seems to be no 
movements, which Ryle can offer, to describe le. Penseur 's 
activity, or 'verbs' which can be qualified by adverbs like 
thinkingly, attentively, carefully, studiously, intention-
ally, etc. For le Penseur the metaphor of 'adverb' breaks 
down, for we require 'thinking' to be a 'doing' which he is 
going through. In other words, we require 'thinking' to be 
treated as a verb as is ordinarily done, otherwise we find 
ourselves stumped for an activity and are forced to say that 
there is nothing which le Penseur is doing. Sibley has 
remarked: "If there is no reason to deny, and some to assert, 
that thinking is an activity in a less restricted sense, 
there may be little other than labels and locutions, to 
choose between...'!-^  We may infer that there are reasons to 
regard thinking as an activity, the change in locution does 
not give us any real advantage. In fact, the 'adverbial 
account' takes us t*\to a blind alley where we are unable to 
find an autonomous X-ing for JLe Penseur. 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 466 
2. Ibid. 
3. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking, p. 95 
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Sibley argues that in order to make his thesis 
acceptable, Ryle should establish more than that thinking is 
not an activity or that it is non-autonomous. Sibley suggests 
that Ryle must also establish that thinking does not include 
some other activity, additional to the X-ing, which is non-
autonomous and requires X-ing and ceases if X-ing ceases. 
Sibley remarks: "It seems indisputable that, with the 
Penseur, the tennis player and any other kind oC thinking, 
some more than zero degree of attention is necessarily 
involved."! Ryle does not accept the view that all thinking 
requires attention. He could easily argue that attention is 
not required for 'idle reverie'. Sibley's assertion, however, 
is a pointer, that some thinking has to be counted as 
activity. 
It is necessary for the acceptance of 'adverbial 
account' to accord le Penseur's thinking some activity. Even 
the idea of pyramiding of adverbs would require some activity 
to be the base as Ryle makes out: "Notice here, what I hope 
will turn out to be relevant, that adverbial verbs may 
pyramid ... Notice that none of these adverbs can get going 
unless the bottom one is attached to a non-adverbial verb or 
1. Ibid. 
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a partly non-adverbial verb in this case 'breakfasting'.^ The 
'adverbial account' fails to provide a 'non-adverbial verb' 
for le, Penseur 's thinking. The 'ascending parasitism' of 
adverbs requires a host which is not available. The 'thin' 
description, according to Ryle's thesis, is not possible for 
le Pensur's thinking. Any description of le Penseur's 
thinking is too 'thick' to be called non-adverbial, because 
the 'thinking verbs', which are ordinarily used for le 
Penseurf have been taken away and turned into adverbs and 
thus no verbs can be found. 
Foley points out that it is not only a relation of 
'bringing about' but also a relation of manner of 'bringing 
about' which can have a place in the construction of 
action-sentences. Foley says one could 'raise one's arm 
rapidly', therefore he argues adverbs, too, are relations of 
'bringing about'.^ it is this aspect, presumably, which led 
Ryle to suggest the notion of pyramiding: *'In this way. If I 
am eating my breakfast, you tell me to hurry over my 
breakfast. If I obey you, I do not by breakfasting, since I 
am doing that already, but by accelerating the rate of 
breakfasting. If I resent your command but dare not disobey 
it, then I am with reluctance obeying your command to hurry 
1. Ryle, G: Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 473. 
2. Foley, R.: Deliberate Actions, p.63 (note). 
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over my breakfast. I am reluctantly obediently hurriedly 
breakfasting... And so on, in principle, indefinitely."^ But 
here 'eating' is at the bottom rung of the pyramid and it is 
absolutely essential for the success of 'adverbial thesis' to 
establish a bottom rung . But we fail to find any such bottom 
rung for thinking of le Penseur. 
The last resort to find an activity to describe le 
Penseur's occupation would be to suggest that he is, 
may be, saying things to himself. Ryle considers this 
approach indirectly, for he says: "There is a good deal of 
promise in this assimilation of the thick description of what 
le Penseur is doing in saying things to himself to that of 
what the will be lecturer is doing in lecture-preparingly 
saying things to himself."2 we have already seen the 
arguments on this in the first chapter. This does not really 
help Ryle for it only means that if a lecturer is preparing a 
lecture he would be dealing with lingual expressions. 
Similarly le Penseur could also, for certain types of 
thinking, use lingual expressions. But this only indicates 
the necessity of language for particular types of thinking 
and not an activity. There are other vehicles or tools for 
1. Ryle, G.rCollected Papers, Vol. II, p.473-474. 
2. Ibid, p. 492. 
228 
thinking of le Penseur where no linguistic expression may 
ensue. The debate here is whether pure and naked thought is 
possible or not as Sibley points out: "I shall not presume to 
pronounce on whether Ryle intended this latter extreme 
position [the possibility of pure and naked thought]; 
certainly his own 'adverbial views* run counter to it. The 
Penseur's X-ing precisely are such things as manipulating 
words, tunes, images or diagrams, in mind's eye or ear; so 
either Ryle is not espousing the extreme view, or else that 
view is in prima-facie conflict with his later views."^ In 
the chapter on 'Logical Illegitimacy' we have pointed out 
that Ryle does not hold the 'extreme view'. 
Ryle says that 'thinking' is an adverb and requires 
some activity or verb to qualify just like hurrying does. 
Sibley says: "There are plenty of at least prima-facie 
activities that are non-autonomous in this sense, those for 
instance that require another activity as their object or 
result. Refereeing, timing, controlling ..., unless Ryle can 
show otherwise, to be activities requiring other activities 
as, in a broad sense, their objects and consequently not be 
related to the latter adverbially as Carrying is to 
running".2 we remarked above that the 'adverbial account' is 
1. • Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking p. 99 
2. Ibid., pp.85-86. 
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not so new, it is present in The Concept of Mind# in which 
thinking was taken to be analogous to refereeing, schooling, 
etc. The weakness of this view was pointed out in the first 
chapter of this thesis. Ryle has said in The Concept of 
Mind; "It [bird] is migrating tells not more stories, but a 
more pregnant story than that told by 'It is flying south'. 
It can be wrong in more ways and it is instructive in more 
ways".l Here the distinction indicated is the same as that 
between 'thick' and 'thin' descriptions. The 'thick' 
description thus contains 'adverbs' which describes the 
•manner of doing' or the 'thinking'. Ryle missed this point 
in 'The Concept of Mind' too. The expression 'It is 
migrating' is more pregnant for it is more like an 'action', 
as compa'gred to 'It is flying south' or 'It is flying' which 
are thinner than the former. 
The 'adverbial account' is an effort to find a via 
media between the Reductionist and Duplicationist extremes, 
as Ryle declares in the Introduction to the Collected Papers 
Volume II. It was 'behaviour' which enabled Ryle to overcome 
the Cartesian howler in 'The Concept of Mind' and he came to 
«^- conclusion that a narrower classification of it might provide 
the solution he was seeking. He thus attached the state 
1. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.136, 
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of having in mind' to behaviour but in doing so he lands 
himself into a near circularity as Armstrong points out: "... 
if ... 'behaviour' were to mean 'behaviour proper' [that is 
behaviour related to having in mind], then we would be giving 
an account of mental concepts that already presupposes 
mentality, which would be circular".^ Ryle cannot be charged 
with circulatory for he does not attempt any solution to le 
Penseur's thinking. He realized that his attempt to arrive at 
a solution was futile. 
Ryle expanded his notion of 'heed concepts', in The 
Concept of Mind; "Now patently one cannot order a person 
merely to pay heed, or merely to take notice. For the order 
to be obeyed or disobeyed, it must be understood as 
specifying just what is to be done with heed".2 it is in 
exactly this fashion that Ryle treats thinking in the 
'adverbial account'.^ He thus bracketed thinking with 'heed 
concepts'. It is a peculiarity of 'thinking' that it can at 
one time function adequately as a heed concept and at another 
resist any such label. The fact that heed concepts may not be 
'obeyable' does not, therefore, encail that thinking cannot 
be an activity. It would be a mistake to classify thinking 
1. Armstrong, D.M.: A Materialist Theory of Mind, p.84. 
2. Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind, p.187. 
3. Ryle, G.: Collected Papers, Vol.11, p.467. 
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entirely in with the category of heed. Searle has pointed 
out: "But the members of the directive class of speech acts-
orders, commands, requests, etc.; - and the members of the 
commissive class-promises, vows, pledges, etc. are not 
supposed to match an independently existing reality but 
rather are supposed to bring about changes in the world so 
that the world matches the speech act and to the extent that 
they do or fail to do that, we do not say they are true or 
false but rather such things as that they are obeyed or 
disobeyed, fulfilled, complied with, kept or broken".^ It is 
required by the directive class that changes be 'brought 
about' in the outside or external world. The command if 
obeyed requires physical manifestation. This externality, 
overtness, publicity, autonomous X-ing, etc. had tempted 
Ryle into explicating thinking in adverbial terms. To accept 
the 'adverbial' nature of thinking saves one from both the 
Reductionist and Duplicationist views. 
The perplexity which Ryle faced is reflected in his 
example of the 'platform waiters', which is an indication why 
the dispositional analysis was abandoned by him. The two 
'platform waiters' may behave in exactly the same agitated 
fashion, whereas one might be waiting for a train and the 
other might just be passing his time. There seems to be no 
1. Searle, J.: What is an Intentional State, p.76. 
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'outward criteria' to distinguish between the two, in the 
same way as there seems to be no 'outward criteria' for le 
Penseur's thinking. The same problem was posed by Descartes: 
"For just as there may be two clocks made by the same 
workman, which though they indicate the time equally well and 
are externally in all respects similar, yet in no wise 
resemble one another in the composition of their wheels, so 
doubtless there is an infinity of different ways in which all 
things that we see could be formed by the great Artif icer" .-'• 
This ticklish problem that arises in the Cartesian framework 
also troubled Ryle and it led him to the interpolations of 
the 'categorical basgists'. Since Ryle had abandoned his 
dispositional analysis of The Concept of Mind, calling it 
perfunctory, he could not resort to what Weiss offers: "For 
not only have we watched him react agitatedly to an instance 
that does not conform to the pattern to which' he is 
accustomed - behaviour that would not by itself lead us 
perhaps to inputs, reflection, we have in addition observed 
him, in response to his state of befuddlement, sit wide-eyed 
and stock-still, and then veritably leap to perform the acts 
that constituted the solution to his problem".2 Weiss goes 
on to suggest that only the 'total context' would help 
1. Descartes, R.: Principles of Philosophy, p.300. 
2. Weiss, D.D.: Prof. Malcolm on Animal Intelligence, p.92. 
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determine the nature of 'reflection'. Malcolm too proposes 
something similar: "In the case of a person we can find out 
whether the thought crossed his mind, either by overhearing 
him say that p, or by his subsequently testifying that the 
thought that p occurred to him".l The 'verb' required by the 
Rylean thesis of adverbiality should be the present-
continuous tense while no such activity can be assigned to le 
Penseur. Most probably because of this failure few 
philosophers gave serious consideration to this Rylean 
notion. 
1. Malcolm, N. : Thoughtless Brutes, p.17. 
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The Concept of Mind had left Ryle entangled in the 
problem/duality. The phrases which Ryle drew up, as analogies 
to explicate the 'mind qua pensive', such as refereeing, 
self-coaching, didactic t.alk, etc., showed that some kind of 
monitoring must be accounted for. Parry has portrayal the 
Rylean dilemma in these words: "However, Ryle cannot account 
for the way a disposition is exercised by allowing a second-
tier activity of monitoring or discriminating - even a non-
occult one because any second-tier activity could be an 
occult one; his strategy does not discriminate between occult 
and non-occult second-tier activities. So his anti-Cartesian 
program forces him to discount second tier activities as 
explanation of intelligent action".^ But, as per his project, 
Ryle could not abandon the anti-Cartesian stance and, 
therefore, could not take the risk of granting any 'second-
tier activity of monitoring', for he feared to be blamed for 
the slightest of hint of occultness. He, thus, proceeded to 
reconsider thinking, in dispositional first-tier terms, which 
threatened to mitigate his entire project. Lyons has 
remarked!"Ryle realised that an anti-Cartesian was in 
difficulty if he granted that thinking was occurrent. For the 
plausible possibilities open to the anti-Cartesian seem to be 
1. Parry, R.D.: Ryle's Theory of Action, p. 391 
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to reduce thinking to a brain state or to some subtle 
muscular activity, neither of which we can easily inspect or 
report on, and neither of which bear any ready connection to 
the content of our reports on our thoughts....".^ We have, 
already, seen in the chapter 'The Perfunctory Ryle'^ that 
Ryle could not fall back on brain states or subtle muscular 
movements, for they are not part of our awareness which we 
can report. He thus applied himself to the 'concept of 
thinking' to retract his anti-Cartesian stance. The main 
problem which Ryle faced was how to give an account of 
thinking which can cope with silent, intellectual, internal 
activity, for these activities seem to offer no behaviour and 
as such no 'outward criteria' can be obtained, and at the 
same time not having to talk of a second-tier disposition or 
activity. This sets the tone of the 'nomological framework' 
which Ryle wanted to offer. 
Ryle's attempt is not a streamlined progression but is 
a struggle, from one idea to another, with a common strand of 
externalizing the 'concept of thinking'. The initial step, 
which Ryle took, was the negative task of declaring the 
'Logical Illegitimacy'^ of various identifications of 
1. Lyons, W: Gilbert Ryle, p. 97 
2. See chapter I of the present thesis. 
3. See chapter II of the present thesis. 
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thinking. From this Ryle progresses to an assertion of a 
positive account. The declared 'heterogeneity' of activities 
lends itself directly to the 'polymorphous account', or an 
attempted 'meaning of thinking'/' The failures of the 
'polymorphous account', forces Ryle to abandon dispositional 
analysis, but not the anti-Cartesian project, and evolve the 
'adverbial account' of thinking, or the attempted reduction 
to 'grammar'2 of the whole issue. 
In his negative task Ryle struggles with one horn of 
the dilemma of thinking,as Ginnane depicts it,-^  viz. the 
argument that thinking consist of or is the screening of 
mental images, poping-up of ideas, etc. The other horn of the 
dilemma hangs on the notion that thinking may be explained as 
consisting of mental-events or acts. Ryle has successfully 
argued against any 'particulars' as composing or constituting 
thinking. At the same time he has very carefully and 
successfully avoided the extreme position which suggests the 
possibility of pure and naked thought. But in order to do 
away with the notion that thinking is a procession of events 
Ryle had to perpetually call up arguments and cite exampleJ of 
1. See chapter III of the present thesis. 
2. See chapter IV of the present thesis. 
3. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts p. 388 
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'occurrence of thought'. He managed to establish that there 
need not be any processes, in thinking. But he did it at the 
cost of allowing an argument, which he should have avoided 
altogether and which proved to bejliability in his subsequent 
positive accounts. Ihe first positive account is the argument 
that thinking is an activity. 
We have found that the 'polymorphous account' springs 
from an ambiguity. Thinking is treated both as the 
'occurrence of thought' and 'act of thought'. The 'occurrence 
of thought' forces Ryle to implicitly accept 'mentality'. It 
is this ambiguity, of which Ryle was not fully aware, •fehat 
made Ryle hold the view that the activities and their 
features are so heterogeneous that nothing common or 
recurrent can be found in them. It is here, as we have tried 
to show, that Ryle misconcieves 'action'. Parry has remarked: 
"That he (Ryle) did not fully appreciate the nature of the 
problem is shown by the way his own account of action 
presents us with the problem all over again [in the papers on 
thinking], without the issue of occult."^ Ryle treats both 
'occurrence of thought', and 'act of thought' as activities, 
which made him avoid the concept of 'family resemblance' for 
the analysis of the concept of thinking. It is the 
'occurrence of thought', which, obviously, would not be like 
1. Parry, R.D.: Ryle's Theory of Action, p. 392 
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any act of thought, that does not allow Ryle to talk of 
•family of meanings'. Ryle in his effort to find the meaning 
of thinking which would cover all instances of thinking, 
takes up too broad a class to fall under the concept of 
thinking. It must be recognized that it was inevitable for 
him to broaden the class of thinking in order to oppose the 
official theory which portrayed the concept of thinking as 
monomorphous. x 
Ryle abandoned the notion of thinking being a 
'polymorphous account' and went on to deny thinking the 
status of an activity at all. The reason for his reaction 
might have been that he realized that even with the 
'polymorphous account' of thinking there still was room 
enough for suggesting that the activity of thinking at times, 
at least, can be said to be internal, especially the higher-
order thinkings of J^ Penseur. It should be suggested that 
Ryle could have reviewed his concept of activity here. We 
have argued that the 'polymorphous account' should be 
abandoned because of the ambiguity in it. Parry suggests: "At 
this point, one might advise Ryle to try either changing his 
strategy or coming up with an account of the relation between 
first-tier activity and second-tier monitoring which avoids 
his arguments against the occult. In considering these two 
alternatives, however, I believe that we can see the head of 
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the issue - i.e. that Ryle's anti-Cartesian program led him 
to misplace the logical problem. The problem is not whether 
the second tier monitoring is occult or not. Rather it is in 
what way the second tier monitoring activity is related to 
the first tier activity. Once we see this we can then see 
that Ryle's strategy is not dictated by the nature of the 
problems but by his anti-Cartesian program".•'• Ryle does not 
however heed to the advice even after the failure of the 
initial reconsideration of the 'concept of thinking', viz. 
the 'polymorphous account'. Instead he abandons the notion of 
activity altogether in order to deny mentality. He, most 
probably, felt that abandoning the notion of activity would 
rid him of the concept of 'mental acts'. 
The 'adverbial account', then is an outright rejection 
of the activity view of thinking. It was for the first time, 
that we found ourselves fully exposed to Ryle's 'concept of 
action', on the basis of which Ryle denied that there are 
acts of thinking. We found that Ryle had been including in 
action not only 'bringing about' of events but also the 
'occurrence' of events. In other words, there seems to be no 
distinction, for Ryle, between events and actions. He, like 
Davidson, argues that actions are events. In The Concept of 
Mind, he did not deny 'mental events', at least, explicitly, 
1. Ibid, p. 391 
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for he included them under the category of 'intellectual 
performances' or 'mental actions or performances'. In The 
Concept of Mind Ryle only denied that physical activity is 
preceded or accompanied by 'mental actions' or 'intellectual 
performances' under the guise of 'intellectualist error'. We 
found the same notion of action in play in 'Logical Illegiti-
macy', where both actions and events of thinking are used to 
complete the 'negative task', which was to rid 'thinking' of 
its mis-identifications - a philosophical behaviourists' 
project. The 'polymorphous account' lands itself into an 
ambiguity and it can be said that thinking as an activity, 
for Ryle, includes thinking events which cannot yield 
results. But then thinking events could occur privately. This 
ran counter to the Rylean project and he abandoned the notion 
that thinking is an activity. He presented thinking as an 
'adverbial verb', hoping to rid thinking of the supposition 
of in foro interne. It was presumed by Ryle that since 
adverbs require verbs to qualify, then if thinking is taken 
to be adverbial all that would be needed is a verb or 
activity in which JLe Penseur can be said to be engaged. In 
this fashion thinking would be rid of. the bogey of activity 
and would be an 'adverbial verb' qualifying the activity 
[physical] of le Penseur. Thus, Ryle thought he would obtain 
much sought after externality for thinking, of a ie Penseur> 
by talking of external or physical activity as being done in 
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a thinking manner. Parry joints out: "What makes an action 
intelligent is not the kind of disposition it is an exercise 
of, but the way in which the disposition is exercised. No 
matter what disposition an action is done from, we can always 
ask whether it v;as done intelligently" .-'• The apparent 
advantage proved to be too strong a temptation for Ryle to 
resist. But Ryle failed in his endeavour. 
The failure again stems basically from the kind of view 
which Ryle holds about activity. Although, the 'adverbial 
account', if we leave aside its failure, does, point out that 
there is a possibility of talking about the thinking of the 
tennis-player or of the conversationalist as the paradigm 
case of thinking, instead of reflection - which has been the 
traditional paradigm, and which is why all thinking is 
treated as if there were internal episodes carried on apart 
from what is visibly or audibly noticed. Sibley makes the 
following comments in this regard: "Ryle's denial of an 
activity account of thinking doubtless has important negative 
value. If excludes those objectionable suppositions already 
exposed in CM [The Concept of Mind] - that tennis playing or 
conversing must be interspersed with or controlled by bursts 
of silent word or image manipulating, that the Penseur's 
1. Ibid, p. 390 
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sequences of subvocal talk must be controlled by similar but 
more hidden sequences".^ Ryle may have achieved his target 
if he had been able to locate a bottom-rung or physical 
activity or 'thin' description for le Penseur. 
Sibley writes further : "...there is nothing to be 
qualified adverbially [in the case of 'listening 
attentively'] .... what it may require is no X-ing, but 
various non-doings, not stamping,not shouting, etc."^ we are 
faced with the problem of finding an X-ing for ie Penseur, 
who is sitting idly on a rock and appears to be doing 
nothing, in the Rylean sense of not exhibiting any physical 
behaviour. Is it not then possible, in accordance with 
Sibley, to call a non-action, which is the avoiding of any 
action, the disengagement, an action? In order to do this we 
would need to introduce the category of 'non-actions', which 
would include all cases of physical inactivity, or avoidance 
of physical activity. 
Ryle in dealing with JLe Penseur does mention his 
disengagement, circumstance detachment and his freedom from 
the use of apparatus, which might be called the 'negative-
atmosphere' and which jLe Penseur needs as a matter of 
1. Sibley, F.N.: Ryle and Thinking, p. 95 
2. Ibid. p. 87 
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necessity for conducting his thinking. This 'negative-
atmosphere' might be said to be created by the 'non-actions' 
of le Penseur. These 'non-actions' are the 'voluntaries' 
mentioned by Ryle as the hall mark of ie Penseur's thinking. 
Ryle says at the beginning of The Concept of Mind; "It 
was not until the Middle Ages that people learned to read 
without reading aloud."^ He furthers the idea by adding: 
"They even come to suppose that there is a special mystery 
about how we publish our thoughts instead of realizing that 
we employ a special artifice to keep them to ourselves".2 The 
special artifice is not specified by Ryle. But whatever the 
artifice many concepts will fall under it, such as 
refraining, abstaining, keeping a secret and waiting. The 
main feature of this class of activities is the non-doing of 
something. It is because of the absence of 'bringing about' 
of events, at least the observable type, which is the 
characteristic of these concepts, they have no members which 
are public or external events. 
Thinking, on the higher-level or reflection, 
similarly,has no public events falling under it. Reflection 
then is a class which has no public events as its members. 
1. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p. 28 
2. Ibid. 
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Palmer remarks:"Refraining from doing something, like 
thinking, has no constituents at all, or rather, if we are 
inclined to ask for its constituents we show a 
misunderstanding of what it is that is being done. It is 
apparent that whole hosts of things we do are, like 
refraining, 'factually hollow"."^ The 'factually hollow' is 
not entirely correct. In Psychology the concept of action-
potentials shows that for certain activities we can detect 
minute muscular movements by use of electrodes, which if not 
curtailed would result in full-blooded public events. The 
'factually hollow' means that there is no possible public 
detection of the events by the ordinary senses. Ryle is 
claiming an 'internalization' of otherwise public events. For 
he cites the example of 'reading to oneself silently', so 
that another cannot without further data distinguish between 
the person reading or the person simply staring at the book 
with reading like movements of the eye. The 'waiting-
example', which Ryle gives, is also a pointer to the same 
thing. It is the artifice which prohibits the events from 
becoming public, but the non-publicity is not like the 
privacy of the Cartesian hermetic cell. There is nothing 
mysterious. 
The internalization of movements develops the 
inhibitions, as Hudson says: "So, knowing how to do things in 
1. Palmer, A: Ryle Cogitans , p.47 
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one's head - and a very young child does not know how to do 
this but has to find out - logically presupposes knowing how 
to do them overtly".•'• Hudson relates the entire thing to 
learning: "Indeed when we have mastered the art of doing 
things in our heads we can dispense with all such 
movements".2 He further qualifies himself by saying: "This 
way of making inhibiting movements by producing muscular 
contractions in the limbs or organs to be moved, has to be 
learnt".-^  Hudson gives the 'inhibitory movements' all those 
features which Ryle allocate to thinking: "Inhibiting is the 
successful culmination of certain activities or the 
successful completion of some task. It does not designate 
some special activity or act, or way of being occupied. 
Nevertheless we often use the word in order to characterize 
actions and efforts in terms of the kind of achievement to 
which they have led. This practice is very common, for 
instance, we often use words such as 'planning'; 'deciding'; 
and 'deducing'; in the same way".'^  But then he goes on to 
1. Hudson, A: Why We cannot Witness or Observe what goes on 
'In our Heads'., p. 222. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid, p.223 
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add: "Now doing something in one's head involves making these 
inhibitory movements, although making them does not 
constitute doing something in one's head".l Ryle presented 
similar arguments in The Concept of Mind in support of his 
view: "That is why such operations [humming silently] are 
impenetrably secret not that words or notes are being pro-
duced in a hermetic cell, but that the operations consist of 
abstentions from producing them. Very likely, too, people who 
imagine themselves producing noises tend to activate slightly 
those muscles which they would be activating fully, if they 
were singing or talking aloud, since complete abstention is 
harder than partial abstention".^ Ryle is here anticipating 
the notion of action potentials. But for Ryle these 'slight 
muscular movements' are not publicly observable. It would 
otherwise be easy to make these movements the physical 
activity ['verb'] so desperately needed for ie Penseur '5 
thinking. Armstrong too suggests something similar:"The 
answer is that behaviour must have as its objective the 
actualization of the disposition or the prevention of 
actualization".3 it is thus arguable that Ryle could attempt 
to make 'the prevention of actualization' the verb qualified 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p. 255 
3. Armstrong, D.M.: A Materialist Theory of Mind, p. 334 
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by the adverb 'thinkingly' to depict the doing of jLe Penseur. 
Ryle could have easily adopted this approach, for he 
elaborates many similar cases, for example he says: "They 
[boxers] may be going through only one set of movements, yet 
they are making these movements in a hypothetical and not in 
a categorical manner .... Sham-fighting is, to put it 
crudely, a series of calculated omissions."^ Ryle repeats 
himself again a little later: "Somewhat as the boxer, when 
sparring, is hitting and parrying in a hypothetical manner, 
so the person with a tune running in his head may be 
described as following the tune in a hypothetical manner."2 
Ryle could attempt to use the descriptions of 'hypothetical 
activities' and then argue that 'thought-adverbs' qualify 
them. 
But there are serious objections to Ryle doing this. 
Ryle requires for his 'adverbial account' some 'overt 
activity', a doing which is 'publicly observable'. Palmer has 
objected by saying: "We have here a kind of doing that can 
take all the adverbial constructions of thinking and yet 
there is a sense in which there is nothing which these ad-
verbs modify".-^  in the Rylean sense, the 'adverbs' are not 
1. Ryle, G: The Concept of Mind, p. 247 
2. Ibid. p. 252 
3. Palmer, A: Ryle Cogitans, p.47 
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able to modify anything. The 'neuro-physiological hookup' is 
not allowed by Ryle which can be said to give us awareness of 
these 'non-actions' Ryle requires that the verbs, in the 
action-sentences that are qualified by adverbs of thinking 
depict physical activities, which supports his anti-Cartesian 
project. Ewing portrays the Rylean position, which denies the 
notion of 'mental act', in the following words:" there 
are no mental processes [or activities] of thinking or coming 
to know or to believe, and that in consequence the words 
referring to these can only be understood 
behaviouristically...."^ Ryle takes up a narrow and re-
stricted view of behaviour, equating it with physical, overt 
and publicly observable. 
Another reason why any such account of verbs for le 
Penseur cannot be accepted by Ryle is that these inhibitory 
events cannot be counted as constituting the 'thinking'. If 
the 'verbs' are taken to be these 'inhibitory movements' or 
'non-actions' then a duality of events can creep in. There 
would be those events which are inhibitory and those that go 
towards the production of results of le. Penseur's thinking. 
The 'non-actions' cannot by themselves yield results which 
le Penseur's thinking normally and ordinarily does. Ryle had 
1. Ewing, A.C.: Mental Acts, p. 78 
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realized this duality in The Concept of Mind, for he says: 
"The central point illustrated by these cases [s.a. sham-
fighting etc.] is that a mock-performance may be unitary as 
an action though there is an intrinsic duality is its 
description,"^ 
A further reason for not-accepting 'non-actions' is 
that it would prove to be an unnatural locution and one which 
cannot be qualified by 'thought-adverbs', such as careful, 
etc. This will leave us in exactly the same situation as of 
the last chapter where ordinary verbs of thinking were found 
not to be qualifiable by 'thought-adverbs'. 
The point which emerges most strongly from this thesis 
and is further substantiated from the exploration of the 
above possibility, is that 'thinking' will have to be 
considered from the angle of actions and events. It may be 
concluded that a meaningful description of thinking can only 
emerge from talking about 'thinking activities' in terms of 
'bringing about', that is relating of events to agents. But 
to think of thinking as just activities would also be a 
mistake. We need to deal with thinking, where it is not an 
activity, in terms.of 'occurrences'. It is because of this 
need to talk about actions and events that some kind of 
1. Ryle, G: The Cocept of Mind, p. 247. 
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plausibility seems to appear in the argument for 'non-
actions' . 
Thinking must be described both as 'occurrence' and 
•action' if it is to consistently cover all the instances of 
thinking. Thinking can at place be the name given to simply 
the 'occurrence of thought', like in 'idle reverie'. At other 
times it will be talked of as 'bringing about' of results, 
like in multiplying, reflecting etc. But this division of 
thinking might not be acceptable. The division, as we have 
been arguing, is only apparent. It is 'event' which will be 
the basic component of the description of thinking and that 
'bringing about' of event will be called an act of thinking. 
Action, in other words, must be viewed as a relation between 
agent and event. The notion that actions are events will have 
to be abandoned, as the attempted analysis of thinking in 
this thesis shows. There is a need in the theory of action to 
distinguish between actions and events, otherwise we end up 
with the kind of folly that we have investigated. 
In our view any such attempts which try and postulate 
accounts of externalizing thinking is bound to fail. Ryle 
must be praised for his continuous struggle towards this end. 
The history of philosophy does not show any other attempt at 
an analysis of thinking with such devotion and fervour. But 
this thesis shows that the attempt failed because of Ryle's 
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project of demolishing the Cartesian 'internality' of the 
concept of thinking. Had he been more concerned simply with 
the describing of thinking, as consistently as possible, 
entirely different results would have been achieved. Ryle's 
failure can be ascribed to his obsession with his anti-
Cartesian programme. Skillen has rightly pointed out: "Melden 
is concerned, like Ryle, to reject the ghostly thrust of 
volitions, but like Ryle, it seems to me, he leaves up in the 
air the issue of the relation between a human agency and a 
full physiological account, extending higher up than the 
muscles of the arm, of the arm's being up there".•'• The 
quotation is not meant to serve as an advice, rather as a 
pointer that there are different possibilities of exploration 
which Ryle could have taken up but for his preoccupation with 
his project. 
• This study, in a way, also shows the inadequacy of 
linguistic philosophy in dealing with the concept of 
thinking. It has been found,to use Ginnane's words, that 
thinking is not an easily remedial linguistic lacuna which we 
are confronted with.^ The following assertion of Palmer is 
pertinent: "The movement into the linguistic sphere turned 
out to be a blind alley; a gigantic twist in the argument, a 
1. Skillen, A.; Mind and Matter, p. 518. 
2. Ginnane, W.J.: Thoughts, p. 385 
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misguided attempt to find acceptable proxies for illusive 
philosophical subjects. Its parallel in The Concept of Mind 
accounts for the behaviouristic tendency that many have 
detected in it which is in its turn quite foreign to its 
central thesis: that to think in terms of minds and bodies is 
to commit a gigantic category mistake".-^ The blown up picture 
of the 'misguided attempt* is present in Ryle's efforts to 
cope with the 'concept of thinking*. We had mentioned in the 
last chapter that 'adverbs' require 'verbs', for Ryle, like 
for Frege, concepts require objects for saturation. 
Linguistic Philosophy is an offshoot of the theory of meaning 
which Frege propagated. It is not surprising that Ryle finds 
himself, in the end, with the Fregean failure. Ryle failed 
to find a plausible explication of thinking, the concept, 
because of a lack of verbs for ie Penseur's thinking. Frege, 
on the other hand, struggled with the notions of concepts and 
objects but could not provide a satisfactory explication. 
Plamer comments on this issue: "Concepts are so to speak 
logically hollow. And while no doubt it is true that concep-
tual investigations are not investigations into what 'le 
Penseur' is doing it seems equally clear that the possibility 
of conceptual investigations needs to be taken into account 
in understanding what 'Le Penseur' is doing. The logical 
1. Palmer, A: Ryle Cogitans, p. 48 
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hollowness of concepts requires its parallel in the factual 
hollowness of thinking. It is this factual hollowness of 
thinking that is summed up in Wittgenstein's dicta 'you won't 
find out what thinking is by watching a man when he 
thinks... The substitution of 'expressions' for 'concepts' in 
the pursuit of conceptual investigations [the method Ryle 
adopted] was in the end a mistake and its parallel in the 
philosophy of mind was the supposition of some mental doings 
that could then take modifications."1 
We must conclude that Ryle believed that 'thinking' is 
the final sticking point of the Cartesians. And to overcome 
the official theory an alternative framework is required. 
But this will not be possible unless thinking is dealt with 
adequately enough. Ryle's account of thinking ends in 
failure, but it is in itself an achievement that he prepared 
the ground for further enquiry into the realm of thinking. 
1. Ibid, p. 47. 
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